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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers how to establish respect for labour rights.  It aims to inform 
the analysis of compliance problems and create a diagnostic approach to 
implementing labour rights.  The ultimate goal is to provide insight into the 
interventions necessary to progressively implement labour rights as defined in 
international law.   
 
The project creates a conceptual framing of labour rights by joining two 
theoretical approaches: institutions theory and compliance theory.  Drawing on 
institutions theory from political economy, the thesis reframes labour rights 
regulations, as holistic institutions comprised of rules, norms and actual 
behaviours, the so-called ‘rules of the game’ in employment.  In this context, 
problems in implementing labour rights are understood as employment practices 
that are embedded in a web of formal and informal rules governing work within 
society.  Once, reframed in institutional terms, employment practices that violate 
labour rights can then be analyzed and shortcomings identified using compliance 
theory.  Compliance theory is well suited to institutional approaches because it, 
like institutions theory treats norms, rules and behaviours as critical components 
in achieving compliance. 
 
The thesis integrates the framework into a diagnostic methodology and tool for 
comparison of labour rights compliance among the countries that are parties to the 
Dominican Republic, Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). It 
applies the methodology to two cases.  The first case examines obligatory 
overtime and trafficking and the second focuses on freedom of association. The 
analyses are based on publicly available documentary evidence from distinct 
perspectives such as the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU), 
the United States State Department Human Rights Reports and ILO Committee of 
Experts reports and observations.   
 
The thesis concludes that the diagnostic methodology can help to uncover 
institutional patterns associated with labour rights compliance problems as well as 
problems with the international legal norms themselves. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
I. Introduction 
A. Statement of Problem 
 
The purpose of this research project was to develop a diagnostic tool to 
help establish respect for and enforcement of labour rights.   Despite almost 
universal adoption of international labour rights conventions, there is widespread 
non-compliance. This gap between widely-accepted legal obligations and their 
persistent violation presents a compelling challenge.  Such gaps have been called 
“the most significant problem in the field of human rights” (Freeman 2008 p. 1).  
Historically, the gaps between rights in law and in practice were considered the 
realm of lawyers and legal academics that primarily focused on the formulation of 
legal standards and their interpretation by courts (Galligan & Sandler 2004 p. 25).  
Increasingly, social scientists and socio-legal scholars have turned their attentions 
and conceptual tools to look at the social and political conditions that affect 
compliance (Galligan & Sandler 2004 p. 25).    
Policy debates about international labour standards and how to improve 
compliance are often polarized or compartmentalized, mirroring the historical 
separation between pro and anti labour standards camps as well as divisions 
between legal and social perspectives.  Some argue that the problem is 
predominantly in the formulation, interpretation, and enforcement of laws, while 
others focus on social and economic problems contributing to violations.  Labour 
and human rights activists have advocated for trade sanctions as the best 
mechanism for achieving enforcement of these universal standards and have paid 
less attention to other labour-standard enforcement mechanisms.  This trend has 
been particularly evident since the World Trade Organisation (WTO) broadened 
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its scope of regulation to include enforcement of other legal regimes such as 
intellectual property protection.  
B.  Aims, Goals and Objectives 
This dissertation aims to inform analysis of enforcement problems and 
policy responses by creating a diagnostic tool and approach to implementing 
labour rights.  The goal is to provide insight into the interventions and processes 
necessary to progressively implement labour rights as defined in international law.  
For this purpose, the project creates a diagnostic tool: (1) to understand and frame 
labour rights as institutional employment practices; (2) to enable systematic 
comparison of these employment practices to relevant compliance obligations in 
ILO Conventions, and (3) to help identify and suggest areas for possible 
interventions to improve congruence between domestic employment practices and 
ILO obligations as well as possible shortcomings and contradictions within the 
ILO Conventions themselves.   
The tool is based on a conceptual framing of labour rights by joining two 
theoretical approaches:  institutions theory and compliance theory.  Drawing on 
institutions theory from political economy, the dissertation reframes labour market 
regulations related to labour rights as holistic institutions, comprised of rules, 
norms and actual behaviours, the so-called ‘rules of the game’ of employment.  In 
the context of this reframing, problems implementing labour rights are not just 
violations of international legal norms but are employment practices that are 
embedded in a web of formal and informal rules governing work within a society.  
The conceptual tools underpinning the dissertation have been applied in 
comparative employment systems and politics but here are applied to problems of 
labour rights (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2002; Helmke and Levitsky 2006).  
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Once reframed in institutional terms, employment practices that violate 
internationally recognised labour rights can then be analyzed and shortcomings 
identified using compliance theory. In this way, institutional shortcomings can be 
diagnostically matched to compliance interventions.  Compliance theory is well 
suited to institutional approaches because it, like institutions theory treats norms, 
rules and behaviours as critical components in achieving change and compliance. 
C.  Research Approach 
  The idea for this research grew out of my experience organizing immigrant 
workers in the building services industry in Boston, Massachusetts.  The building 
services industry in Boston is dominated by immigrants from the Dominican 
Republic and Central America.  As an organizer I would visit many office 
buildings in the mornings and afternoons at shift change.  In the course of these 
visits I began to notice that I was seeing the same Dominican workers at different 
buildings but they would be wearing a different nametag for each building.  I had 
stumbled upon an employment practice that violated the law.  Had the workers 
worked at the second building under their own name, the employer would be 
required to pay them time and one half overtime pay.  By working under a second 
name, the worker received extra pay but at their regular hourly rate without 
overtime premium pay.  Dominican supervisors arranged the work schedules 
insulating higher management from knowledge or responsibility.  The union did 
not object.  The workers paid union dues twice based on each name and job.   
In effect, the violation of the overtime law was an informal but regular 
employment practice and employers, workers and the union received different 
distributional benefits from the violation.  After a city-wide strike in which many 
of the janitors’ demands for health care and pay were met, there came to be an 
enhanced confidence among workers regarding their collective power.  For the 
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first time, as an organizer, I began to hear complaints from workers about being 
forced to work under two different identities as part of the overtime avoidance 
scheme.  What had formerly been an informal workable practice between workers, 
employers and the union became a problem.  The union reformed its dues 
systems, allowing dues refunds to its members who worked multiple jobs (even 
under different names) and workers increasingly insisted that additional work time 
be paid at overtime rates.  Employers reacted by restricting extra work 
opportunities to avoid overtime. 
The experience working with immigrant workers from the Dominican 
Republic and Central America raised the possibility that we think about labour 
rights violations in the wrong way.  As I had seen in the case of overtime and 
multiple nametags, violations were not aberrations from the system but rather an 
integral component of the system.  It was also striking that such an integral, well-
known employment practice could exist ‘off the books’ completely informally and 
without explicit knowledge of the employer’s top management or the union’s top 
leadership even though both actors benefited from its continuance.  Also, of note 
was that the equilibrium allowing the practice was disturbed by a successful strike 
and the new equilibrium entailed changes in behaviour by workers, the union and 
the employer.    
This experience led to three avenues of inquiry.  The first was to better 
understand the societies and employment systems of the countries from which the 
immigrant janitors had come.  The second was to identify what conceptual tools 
could be used to understand labour rights violations as an integral part of an 
employment system rather than as an aberration.  The third was to explore 
whether this knowledge could be usefully applied in real cases of labour rights 
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violations to help guide interventions to improve compliance.   Based on these 
goals, the methodology of the project became a search for such a conceptual 
framework based on an examination of the employment systems in the countries 
from which the janitors had come.  Once the framework was created, two case 
studies were undertaken with specific labour rights based on a qualitative 
comparative analysis on forced labour and freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.  The research examined six Spanish-speaking countries composing the 
Dominican Republic Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).  
The countries are Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua.   For purposes of the research, the ILO Conventions 
underlying Core Labour Standards (CLS) are examined in place of an imprecise 
notion of labour rights.  
D.  Plan for the Remainder of the Dissertation 
In this research project, institutional arrangements associated with several 
aspects of core labour standards will be compared in the six countries. The 
remainder of the introduction explains the rationale for the selection of core 
labour standards and countries, the reasons for undertaking the study at this time, 
relevant debates in the literature and the selection of cases for purposes of 
comparison.  Chapter two presents the steps in the research process over the 
course of the project as well as an examination of labour rights monitoring 
methodologies in the literature, their limitations, the methodology adopted for this 
project and identification of obstacles to be overcome in the project.   
Chapter three presents the countries in comparative context based on the 
country studies undertaken as part of the research.  To facilitate comparisons that 
are made in the case studies, the chapter explores a system for comparing the 
countries in accordance with frameworks developed by Evans (1995) and 
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Standing (1991).  These frameworks are not intended to be an outcome of the 
thesis but were necessary to facilitate the sorting and comparing of the countries.  
Chapter three also provides some historical context and profiles of the countries in 
the study. 
Chapter four presents the diagnostic tool after a review of the literature 
and theoretical basis for the tool in institutions theory from political economy and 
compliance theory from international law.  The chapter first explains and then 
synthesizes and matches both of the theoretical bases.  The compliance theory 
adopted for use in the tool is based on the work of Harold Koh (1997; 1998).  The 
chapter then explains the tool on two levels: the first being the international level  
(Table 4.2). At this international level the text of ILO Conventions are adopted 
through compromise and represent institutional settlements at the international 
level among ILO social partners.  Once adopted, the institutional settlement is 
further altered at the international level as a result of interpretation and 
enforcement by the ILO Committee of Experts through its process of supervision 
of countries that ratify the Conventions.  
The chapter then explains the domestic level of the diagnostic tool (Table 
4.3).  If a country ratifies the ILO Convention, then the Convention text as 
interpreted by the Committee of Experts represents a set compliance obligations 
for the country.  At this domestic level, domestic institutional arrangements can be 
systematically compared with compliance obligations and specific areas of 
incongruence can be identified as well as possible interventions.   
Chapter five presents the first case study on forced labour in the form of 
obligatory overtime and trafficking.  The Chapter presents the historical context 
for the ILO Conventions governing forced labour as well as the compliance 
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obligations for each kind of forced labour examined.  The two forms of forced 
labour are also compared in terms of compliance obligations and institutional 
patterns among the countries.    
Chapter six presents the second case study on freedom of association and 
right to collective bargaining.  This case study is different from forced labour 
since freedom of association is really a compound right composed of many 
components.  The case study first presents an examination of the historical process 
by which the Conventions were adopted and the compliance obligations that 
resulted from their adoption as well as subsequent interpretation that significantly 
expanded on the rights explicitly found in the texts of the Conventions.  Finally, 
chapter seven presents a brief discussion of concluding thoughts about the 
research project.  
II.  Background on the Project 
A. Why Core Labour Standards? 
 This research project is based upon evidence of compliance and non-
compliance with rights that are among the ILO four Core Labour Standards: (1) 
abolition of forced labour, (2) abolition of child labour, (3) elimination of 
discrimination in employment and (4) freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining.  Although there are numerous labour rights frameworks that 
could provide the basis for this research project, including the Decent Work 
Initiative of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), there are three reasons 
for selecting rights within the Core Labour Standard framework.  These are (1) 
universality, (2) comparability, and (3) adequacy of evidence. 
 First, the four Core Labour Standards have been ‘elevated’ to universally 
accepted labour rights since the ILO 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (ILO 1998 a).  These “core” rights are enumerated in eight 
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previously existing ILO conventions but the Declaration applied the “principles” 
underlying the Conventions to all ILO member states by virtue of their 
membership in the ILO, regardless of whether they have ratified the specific 
conventions (ILO 1998 a, Eliot & Freeman 2003 p. 93).  They are thus universal 
by virtue of being considered “fundamental to the rights of all human beings at 
work, regardless of the level of development of a country and applicable to all 
sectors, including the informal sector and Free Trade Zones” (Hensman 2001 p. 
125; Van Roozendaal 2002). 
 Second, as a result of their universality, the labour rights contained in the 
Declaration provide a common currency and useful benchmark for purposes of 
comparison between countries (Maupin 2005a p. 136).  Other rights such as the 
right to work contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the Organisation of American States’ Protocol of San 
Salvador – or other ILO Conventions such as workplace safety and health and 
minimum wages – have not received the same treatment and so their status as 
rights is distinctive from the Core Labour Rights (Alston 2004).  These non-core 
labour rights, although universal in the sense that they are included in the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, do not impose enforcement 
obligations upon a country unless the country adopts specific international human 
rights treaties or ILO conventions.  All ILO member countries share an obligation 
to comply with and enforce core labour rights and this serves as a common basis 
for comparison.     
 Third, as a result of establishing the Core Labour Standards, there is now a 
developed research methodology on monitoring compliance as well as collecting 
data and evidence on all four rights in all five countries.  The Declaration included 
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two follow-up mechanisms that add to the body of evidence available: (1) ILO 
annual reports reviewing the efforts of countries that have not ratified relevant 
core labour standards, and (2) global reports alternating among the four rights to 
provide a picture “of the state of implementation of each category of fundamental 
principles and rights” (Alston 2004 p. 511; Maupin 2005a p. 136).  The 
Declaration has “unquestionably attracted enormous attention” (Alston 2004 p. 
459) including development of specific research methods and critiques of those 
methods for monitoring compliance (Alston 2004 p. 510; Moran 2005; Hilton 
2005).  Part of this developing research methodology includes identifying and 
assessing various sources of information on compliance (Hilton 2005 p. 281).   
Despite the sound reasons for applying the Core Labour Standards 
framework, there are problems with the framework that must be acknowledged.   
Several critiques of the Core Labour Standards have emerged.  Most notably, 
Philip Alston has argued that the concept of the “Core” Labour Standards (1) 
violates long established human rights frameworks, (2) weakens labour rights by 
de-linking them from well established treaty obligations, and (3) replaces 
internationally recognised enforcement regimes with “soft promotionalism” 
(Alston 2004).  His critique raises doubts about whether the ILO 1998 Declaration 
and resulting Core Labour Standards system has contributed to improvement or 
deterioration of the international labour rights regime.  
The first criticism is that the Core Labour Standards depart from the 
international human rights regime’s insistence that all human rights are “universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated” (United Nations 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action). Regional human rights regimes – such as 
in the San Salvador Protocol – also support this notion of the indivisibility and 
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interdependence of all human rights (Ghandi 1995 p. 307).  The ILO’s 1998 
Declaration abrogates the equal importance of all ILO conventions and instead 
privileges the four Core Labour Standards as hierarchically superior (Alston 2004 
pp 459-460).  Using the Core Labour Standards for comparison purposes in this 
project runs the same risk, namely that the rights included for comparison 
comprise an “inadequate list of rights,” and “downgrades” those rights not 
included as core rights (Alston 2004 p. 462).   
Secondly, the ILO 1998 Declaration establishing the Core Labour 
Standards does not actually commit member states to comply with the 
corresponding ILO Conventions, but rather, 
to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning 
fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions  
(ILO 1998a).   
 
This language allows the Core Labour Standards to be accepted apart from 
acceptance of and compliance with the conventions themselves thus “delinking” 
and “liberating the standards” from ILO Convention-based definitions of rights 
and obligations’ (Alston 2004 p. 457, p. 460).  The delinking transforms the 
convention-based workers’ rights regime into a new regime of ILO membership-
based “principles” in which the definitions of specific rights and obligations are 
debatable and “treaty based formulations,” which are “too precise,” can be 
avoided (Alston 2004 p. 468).  In fact, the ILO employer group supported the 
Declaration only on the condition that the Declaration “should impose no new 
legal obligations on Members” and “should not impose on Member States detailed 
obligations arising from Conventions they had not freely ratified” (ILO 1998b).  
Third, the ILO 1998 Declaration establishing the Core Labour Standards 
has been criticised for its “unstructured and unaccountable decentralisation of 
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responsibility for implementation” and reliance on soft promotionalism rather than 
enforcement (Alston 2004 p. 457).  Evidence supporting this criticism includes the 
employer group’s uncontested condition for supporting the Declaration that “it 
should impose no new reporting obligations on member states, should not be 
concerned with technical and legal matters but only with making an overall policy 
assessment, should not result in new complaints based bodies and should have no 
links with questions of international trade” (ILO 1998b).  As Alston points out, “it 
is difficult to imagine that the 1998 Declaration will be permitted to escape from 
the straightjacket which was very clearly applied to it by its drafters” (Alston 2004 
p. 470).   
Despite these criticisms, the labour rights contained in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration provide a useful tool for purposes of this research project.  Even 
within the contentious debates, its main participants (Alston 2005; Langille 2005 
and Maupin 2005b) agree that the Declaration “has a potentially important role” 
and that “more creative institutional and other arrangements are required” to 
supplement the ILO’s traditional role (Alston 2005 p. 14).   In addition to 
recommending systematic analysis and evaluation of the Declaration’s 
effectiveness and pitfalls, Alston points out the need for “country-specific 
critiques” that should emerge on the basis of systematic comparative analysis 
(Alston 2005 p. 16).   The research agenda, for which Alston argues, includes ILO 
investigations as well as independent research and evaluation (Alston 2005 p. 15).  
This independent research project seeks to investigate institutional arrangements 
that sustain or curtail labour rights enforcement.  It also seeks to provide country 
specific as well as systematic cross-national comparison and analysis.    
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 For all of the above reasons, this research project will be based on a 
subsection of labour rights contained in the ILO 1998 Declaration creating the 
Core Labour Standards.  This in no way is to suggest that other labour standards, 
such as health and safety or minimum wage regulations, are less important or 
would be less useful as benchmarks for comparison if there were universally 
accepted standards and adequate data collection.  While adopting the framework 
of the four Core Labour Standards as a basis for comparison, this project is 
undertaken from a human rights perspective.  In other words, the project assumes 
that labour rights are human rights as recognized in numerous international human 
rights treaties.  Thus, the term core labour rights, as opposed to standards or 
principles is used throughout the paper. 
B. Why DR-CAFTA Countries? 
The goal of this research project is to explain and interpret variation in 
realising labour rights in the tradition of qualitative, holistic comparative methods 
(Ragin 1987 p. 5).  Cross-national differences and similarities provide “specific 
experiences and trajectories” that are interesting on their own account and also 
provide possible answers to help understand and explain variable outcomes 
(Ragin 1987 p. 6).  Toward this goal, Central America as a region and each of its 
countries are well suited for cross-national comparisons of core labour rights. 
First, Central America has coherence and identity as a region, sharing history, 
culture, geography and economic development trajectories.  Second, countries in 
Central America share many characteristic similarities in their economic, social 
and employment institutions. Finally, there are distinctive regional divides and 
gaps between countries, the most striking of which is between the high level of 
human development in Costa Rica compared to much lower levels in the other 
countries. 
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Dating from Spanish colonial history, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua share a regional 
identity.  They have a closely aligned trajectory from “discovery” through 
independence from Spain, and then, with the exception of the DR, share a period 
of federation as one country before final independence and statehood.  One 
enduring example of this shared inheritance is the continued importance of the 
Catholic Church and its status as the ‘official’ religion in all five of the countries.  
It is a small region with a combined land area of 423,118 square kilometres -- just 
slightly larger than Japan (377,801 sq km) and Paraguay (406,752 sq km) and just 
smaller than Iraq (438,317 sq km) and Sweden (449,964 sq km) (Reckziegel 
1999).  Panama is excluded from the research project because its origins are 
Columbian and South American and the Chiapas province of the United States of 
Mexico is also excluded because, while it began as a province of Guatemala along 
with the other five countries, after independence from Spain, it was incorporated 
into Mexico.  The Dominican Republic is added because it is one of the 
participants in the U.S. - Dominican Republic, Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA Treaty). 
Central American regional identity, and the larger Latin American context 
as well, have also influenced political, economic and human rights development in 
modern times.  The Organisation of American States (OAS) to which all six 
countries belong, approved the American Declaration of Human Rights seven 
months before the Universal Declaration was approved by the United Nations in 
1948 (Cavallaro & Schaffer 2004 p. 224).  Although the Declaration is not 
directly binding on countries, the OAS interpreted it as “indirectly binding on all 
member states by virtue of their ratification of the OAS Charter,” (Cavallaro & 
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Schaffer 2004 p. 230), echoing a similar logic used by the ILO in its 1998 
Declaration.  Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua all have 
constitutional provisions that make explicit reference to the state’s obligation to 
implement OAS Conventions (Cavallaro & Schaffer 2004 pp. 232-233).  In 1987, 
Central American presidents negotiated their own regional solution and peace to 
the civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua without intervention by 
the US or international community at the Esquipulas II regional summit (UNDP 
2002).   No other region of the world in recent times has been able to find and 
implement such a transition to peace without international intervention (UNDP 
2002). 
Regional identity and coherence have also had expression in economic 
coordination and efforts at integration.  Import substitution policies dating from 
the 1950s were regionally coordinated with the countries “banding together and 
shutting off their region to imports” to support industrial growth (Baker 2005 p. 
1346).  Central American countries were the first after the European Economic 
Community to establish a common market, the Central American Common 
Market creating a EU style customs union in 1960  (Baker 2005 pp. 1347).  In 
addition to the customs union, the Central American Common Market Treaty 
provided for “coordination of macroeconomic policies and the creation of cross-
border industrial development” (Baker 2005 p. 1348).  Regional identity has not 
been without conflict however, as in the case of the Central American Common 
Market in which Costa Rica waited three years to join and Honduras quit in 1969 
(Baker 2005 p. 1347 note 126).  After the demise of the Common Market in the 
1970s, efforts at integration were re-discovered in the 1990s with reforms to the 
Common Market and negotiation of new trade agreements culminating in the 
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relatively new U.S. - Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA).   
In addition to regional identity and coherence, Central American countries 
share important commonalities including (1) the structure of their economies, (2) 
persistent poverty, extreme income inequality and social divisions, and (3) 
institutional commitments and arrangements for protecting workers’ rights and 
regulating the employment systems.  Tables below accompany each of these 
themes.  
1. The Structure of the Economies 
The common structures of economies can be seen in terms of the relative 
importance of agriculture, industry and services across the countries.  The service 
sector is the largest contributor to GDP for all six countries and agriculture, 
despite its historic importance, now has the lowest share contribution towards 
GDP.  An equivalent shift in occupations has not happened in every case.  
Guatemala’s economy, reflected in its GDP composition, looks like it is largely 
service sector based but its employment remains overwhelmingly agricultural with 
half the labour force working in agriculture but contributing only 13.3% to GDP.  
Honduras also has this mismatch between GDP and labour force occupational 
composition. 
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Table 1.1 Composition of Economy and Labour Force Occupation by Sector 
 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Economy 
 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
 
 
6.3% 
22.9% 
70.8% 
 
 
 
11.5% 
21% 
67.5% 
 
 
 
11% 
29.1% 
59.9% 
 
 
13.3% 
24.4% 
62.3% 
 
 
12.4% 
26.9% 
60.8% 
 
 
17.6% 
26.5% 
56% 
Labour  
 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services  
 
 
*14% 
22% 
64% 
 
 
 
**14.6% 
22.3% 
63.1% 
 
 
*19% 
23% 
58% 
 
 
 
***50% 
15% 
35% 
 
 
**39.2% 
20.9% 
39.8% 
 
 
28% 
19% 
53% 
 
(Europa 2005; Reckziegel et al 1999, Updated with CIA World Fact Book 2011) 
*2006, **2005, ***1999 
Another common element of their economic structures is continued shared 
reliance on exports of primary products such as bananas and coffee while shifting 
from agriculture to manufactured goods, particularly textiles and services.  The 
countries also share a common reliance on imports of raw materials, consumer 
goods and fuels.  Finally, the economies are small and rely on asymmetrical trade 
relations with the United States.   The United States is the most important trading 
partner to each Central American country but combined they are only the 13th 
most important trading partner to the United States (Baker 2005 p. 3151).  The 
combined 2003 GDP of all Central American countries amounted to only 1.4% of 
the United States economy (Baker 2005 p. 1351).  
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Table 1.2 Exports & Imports 2010 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Exports Banana 
Pineapple 
Coffee 
Melons 
Plants 
Sugar 
Beef 
Seafood 
Electronic 
Compon-
ents 
Medical 
Equipmen
t 
 
Feronickel 
Sugar 
Gold 
Silver 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Tobacco 
Meats 
Consumer 
Goods 
 
Off Shore 
Assembly 
Coffee 
Sugar 
Textiles & 
Apparel 
Gold 
Ethanol 
Chemicals 
Electricity 
Iron 
Steel 
 
Coffee 
Sugar 
Petroleum 
Apparel 
Bananas 
Fruits 
Vegetables 
Cardamom 
Apparel 
Coffee 
Shrimp 
Wire 
Harnesses 
Cigars 
Bananas 
Gold 
Palm Oil 
Fruit 
Lobster 
Lumber 
Coffee 
Beef 
Shrimp 
Lobster 
Tobacco 
Gold 
Peanuts 
Textiles & 
Apparel 
 
 
Imports Raw 
Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Capital 
Equipmen
t 
Petroleum 
Constructi
on 
Materials 
Foodstuffs 
Petroleum 
Cotton 
Fabrics 
Chemicals 
Pharmaceutic
als 
Raw 
Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Capital 
Goods 
Fuels, 
Foodstuffs 
Petroleum 
Electricity 
 
Fuels 
Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment 
Construction 
Materials 
Grain 
Fertilizers 
Electricity 
Machinery & 
Transport 
Equipment 
Industrial 
Raw 
Materials 
Chemical 
Products 
Fuels 
Foodstuffs 
 
Consumer 
Goods 
Machinery 
& 
Equipment 
Raw 
Materials 
Petroleum 
Products 
(Europa 2005; Reckziegel et al 1999, Updated with CIA World Fact Book 2011) 
 
Table 1.3 Export and Import Partners 2009 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
 
Export 
Partners 
 
 
 
USA  
Nether-
lands 
China 
 
USA 
Haiti 
 
USA 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
 
USA 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
 
USA 
El Salvador 
Mexico 
 
 
 
USA 
El 
Salvador 
Costa Rica 
 
 
Import 
Partners 
 
 
 
USA 
Mexico 
Venezuela  
 
USA 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
 
 
USA 
Mexico 
Guatemala 
 
 
USA 
Mexico 
China 
 
 
USA 
Guatemala 
El Salvador 
 
USA 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
(Europa 2005; Reckziegel et al 1999, Updated with CIA World Fact Book 2011) 
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2. Persistent Poverty, Extreme Income Inequality and Social Divisions 
Central American countries share high levels of persistent poverty and 
extremely high levels of income inequality.  A 2002 United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) report on the region indicated that three out of every five 
Central Americans live in poverty with two out of five in severe poverty (Saxe & 
Cullell 2002).  According to the same report, “income and wealth distribution 
continues to be highly concentrated, and it is not improving” (Saxe & Cullell 
2002).  Agriculture and textiles provide sources of wealth for owners but workers 
receive low salaries throughout the region (Saxe & Cullell 2002).  Newer 
industries such as tourism and finance are equally concentrated (Saxe & Cullell 
2002).  Poverty and extreme poverty disproportionately affect overlapping 
categories of the population: people who live in rural areas and people who are 
employed in informal jobs.  Across Central America there are extreme disparities 
within each country with respect to levels of human development (UNDP 2002).  
Table 1.4 Percentage of Population Below Poverty Line Various Years 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Population 
below 
poverty 
line 
 
(2006) 
16% 
 
(2004) 
42.2% 
 
 
(2009) 
37.8% 
 
 
(2004) 
56.2% 
 
 
(2010) 
65% 
 
(2005) 
48% 
(CIA World Fact Book 2011) 
 
Table 1.5 Gini Index and Share of Household Income or Consumption of 
Highest and Lowest 10% 2005 
 Costa Rica Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Gini 
Index 
 
47.2 
 
50 
 
49.7 
 
53.7 
 
55.3 
 
52.3 
 
Highest 
10% 
 
Lowest 
10% 
 
35.5% 
 
 
1.5% 
 
 
38.7% 
 
 
1.5% 
 
 
37% 
 
 
1% 
  
42.4% 
 
 
1.3% 
 
42.2% 
 
 
0.7% 
 
 
41.8% 
 
 
1.4% 
(UNDP, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html; Segundo Informe Sobre Dessarrollo 
Humano en Centro America y Panama updated with CIA World Fact Book 2011) 
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3. Institutional Commitments and Arrangements 
All of the DR-CAFTA countries are members of the ILO as well as the 
Organisation of American States and Inter-American System.  In addition to their 
participation in these organisations, the countries have made human rights treaty-
based commitments to labour rights by ratifying United Nations human rights 
treaties and ILO conventions.  Each country has ratified all four of the ILO 
conventions that were included in the ILO 1998 Declaration (Table 6). 
Table 1.6 Core Labour Rights Convention Ratifications 
 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Elimination of 
Forced 
Labour 
Conv. 29 
Adopted 1930 
 
Conv. 105 
Adopted 1957 
 
 
 
 
1960 
 
 
1959 
 
 
 
 
1956 
 
 
1958 
 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1958 
 
 
 
1989 
 
 
1959 
 
 
 
1957 
 
 
1958 
 
 
 
1934 
 
 
1967 
Abolition of 
Child Labour 
Conv. 138 
Adopted 1973 
 
Conv. 182 
Adopted 1999 
 
 
 
1976 
 
 
2001 
 
 
1999 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1996 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1990 
 
 
2001 
 
 
1980 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
1981 
 
 
2000 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
Conv. 100 
Adopted 1951 
 
Conv. 111 
Adopted 1958 
 
 
 
1960 
 
 
1962 
 
 
1953 
 
 
1964 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1961 
 
 
1960 
 
 
1956 
 
 
1960 
 
 
1967 
 
 
1967 
Freedom of 
Association & 
Right to 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Conv. 87 
Adopted 1948 
 
Conv. 98 
Adopted 1949 
 
 
 
 
 
1960 
 
 
1960 
 
 
 
 
 
1956 
 
 
1953 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
1952 
 
 
1952 
 
 
 
 
 
1956 
 
 
1956 
 
 
 
 
 
1967 
 
 
1967 
Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/index.htm 
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Table 1.7 Core Labour Rights-Related Treaty Ratifications 
 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Elimination of 
Forced 
Labour 
ICESCR Art 6 
 
 
 
 
 
1968 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
 
1979 
 
 
 
 
1988 
 
 
 
1981 
 
 
 
1980 
Abolition of 
Child Labour 
ICESCR Art 10 
Convention on 
Rights of the 
Child 
 
 
 
1968 
1990 
 
 
1978 
1991 
 
 
1979 
1990 
 
 
 
 
1988 
1990 
 
 
1981 
1990 
 
 
 
 
1980 
1989 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
ICCPR Art 3, 
22, 26 
ICESCR Art 7  
CEDAW 
CERD 
 
 
1968 
 
1968 
1986 
1967 
 
 
1978 
 
1978 
1982 
1983 
 
 
1979 
 
1979 
1981 
1979 
 
 
 
1992 
 
1988 
1982 
1983 
 
 
 
1997 
 
1981 
1983 
2002 
 
 
1980 
 
1980 
1981 
1978 
Freedom of 
Association & 
Right to 
Collective 
Bargaining 
ICCPR Art 22 
ICESCR Art 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1968 
1968 
 
 
 
 
 
1978 
1978 
 
 
 
 
 
1979 
1979 
 
 
 
 
 
1982 
1988 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 
1981 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980 
1980 
 
Source Ghandi 2000, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) Treaty Body Database,    
 
All DR-CAFTA countries have also ratified other international treaties 
(Table 8) that correspond to the labour rights contained in the ILO conventions 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (ICESCR), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).  Labour rights enumerated in these international treaties are also 
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recognized in regional treaties (Table 9) specified in each country’s constitution as 
well as in industry-specific legislation (USTR 2005). 
Table 1.8 Core Labour Rights- Related Regional Treaty Ratifications 
 Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Elimination of 
Forced 
Labour 
Amer Conv on 
Human Rights 
Art 6 
Protocol of San 
Salvador 
7(g) 
 
 
 
 
1970 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
1977 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
 
 
1979 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
Abolition of 
Child Labour 
Amer Conv on 
Human Rights 
Art 19  
Protocol of San 
Salvador 
Art 7(f) 
 
 
 
1970 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
 
1978 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1978 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1977 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
 
1979 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
Amer Conv on 
Human Rights 
Art 1, 24 
Protocol of San 
Salvador 
Art 3 
Belém Do Pará 
Art 1, 7(d) 
 
 
1970 
 
 
1999 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1978 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
1996 
 
 
1978 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1996 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1977 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
1995 
 
 
1979 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
1995 
Freedom of 
Association & 
Right to 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Amer Conv on 
Human Rights 
Art 8, 16 
Protocol of San 
Salvador 
Art7(d), 8 
 
 
 
 
 
1970 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
1978 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
1977 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
 
 
 
 
 
1979 
 
 
Not 
Ratified 
Source Ghandi 2000, Organization of American States 2006 
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Finally, there is a common framework for implementing and enforcing 
labour rights across Central American countries.  In each country there is a labour 
ministry responsible for labour relations including registering trade unions, 
overseeing collective bargaining including dispute resolution, inspecting work 
places to ensure compliance with laws and related follow-up and administrative 
procedures for investigating and determining the validity of complaints (USTR 
2005).  This common administrative framework is complemented with similar 
specialised labour courts and appeals procedures such that disputes concerning 
labour rights violations are heard and appealed through steps within the judicial 
system and ultimately may be appealed to a court of last resort (USTR 2005).  
In contrast to the economic, social and institutional commonalities shared 
by Central American countries, they also provide a useful basis of comparison due 
to their distinctiveness and the startling divides between them.  These differences 
result from geographical context and historical choices as well as divergent 
contemporary policies.  The most striking divergence is the contrast between 
Costa Rica’s high-level of human development and income compared to its 
neighbours.  This difference allows this study to investigate, among other 
variables, the impact of the level of development of a country on the enforcement 
of labour rights. 
 One example of distinct historical trajectories originates at the time of 
colonisation.  Costa Rica’s settlement was last and involved an almost complete 
genocide of indigenous peoples.  It was considered an unimportant backwater far 
from the political centre in Guatemala and was largely ignored by Spain.  Based 
on its homogeneity – the indigenous people having been killed – and relative 
freedom from direct colonial control, it developed a society and state far more 
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egalitarian and democratic than its neighbours.  The opposite extreme is 
Guatemala where it is contested and unclear whether Spanish-identified Ladinos 
comprise a majority of the population.  In contrast to Costa Rica’s celebrated 
democracy, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua have suffered long periods of 
dictatorship, civil war and in the case of Guatemala, modern allegations of 
genocide. 
Economic policy and development choices have also been distinct despite 
the many common structural aspects of the economies.  In the wake of the failure 
of import substitution, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) began pressuring Central American Countries to implement structural 
adjustment programs.  Here, the specific policy programs and responses to them 
varied distinctively.  Costa Rica was vulnerable to pressures of the IMF and the 
WB based on its debt crisis arising from its higher level of social spending.  Great 
differences between countries in social spending persist.  Costa Rican resistance 
to IMF and WB prescriptions, particularly with respect to privatisation, continues.  
On the other hand, although the Salvadoran government embraced the policy 
prescriptions of structural adjustment, its implementation was delayed due to fears 
that the fallout of structural adjustment would enhance public support for 
guerrillas fighting the government in the civil war.  El Salvador has been called 
the most neo-liberal country in the region while neo-liberal reforms are popularly 
opposed in Costa Rica. 
Economic differences between countries include wide differences in levels 
of income and human development.  Income and poverty differences can be seen 
in divergent levels of informal and formal employment (Tables 10 and 11).  Half 
of all employment in Costa Rica is in the formal sector compared to 19.9% in 
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Guatemala (UNDP 2002 p. 67).  Employment in agriculture also varies with Costa 
Rica having a low of 17.2% of its labour force working in agriculture compared to 
more than 30% in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (UNDP 2002 p. 67).  
Most striking are the differences in the Human Development Index and GDP per 
capita between Central American countries with GDP per capita in 2003 ranging 
from a high of US $4,410 in Costa Rica to a low of US $767 in Nicaragua (in 
constant 2000 US$).  
Because these countries have such similar histories and yet such 
distinctive trajectories, comparing labour rights enforcement between them may 
offer insights into what factors and patterns of factors are present or absent in 
labour rights enforcement.  Based on preliminary country studies completed over 
the past year, there are indications of striking differences with respect to labour 
rights enforcement within and between countries.  In accordance with 
methodological guidance from qualitative comparative analysis, the cases are 
“comparable” but also “display diversity with regard to conditions and outcomes” 
(Rihoux 2006 p. 688).  This allows utilisation of both ‘most similar systems 
design’ (Przeworski & Teune 1970) and newer approaches that combine ‘similar 
systems design’ and  ‘different systems design’ to identify similar cases that 
display different outcomes as well as different cases that display similar outcomes 
(Rihoux 2006). 
4. Framework for Categorizing Differences 
 
For purposes of comparison of the countries, they are grouped in 
accordance with their proximity to an ideal types of countries in terms of: (1) 
State Capacity for Institutional Action (Evans 1995), and (2) and Labour Market 
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Regulatory Regime (Standing 1991 cited in Itzigsohn 2000 p. 140).  Both of these 
are explained in Chapter 3, Countries in Comparative Context. 
State capacity for institutional action refers to a state’s general regulatory 
orientation over many areas of state bureaucracy. Costa Rica is consistent with the 
ideal type developmental state based on its relatively high functioning state 
apparatus in service of the country as a whole.  In contrast, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua are each closer to the 
ideal type predatory state. The character of the state apparatus in predatory states 
is that the state apparatus is a market serving only those segments of society with 
the power or economic services to buy state services or protections.  In these 
systems, corruption tends to create the central logic to the running of the state.  In 
reality, the countries do not exist purely in one ideal type or the other but rather on 
a continuum between them.   
 The second dimension to categorizing the countries is their respective 
labour market regulatory regime.  These are ideal types created by Guy Standing 
(1991) to characterize distinctive roles that states play in labour market regulation.  
Standing described three different ideal types along which the countries can be 
said to fit.  In repressive regimes, the state’s role in regulating labour markets is to 
repress collective action by workers.  The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras fit best in this category.    In paternalistic regimes, the 
state legislates regulations based on the values of elites rather than in negotiation 
with workers.  Costa Rica fits relatively well in this category.  Lastly there are 
protective regimes in which worker organization and negotiations are more likely 
to influence labour market regulations.  In this category I have added the 
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characteristic of an absence of repression so that unions and negotiations take 
place.  Nicaragua fits this category.   
Like State Capacity for Institutional Action, countries exhibit more than 
one kind of regulatory influence and in reality exist on a continuum.  For example, 
repressive regimes may have paternalistic elements such as minimum wages. 
5. Groupings of Countries 
 
Based on these typologies three different groups of DR-CAFTA countries emerge.  
They are: 
 
Table 1.9 
 
 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Predatory 
Protective 
(non-repressive) 
 
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Costa Rica Nicaragua Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
 
 
C. Why Now? 
Recent changes in regional as well as international economic, political and 
social arrangements make the current investigation comparing labour rights in 
Central America timely.  Such changes include the relatively recent increase in 
data available as a result of the 1998 Declaration, a relatively new (2005) DR-
CAFTA trade agreement replacing earlier labour rights/treaty enforcement 
mechanisms, increased inclusion and visibility of labour rights in the Inter-
American System, and finally, changes in migration patterns, which have resulted 
in transnational Central American communities that appear to endure and have the 
potential to influence policies of Central American countries.   
First, enough time has elapsed since the establishment of the ILO 1998 
Declaration to gather data and investigate patterns and changes with respect to 
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labour rights.  This research would not have been possible before the 
establishment of core labour rights or immediately following their establishment.  
Many ILO reports, analysis and projects since 1998 have focused on Central 
America and so there is more data available to enable comparisons to be drawn.   
There is also a burgeoning literature on methods for collecting data and 
comparing compliance.    
Second, a new and controversial trade agreement (DR-CAFTA) was 
signed in May 2004 and has been ratified by all the countries by 2005.  DR-
CAFTA is important because it replaced the former Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBI) and the CBI’s General System of Preference (GSP) 
mechanisms.  Under GSP, Central American countries gained preferential access 
to US markets but that access was conditioned on their commitment to enforce 
certain internationally recognised labour rights.  Violation of these rights could 
lead to unilateral U.S. trade sanctions and loss of access to U.S. markets.  There 
was extensive use and analysis of GSP with respect to Central America (Frundt 
1998).  In its place, DR-CAFTA removes the possibility of sanctions and requires 
countries to enforce their own domestic labour regulations.  It also has no 
minimum standards and allows each state to exercise “discretion with respect to 
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters” (USTR DR-
CAFTA Final Agreement Section 16.1 2004 p. 16.1; Pagnattaro 2006).   
The absence of GSP-like conditionality in DR-CAFTA created a 
contentious debate within the United States about whether the trade deal would 
cause labour standards to improve or deteriorate.  To ease concerns over possible 
worsening of labour standards, the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. 
Congress struck a deal to provide U.S. $20 million to improve labour rights 
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enforcement as part of the trade deal.  The funds have been focused on 
recommendations developed by Labour Ministers from each of the DR-CAFTA 
countries in a 2005 White Paper (Working Group 2005).   Approximately U.S. $3 
million was given to the ILO to verify progress implementing the White Paper 
recommendations (ILO 2007a Baseline Report p. 3).  Despite numerous projects 
funded and twice yearly ILO reports an NGO recently reported the lack of 
“substantive advances” (WOLA 2009 p. 7).  In fact, the NGO noted, “…it is not 
clear whether this has resulted in reduced labor violation or improved working 
conditions” (WOLA 2009 p. 7).  
Third, there has been increased inclusion and visibility of labour rights in 
regional human rights bodies such as in the Inter-American System’s Commission 
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  Most notably, 
the Court has given its authoritative interpretation of the right to freedom of 
association extending due process rights to a fair trial beyond criminal trials to 
labour court proceedings (Baena Ricardo et al 1999).   In doing so, the Court 
effectively integrated regional human rights treaties with ILO Conventions and 
opinions of the ILO Freedom of Association Committee by drawing on a previous 
decision by the ILO Committee of Freedom of Association, which dealt with the 
same facts (Wilson and Perlin 2003).  The Court’s approach and decision is 
important because it was the first time that an international court has relied upon 
an ILO decision.   
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also been active in 
deciding cases related to labour rights such as undocumented migrant workers’ 
rights and equality and non-discrimination rights (Butler 2004), and it has been 
instrumental in linking civil and political rights with economic and social rights.  
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In the Baena case and subsequent cases, the court has noted that violations of civil 
and political rights, such as freedom of association, entail violations of labour 
rights that are social and economic (Cavallaro & Schaffer p.23).  These include 
Inter-American System rights such as the right to work and the right to a “decent 
dignified living” (Protocol of San Salvador 1988, Cavallaro & Schaffer 2004).  
The Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
offer the possibility of novel strategies for achieving enforcement of labour rights 
through civil society, non-governmental organization (NGO) mobilisation and 
mainstream litigation (Cavallaro & Schaffer).  
Finally, extensive migration due to natural disasters, civil wars and 
poverty, has reframed concepts of citizenship and shifted power balances in 
Central America.  Migration provides a new dynamic that can influence the 
enforcement of labour rights for better or worse.  Central American migrants 
predominantly seek to settle in the U.S. and are poor by U.S. standards but 
comprise a rising influential ‘middle class’ in Central America.  The money 
migrants send home in the form of remittances has become critically important to 
supporting families and entire economies.  For example, one recent estimate in El 
Salvador from Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) indicates that 
much of El Salvador’s poverty reduction has been due to remittances sent by 
Salvadorans working abroad rather than economic development at home (Macías 
& Cruz 2004 p. 5; Agunias 2006 p.4). 
Remittances are greater than foreign direct investment in every country 
except Costa Rica.  As a result, government policy is shifting with governments 
such as Guatemala increasingly playing an activist role with expatriate 
communities (Mahler 2000 p. 31).  Migrants in turn are becoming more influential 
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and demanding more rights such as dual citizenship and transnational voting 
rights (Mahler 2000 p. 3).  Research on the Dominican Republic has shown that in 
addition to economic remittances, migrants also engage in social remittances 
based on their experiences as migrants (Levitt 2001).  For example, migrant 
experiences of rule compliance or ‘rule of law’ can change perceptions and 
normative attitudes about the rule of law in their country of origin and can 
influence attitudes there (Levitt 2001).  
 On the other hand, migration and reliance on remittances can also make 
migrants and their home countries vulnerable to violations of labour and other 
human rights.  Nicaraguans who have left Nicaragua for work in Costa Rica and 
undocumented Central Americans in the U.S. are vulnerable to labour rights 
violations as a result of negative attitudes held towards them (Vargas-Cullell & 
Rosero-Bixby 2004).  Voters in El Salvador, and more recently Nicaragua, have 
received threats from the U.S. government warning that its migration and 
remittance policies will be tightened, if left-leaning politicians are elected to 
government (Beachy 2006; Bertelsmann 2006).  In sum, migrants are demanding 
recognition, status and improved rights both in the U.S. and from their homelands.  
It remains to be seen whether a government’s concern for protecting the rights of 
its migrants abroad translates into improvement of rights enforcement at home. 
In conclusion, the reasons that this project is timely include the contrary 
trajectories in labour rights at this particular moment under a new trade agreement 
regime that displaced GSP labour rights enforcement tools. Activists have argued 
that this is a step backwards for labour rights enforcement.  At the same time, 
Latin America is poised to embrace labour rights within treaty-based human rights 
courts and migrants themselves may be able to play an increasingly influential 
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role in debates about labour rights enforcement.  All of these countervailing forces 
and influences are buttressed by additional data, evidence, methodologies and 
(debates) that have arisen as a result of the ILO 1998 Declaration.  
D.  Current Debates 
There are two broad areas of debate about labour standards: (1) whether 
labour standards are human rights, and (2) how labour rights should be enforced. 
1.  Debate: Labour Standards vs. Labour Rights 
The first thematic debate concerns two issues: whether there are (or should 
be) international labour standards and whether these standards are or should be 
considered human rights.  The first is undoubtedly the oldest debate arising during 
the process of Britain’s Industrial Revolution (Engerman 2003 pp. 22-23).  As 
Engerman points out, the arguments on both sides have not changed much since 
1802 (Engerman 2003 p. 29).  Pro-labour standards arguments include moral 
imperatives such as to aid poor, voiceless, powerless workers (Engerman 2003 p. 
23).  Economic arguments in favour of labour standards include the improved 
efficiency of economies and the necessity to correct market failures (Engerman 
2003 p. 23; Palley 2004).  Related to moral and economic arguments, are social 
arguments supporting labour standards as a means to improve public health, 
education and political stability (Engerman 2003 p. 23).   Notably, these 
arguments are about “standards” not “rights” and the raison d’etre of “standards” 
is that they are instrumental because they serve as a means to an end rather than 
an end in themselves. 
Modern anti-labour standards arguments are also consistent with earlier 
arguments highlighting the higher costs that result from labour standards, making 
trade less competitive and therefore having an adverse impact on employment 
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levels and living standards (Engerman 2003 p. 30).  Other longstanding anti-
labour standard arguments focus on the protectionist motives for their 
establishment, the cultural imperialism of developed countries imposing standards 
on less powerful countries, and the interference with the freedom of employers 
and employees to enter into contracts (Engerman 2003 p. 30; Brown 2001 p.91).  
As above, anti-labour standards advocates focus on “standards” not “rights” and 
in fact argue that standards may interfere with legal rights to contract.  To anti-
labour standards advocates, labour standards are also a means to an end but it is an 
end to be avoided.  Ultimately, Engerman points out that policy changes 
implementing labour standards have resulted from changes in attitude, rhetoric 
and political power rather than any new or innovative arguments for or against 
them. 
The second part of this debate on the status of labour standards is more 
subtle and ambiguous than the pro-anti positions.  For example, the source of the 
standards is debated in terms of social justice (Hepple 2003) vs. human rights 
(Alston 2004).  The ambiguity of the status of labour standards has been noted as 
well as the preference to “avoid the language of rights” and instead “argue that a 
consensus is emerging” on standards (Brown 2001 p. 92).  In a recently published 
book on labour standards, “International Labor Standards,” Engerman points out 
such a consensus,  
In general, there are now some very basic terms of internationally 
agreed upon labor standards, reflecting both moral and economic 
beliefs”(Engerman 2003 p. 11).   
 
His list of consensus standards is extensive, including sexual harassment and 
some of the core labour standards but omitting freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.  It is unclear clear why freedom of association, which is 
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included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is not a consensus standard.  
In addition to the explicitly anti-labour standards arguments, subtle 
arguments and ambiguity, there is, within social sciences, more stealth approaches 
to undermining the idea of labour standards as human rights.  In these approaches, 
labour rights are either entirely invisible or irrelevant to economic, political and 
social debates.  Here is one example from industrial relations and human resource 
management literature that illustrates the point:   
Because of high productivity and low unemployment in the United 
States during the 1990s relative to Europe, many have argued that 
Europe should emulate key features of the U.S. economy, 
including weaker unions… (Michel et all 2003 p. 397). 
 
Making “weaker unions” is described as an ‘exportable policy choice’ and feature 
of an economy, like tax or welfare policy.  The policy choice is framed in its 
relation to employment levels without reference to issues or concerns about the 
human rights implications of making freedom of association more difficult for 
workers to exercise.   Importantly, the author is concerned with the detrimental 
effects of the U.S. model in terms of poverty and inequality for workers but 
ignores human rights in the discussion.  
Within this first frame of debates, this research project seeks to place 
obligations for compliance with labour standards/labour rights based on the 
country’s ratification of the relevant standard and agreement to be supervised by 
the ILO Committee of Experts (CEACR) and other ILO supervisory bodies.  In 
fact, many countries do renounce ratifications of ILO Conventions (See ILO 
ILOLEX).  Countries may ratify ILO Conventions or other treaties as a means to 
an end such as greater stature in their relations with other countries.  Nevertheless, 
the obligations contained in the ratified Conventions are not merely instrumental 
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‘means to an end’ but rather, borrowing from Sen (2000 p. 10) on development 
and freedom, they are the “end” for which we the Country must find the “means.”  
Admittedly, there are many philosophical and political theoretical debates that 
contradict this premise and approach.  This research project does not contest them 
on philosophical or theoretical grounds but on the much more mundane basis that 
human rights are the subject of international treaties and therefore impose the 
legal commitments and obligations contained in the treaties themselves.    
2. Debate: Labour Rights Enforcement 
The second broad area of debate on international labour rights begins with 
a rights-based premise and is concerned with how to best enforce labour rights.  
One part of the enforcement debate centres on the question of whether the 
existence of so many rights hinders their enforcement (Langille 2005; Alston 
2004).  Other aspects of the enforcement debate concern (1) what role the ILO and 
other international institutions should play (Alston 2005; Maupin 2005; Langille 
2005), (2) whether the ILO 1998 Declaration is an effective approach (Alston 
2004; Langille 2005; Maupin 2005) (3) whether trade sanctions should be 
included as an enforcement mechanism (Frundt 1998; Brown 2001; Griffin, 
Nyland & O’Rourke 2003; Singh & Zammit 2004), (4) whether corporate social 
responsibility and self-regulation is an effective tool or a worthless ploy (Wick 
2005; Feinberg 2009), and (5) whether multiple interventions and mechanisms are 
necessary (Frundt 1998; Verma 2003; Douglas et al 2004). 
Over the course of the research project these debates have been reflected 
in the many reports on labour rights in Central America.  These include the ILO 
(2003a), Human Rights Watch (2004), the U.S. Trade Representative (2005), the 
AFL-CIO (2005), Central American Labour Ministers (Working Group) through 
the Inter-American Development Bank (2005), Stop CAFTA.org (2006), the 
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Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) 2005 and 2009, the International 
Labor Rights Forum along with its regional non-governmental organization 
partner Asociación Servicios de Promoción Laboral (ASEPROLA) 
(ILRF/ASEPROLA) 2004.  In 2009, a political economist noted that despite the 
numerous studies there are insufficient benchmark studies to definitively 
characterise the state of labour standards and practices in the region (Feinberg 
2009 p. 3).   In effect, the many studies are fodder for conflicting points of view in 
the contentious debates over DR-CAFTA and labour standards enforcement. 
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Chapter 2 Research Process 
I. Introduction 
A. Summary of the Research Method 
 
The goal of my research has been to develop a theoretical framework that 
could serve as an analytical model and method for examining and comparing 
labour rights compliance in DR-CAFTA countries (or any other group of 
countries for that matter).  The methodology is qualitative and comparative.  
Qualitative assessments are carried out using narrative documentary evidence 
from a variety of sources.  These include U.S. State Department Human Rights 
Reports and nongovernmental organisation reports from the International Trade 
Union Confederations (ITUC) and regional organizations such as the Asociación 
Servicios de Promoción Laboral (ASEPROLA).  A central source of narrative 
evidence comes from Individual Direct Requests and Individual Observations of 
the ILO Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR).  The use of these distinctive perspectives mirrors 
the process the ILO Committee of Experts (CEACR) utilizes in supervising 
country compliance with ILO Conventions. The CEACR considers reports 
submitted by the country in which it discusses its compliance with the 
conventions along with ‘shadow reports’ from trade unions and NGOs often 
contradicting claims made by the government.    
The development of the theoretical framework and its connection to the 
methodology was an iterative process based on the interaction between my own 
experiences, reading, reflecting, testing and proposing ideas and receiving 
feedback leading to further reflection from presentation of the ideas in seminars, 
conferences and papers.  Driving my search for an adequate theory and 
methodology was my continual discovery of partial answers and further puzzles as 
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I read and reflected upon what I had discovered.  This section briefly outlines the 
method adopted in the research and process of developing the analytical model.  
II.  Steps in Research Process 
A.  Step One: Framing the Field in Relation to My Own Experience 
 
The first step in the research process was framing the issue of labour 
standards compliance.  My own experiences organizing workers, particularly 
immigrant workers in Boston strongly influenced the area of research.  Having 
learned about comparative employment systems in the masters’ program, I began 
re-thinking my organizing experiences.  The works of Amable (2003) and Hall 
and Soskice (2001) that I had read, provided a beginning of a theoretical 
framework upon which I could organize my experiences.  I considered the formal 
and the informal rules within which my organizing experience had occurred.  I 
also, saw my former work in various industries, such as health care and education, 
as fundamentally trying to change the institutional settlement between the 
employer and workers at the work site level.   
In the masters’ program I had learned that institutional settlements at the 
work site were influenced by larger scale institutional settlement of U.S. labour 
relations and the U.S. liberal market economy.  It was puzzling, because ideas 
about institutional complementarities indicated that transformative change in 
labour rights might be very difficult to accomplish.  On the other hand, Streeck 
and Thelen (2005) presented ideas about incremental yet transformative change.  
So I had both an appreciation for how difficult institutional change might be to 
accomplish but also how it might be achieved in surprising and small ways. 
B.  Step Two:  Selection of Countries 
The next step was to select the countries that I would examine more 
closely in the thesis.  I considered choosing the United States but I felt that my 
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familiarity and experience working in the U.S. system might undermine the 
quality of the research because it would be easier for me to take social facts 
uncritically for granted in the context of the United States employment system 
relative to other systems.  I kept returning to the puzzle of the immigrants from 
the Dominican Republic and Central America and how little I knew about the 
employment systems from which they had come.  Labour rights compliance in the 
Dominican Republic was the topic of my masters’ dissertation.  Broadening the 
research to Central American countries was consistent with examining the 
Dominican Republic as part of the masters’ research.  The other Central American 
countries generally share with the Dominican Republic preferential immigration 
relations with the US.  Even before the DR-CAFTA trade agreement, the 
countries were also interesting in light of their connection to the United States 
through trade and foreign policy.  Before settling on DR-CAFTA countries as the 
subject of the study, I also spent weeks reading local newspapers on line through 
the Guardian and local web sites to begin to get an understanding of employment 
in the region. 
C.  Step Three: Labour Standards and Employment Systems in the 
Dominican Republic and Central America 
 
Turning from my own experiences in the U.S., I traveled to three of the 
countries I wanted to study, keeping in mind institutions theory and employment 
systems and how formal and informal rules interact.  I worked and traveled in 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala in 2003-2004 after finishing my masters’ 
and before starting the PhD.   My goals were to become more knowledgeable of 
employment systems in the region, to improve my Spanish language proficiency, 
to become familiar with unions and non-government groups and to begin thinking 
about research design and questions for the PhD project. 
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My work in the region included providing assistance to a Costa Rican non-
governmental organization supporting labour rights that was organizing among 
agricultural workers in pineapple and banana production.  Some of this work took 
place among indigenous Bribri living on the border of Costa Rica and Panama.  
This is an area of Costa Rica where banana worker solidarity was relatively strong 
and organizing was successful partly because the workers’ solidarity was based on 
indigenous identity.  It was also very useful to experience and better understand 
what informal market relations looked like in Nicaragua and how the Guatemalans 
I met discussed the 1996 peace treaty that was signed but not approved by voters 
or implemented by the government.  Traveling in the region helped to frame some 
of the vast differences that exist between the countries despite their common 
history, language and religion.   
D.  Step Four: Labour Standards Monitoring Literature 
 
Upon returning to academic research, I started with an examination of 
existing labour rights monitoring methodologies.  I did this for two reasons.  
Initially, I wanted to pursue a more quantitative approach or alternatively create 
indicators of respect for labour rights and I was looking at possible 
methodological models.  Among the systems I considered was the left-leaning 
Bertelsmann Index, an index and country ranking system based on democracy and 
socially-responsible market economies (Bertelsmann 2006) as well as the right-
leaning, Heritage Foundation Index of Freedom (Heritage Foundation 2006).  One 
of the Heritage Foundation reports referred indirectly to informal labour rights 
arrangements in its rankings.  It mentioned that Guatemala had a very burdensome 
minimum wage system, but did not downgrade the country’s score because the 
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law was hardly ever applied.  Most importantly, I examined the Cingranelli 
Richard Human Rights Dataset (2004) discussed below. 
My second reason for examining existing monitoring systems was to 
preview how each of the countries and the region as a whole performed in terms 
of respecting labour rights.  This survey of quantitative research on the region 
provided useful background information but ultimately raised more questions than 
it answered.  The insights and limitations in these approaches therefore led me to 
choose a qualitative diagnostic approach rather than a quantitative approach based 
on indicators. 
Labour rights compliance monitoring predates the 1998 ILO Core Labour 
Standards and post World Trade Organization (WTO) trade agreements including 
DR-CAFTA.  One of the most respected human rights monitoring systems was 
developed by political scientists Cingranelli and Richards and greatly influenced 
my methodology and conceptual approach. Cingranelli and Richards created a 
database to measure respect for labour rights, among other human rights.  Annual 
measures of respect for human rights are based on content analysis of U.S. State 
Department and Amnesty International human rights reports (CIRI 2004).  
Respect for worker rights is a composite measure, roughly covering rights covered 
by the ILO’s Core Labour Standards on freedom of association, the right to 
collective bargaining, the prohibition against forced labour, the minimum age for 
employment of children and discrimination in employment (CIRI 2004).   
In Cingranelli and Richards’ system, countries receive a score of “0” when 
the government does not allow workers to form unions or to strike.   A score of 
“1” indicates that the government allows workers to form unions and to strike but 
problems exist with other protections such as forced labour, discrimination or 
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employment of children.  A score of “2” indicates that the government ensures 
that workers have the right to form unions and strike, and in addition there are no 
other problems with other labour rights protections (Abouharb and Cingranelli 
2007 p. 197).  The inter-rater reliability for the data is high at 0.944 (Cingranelli 
and Richards 2010).  The raw scores for DR-CAFTA countries from 1981 to 2009 
are charted below in Figure A and presented afterwards as trend lines in Figure B. 
Table 2.1 
 
Year 1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 
CR 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 
DR 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
ES 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
G 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
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The scores and trend lines demonstrate several remarkable changes from 
the 1980s’s through the establishment of ILO Core Labour Standards in 1998 and 
more changes become apparent through the ratification and implementation of 
 50 
DR-CAFTA from roughly 2003 through 2009.  In the 1980s, there were very 
clearly delineated well-performing and poor-performing countries. Costa Rica and 
Honduras consistently scored higher, having 79% of all the best scores of “2.” 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua consistently scored the worst accounting 
for 100% of all the worst scores of “0.”  
From the end of the 1980s through to 1998/99 when the ILO Declaration 
of Fundamental Principals and Rights at Work established Core Labour Standards, 
the scores across the region began converging with longstanding best performer 
Costa Rica scoring a “0” for the first time and the formerly poorly performing 
Nicaragua attaining a score of “2” four times throughout the ten years.   The 
scores for the region as a whole reached their peak in 1998, as Core Labour 
Standards were coming on line, when no country received a “0,” Costa Rica and 
the Dominican Republic each received a “1” and the remainder, even Guatemala 
received a score of “2.”  The total scores for the region in 1999 and 2000 continue 
to be higher than previous decades but the trend abruptly ends in 2001 when total 
regional scores continually decline.  Remarkably, in 2008, for the first time, every 
country received a score of “0.”  
The CIRI scores represent a perplexing mixture of results—change for the 
better, change for the worse and sometime little or no change at all. The two 
consistently high performers in the 1980s, Costa Rica and Honduras experienced a 
stark reversal from receiving the highest score 66% and 100% respectively in the 
1980s to 20% and 0% from 2000-2009.  Interestingly, not all reversals were 
negative.  Nicaragua reverted from its relatively poor performance in the 1980s, 
scoring a 1 or better only 33% of the time, to scoring 1 or better 80% of the time 
between 2000 and 2009.   Guatemala’s performance in the 1980s improved over 
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the course of the 1990s but worsened again after 2000, returning very close to its 
1980s level.  El Salvador’s performance has consistently declined in each period.  
Finally, the Dominican Republic has received the same score of “1” in 26 out of 
29 years, roughly 90% of the time.  
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset scores created 
many puzzles for my research.  The scores appeared to show a trend towards 
convergence at the time that the ILO Core Labour Standards were launched. The 
changes in CIRI average scores over 28 years shown in Appendix 2, Figure C 
indicate a regional deterioration.  From 2005 to 2009, the years during which DR-
CAFTA was ratified by the United States and all of the countries, the scores 
appeared to be further declining, and I questioned whether CIRI had captured a 
regional race to the bottom.  However, the scores themselves do not explain why 
there were reversals as in the case of Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.  
Equally, the scores do not explain why there was little or no change in the 
Dominican Republic or why scores changed for a period of time before reverting 
to their former level as in the case of Guatemala.  
Table 2.2 
 
Average Scores 
1981-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 
Net 
Change 
Costa Rica 1.66 0.9 1.0 -0.66 
Dominican Republic 1.11 1.10 0.9 -0.21 
El Salvador 0.88 0.70 0.40 -0.48 
Guatemala 0.11 0.60 0.20 +0.09 
Honduras 2.00 1.60 0.30 -1.70 
Nicaragua 0.44 1.30 0.90 +0.46 
Regional Average 1.03 1.03 0.61 -0.42 
CIRI Worker Rights Scores 1981-2009 Averages 
 
The limitation of the CIRI system is that it is not designed to reveal the 
underlying processes leading to change, or alternatively processes leading to an 
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unchanged score.  A score of “1” such as that received by the Dominican Republic 
about 90% of the time indicates that the government allows workers to form 
unions and to strike but does not explain which other labour rights problem or 
possibly multiple problems prevent a score of “2” from being given.  Similarly a 
score of “0” does not indicate whether problems occur with respect to both 
organizing and strikes or possibly one without the other.  Further, it does not 
indicate whether freedom of association problems exist in conjunction with other 
labour rights problems such as forced labour, discrimination or child labour. 
To address the puzzles and unanswered questions from CIRI, I turned to 
more recent monitoring projects and began to consider taking a qualitative rather 
than quantitative approach for the research.  The 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, “Core Labour Standards” spurred 
considerable interest in methodologies to monitor compliance with labour 
standards.  One such approach under development was a project of the US-based 
National Research Council of the National Academy of Science (National 
Research Council 2004).  The project aimed to establish a world-wide database to 
aide in labour standards monitoring and to influence data collection and analysis 
methods.  Its 2004 publication identified several problems in monitoring 
compliance with labour standards.  These included (1) problems defining the 
specific obligations of countries to comply with labour standards, (2) problems 
with identifying indicators of compliance or non-compliance, (3) problems 
associated with sources of information and (4) problems associated with making 
appropriate inferences (National Research Council 2004, Moran 2005).  The 
project was subsequently unfunded and no database was ever established but the 
outline of compliance monitoring challenges was nevertheless a useful guide in 
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shaping the problems that my research method would need to address.  In order to 
address the problems identified by the National Research Council and the limits of 
systems such as Cingranelli and Richards I decided I needed learn about the 
history of the region and gain knowledge specific to each of the countries in my 
study. 
E.  Step Five: Country Studies 
 
The next step was to research and write background papers on each of the 
six countries.  In addition to historical context and employment systems, I was 
also able to identify actors and available data evaluating labour standards 
compliance.  In the course of this research I was able to explore country specific 
themes such as corruption, racism, historic development of trade union 
movements and the extent of the informal economy.  The timing of this part of the 
research coincided with intensifying conflict and debate within DR-CAFTA 
countries over ratification of the trade agreement.  As a result, many of the reports 
on labour standards compliance in the region first described and then made 
judgments about respect for labour standards for the purpose of either supporting 
or arguing against the trade agreement. 
The model for the country studies was the country-study that I completed 
on the Dominican Republic for my dissertation for the masters’ degree.  The 
dissertation was also an initial and rough attempt to apply institutions theory to 
explain persistent labour rights enforcement problems in the Dominican Republic.  
The data that I examined for the six country studies included Spanish and English 
language qualitative reports on labour standards in each country from NGO’s 
proposing or using different approaches to examine labour rights, the ILO 
Committee of Experts (CEACR) Individual Observations and Direct Requests, the
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International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Annual Surveys of Trade Union 
Rights, U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports and academic monitoring 
articles and systems proposed by the U.S. National Science Foundation.   
It was immediately apparent from these diverse sources that judging 
labour rights performance is sometimes contentious and conflictual.  These 
divergent compliance pictures have continued throughout the research.  For 
example, non-governmental organizations and the ILO were extremely critical of 
Costa Rica’s protection of freedom of association and right to collective 
bargaining while the US State Department characterizes Costa Rica as respecting 
and protecting the rights (ILO CEACR 2009 Individual Observation Costa Rica; 
US State Department 2009). Occasional conflicts between sources especially 
those concerning Costa Rica and Nicaragua continued but generally there was 
substantial agreement as for example on El Salvador and Guatemala.  The country 
studies ranged from 40 to 60 pages.  The country studies are summarized in 
Chapter 3. 
In the process of trying to incorporate the country studies into the body of 
the thesis, it became apparent that they were overly long and descriptive.  They 
were useful in becoming familiar with each country but not helpful in generating 
ideas and approaches to comparisons across the countries.  In the process of 
writing the thesis, I re-examined and updated the content of the country studies 
with additional material.  In addition, I re-worked them into a comparative study 
to identify potentially important differences and distinctions between the 
countries.  To do this I searched for how others had done country comparisons 
within regions.  Roberts (2007) had a system based on examination of import 
substitution policy differences across the countries.  I tried this approach in an 
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early version of the case on Freedom of Association but its usefulness was very 
limited. 
Ultimately I borrowed aspects of Itzigsohn’s (2000) comparative 
developmental study of Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic and in particular 
his use of Evans’ (1995) State Capacity for Institutional Action and Standing’s 
(1991) Labour Market Regulatory Regimes to facilitate meaningful comparisons 
from among the six countries to carry forward through the two case studies.  In 
addition, for the freedom of association case study, I kept but narrowed Robert’s 
idea about unions’ role in politics by limiting consideration to the uniquely 
distinctive relationship between Nicaraguan unions and the Sandinistas.   These 
frameworks were incorporated to facilitate comparisons among the countries but 
not a key outcome of the project. 
F.  Step Six:  Research Questions 
With deeper knowledge of country specific history, employment systems, 
patterns of labour rights violation and sources of documentary evidence I 
developed the following three research questions for the project: 
• How are formal commitments such as ILO Convention 
ratifications disregarded in practice? 
 
• Is there cross-national variation in how this disregard 
occurs? 
 
• Does the formulation of the ILO Conventions and their 
interpretation influence their disregard? 
 
The first two research questions developed over the same time as I reflected on 
the puzzles and limitations in the labour standards monitoring literature and as I 
became more knowledgeable about the countries through the country studies.   
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The third question arose after I began to more closely examine the ILO 
conventions underlying Core Labour Standards.  The ILO conventions themselves 
had distinct historical and political contexts contributing to their content and to 
their adoption.  In an institutional sense, the conventions were institutional 
settlements made at particular moments by the social partners at the ILO.  Once 
adopted, the conventions continue to be interpreted and for some of the 
conventions I examined such as forced labour, were re-interpreted in light of new 
or evolving employment practices.  This made the ILO conventions less a one-
dimensional list of obligations and instead required that they be considered in a 
more dynamic way.  It raised the question of how the content of the conventions 
and their interpretation by the ILO influence how states implement or disregard 
them. 
G.  Step Seven: Building a Theory and Diagnostic Tool 
 
With these research questions before me, I began reading the institutions 
and compliance literatures, deepened my knowledge of each and synthesized the 
two literatures together into the chapter on literature and the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 4).  I presented this work at a PhD seminar in Trier Germany 
and received valuable critiques from my advisor and others in attendance.  With 
this valuable feedback, I found that the compliance theories I had examined under 
emphasized the role of power and conflict relative to their prominence in the work 
I had done on institutions.  I set about analyzing the absence of power and conflict 
in the compliance theories I was using and adjusted the framework to give power 
more prominence.  The chapter on the theoretical synthesis is very dense and not 
workable as an actual tool for analysis.  As a result, I drew a theoretical 
framework from the synthesis, shedding components that were not absolutely 
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necessary, making the role of power more explicit and translating the theory into 
an analytical tool to guide the theory’s application to evidence.  The literature 
review and synthesis from institutions and compliance theory is found in Chapter 
Four and the analytical tool is in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 at the end of chapter 4. 
H.  Step Eight: Putting the Theory and Method into Operation 
1. Case Study Research Process 
Putting the theory and analytical tool into operation involved the collecting 
of evidence as guided by the tool to allow identification of specific patterns of 
disregard for the ILO conventions as well as cross-national variation in respect or 
alternatively, disregard for conventions.  I carried out two case studies to test the 
approach.  The case study process involved  (1) selecting one of the core labour 
standards, (2) identifying the relevant labour rights obligations, (3) gathering 
evidence of performance and institutional patterns, (4) analyzing the evidence 
using the theoretical tool developed from institutions and compliance theories, (5) 
comparing each country’s performance to their obligations and to the performance 
of one or more other countries, (6) identifying compliance interventions using 
compliance theory and (7) identifying gaps in the ILO system of obligations. 
The evidence selected for use and the process for gathering it were 
theoretically driven by compliance theory.  Harold Koh argued that gaining 
compliance with international legal norms such as ILO Conventions is dependent 
upon processes in which a group such as the ILO Committee of Experts receives 
criticisms of a state’s performance and is able to test and define the norms in 
relation to the state and articulate judgments about their violation or respect of the 
norm (Koh 1998, p. 650).    
The Committee of Experts interprets the meaning and application of ILO 
Conventions in its process of monitoring and supervising a country’s compliance 
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with the ILO Conventions it has ratified.  The Committee examines reports 
submitted by governments as well as communications, or ‘shadow reports’ often 
from trade unions or other nongovernmental organizations that challenge the 
government’s assertions of compliance with ILO conventions.  
The CEACR publishes neither the government reports, nor 
communications from trade unions critical of government compliance.  Instead, 
the Committee reports its findings to the annual International Labour Conference.  
In addition, the Committee reports its interpretations and findings in Observations 
and Individual Direct Requests referenced to specific countries.  The Committee 
also undertakes an annual General Survey in which it examines country reports 
from ILO member states on one specific labour standard for which the country 
may or may not have ratified.  Here again, the Committee does not publish the 
government report nor the shadow reports and instead submits its findings and 
interpretations of the labour standards to the Governing Body of the ILO.  
To mirror the process of the CEACR, the methodology called for the use 
of evidence from a variety of perspectives including narrative documentary 
evidence from U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports and 
nongovernmental organisation reports from ITUC and the Asociación Servicios de 
Promoción Laboral (ASEPROLA).  A central source of narrative evidence came 
from Individual Direct Requests and Individual Observations of the CEACR.  The 
use of these distinctive perspectives in documentary form also mirrors the 
interactions envisioned by Koh.  
The distinct perspectives in these documents represent at least some of the 
collective voices in debates over compliance with ILO conventions and core 
labour standards.  Ultimately, a transparent assessment based on these sources 
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explicitly allows independent evaluators to identify where they disagree within the 
assessment methodology (Moran 2005). In the end, the goal is not a technical 
debate over compliance with ILO Conventions but a wider debate about how to 
involve all sectors of society toward progressively achieving respect for the rights.  
The tool is intended for use with publicly available material and not meant to 
establish the  ‘authoritative’ or ‘whole’ story.  Nevertheless because it is 
theoretically based, the diagnostic and compliance interventions that arise from 
the tool’s use can be helpful in debates about the status of specific labour rights. 
  In keeping with compliance theory, ILO sources at one corner of this 
triangle are treated as the most authoritative.   The US State Department Human 
Rights Reports take up another corner of the triangle offering a sceptical 
perspective towards international human rights.  For example the US State 
Department reports treat obligatory overtime as a matter of working conditions 
rather than forced labour.  The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
and non-governmental organisations fill the final corner of the triangle offering a 
distinct perspective sometimes critical of ILO or US State Department 
perspectives.   
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Figure 2.2 Evidence for Case Studies 
ILO Direct Requests and Observations 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Non-governmental groups:   U.S. State Department 
ITUC, Asociación Servicios    Human Rights Reports 
de Promoción Laboral  
(ASEPROLA)   
 
2. Forced Labour Case Study 
The first trial case concerned all of the forms of forced labour in the 
evidence.  Later as a result of my evaluation of the trial, the case focused on two 
aspects of forced labour— obligatory overtime and trafficking.   The second case 
study examined anti-union discrimination and overall respect for freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining. 
The trial case study on forced labour was selected because it is the least 
controversial of the core labour standards as it is tied to the abolition of slavery.  
For the other core labour standards, there remain counter-arguments about the 
desirability of compliance.  Child labour is argued to be a necessary step to 
development for example while freedom of association is characterized as 
undermining development (Engerman 2003).  In my reading to date, no one had 
argued for the re-establishment of slavery.  I thought I could start from the 
simplest case and then move through more contested core labour standards. 
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The research process for the case study on forced labour involved inter-
related steps.  First, documentary evidence of forced labour was gathered from 
sources, intended to mirror the transnational legal process in which the ILO 
CEACR considers reports submitted by State parties as well as shadow reports 
submitted by national and international labour organizations such as the ITUC.   
Second the documentary evidence was divided by country into the specific 
forms of forced labour such as obligatory overtime, trafficking and forced prison 
labour.   Third, institutional components of rules, interpretations, enforcement, 
social norms, social conventions and institutions from other realms of social life 
were sorted and analyzed to discern ingredients and institutional arrangements 
supporting forced labour as an enduring practice.  Fourth, it was necessary to 
identify the ILO compliance obligations including their context in history and 
their application to obligatory overtime and trafficking.  Fifth, the institutional 
components and outcomes were analyzed in comparison to compliance 
obligations arising from ILO Forced Labour Convention Nos. 29 and 105 
obligations.   
Finally, when these steps were completed, two kinds of compliance 
analysis were possible.  First, using Koh’s compliance theory framework, 
institutional conditions associated with non-compliance were linked with multiple 
compliance interventions.  This allowed the identification of complex and often 
multiple interactions and combinations of conditions and causal paths to forced 
labour practices (Ragin 1987; Rihoux 2006).   Second the compliance obligations 
arising ILO Convention Nos. 29 and 105 could be analyzed and compared to each 
other and the social reality of forced labour practices.  
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The first lesson from the case study was that the idea of a Core Labour 
Standard such as elimination of forced labour was a label that belies complex 
compliance regimes involving differential obligations for state imposed prison 
labour, eliminating trafficking in persons and forced obligatory overtime.  In fact, 
after looking at the evidence, there was very little overlap in institutional 
arrangements across these different forms of forced labour.  Nevertheless, I 
compiled and analyzed the evidence across prison labour, traditional forced 
labour, trafficking and obligatory overtime for all the countries.  The results were 
unruly, not very meaningful and ultimately were mostly a fine-grained description 
of the violations as employment practice institutions.  The most interesting results 
from this work on the first case was discovering how the ILO’s obligations 
although they came from the same two conventions varied for each different form 
of forced labour.  
I learned from this observation that the analytic tool does not explicitly or 
sufficiently address the fact that the ILO convention obligations that anchor it are 
themselves, imperfect institutions that come about as a result of power 
asymmetries, compromise and struggle.   Employment practices that one would 
expect would violate an ILO convention sometimes actually comply with it, as is 
shown in the case study on forced labour in chapter 5.   This unanticipated 
outcome caused me to pay particularly close attention to perverse outcomes in 
which employment practices were not violations of conventions.   
Through the process of research it became increasingly apparent that the 
study of ILO core labour rights, as a whole entity, would not be pragmatic.  Upon 
closer examination of the rights through the course of the research, it became clear 
that the labels identifying the four core labour rights are oversimplifications.  Each 
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one of the rights labelled Core Labour Rights entails multiple and inter-related 
rights and facets of rights.  The necessity for further refinement of selection within 
Core Labour Rights became apparent.  Core Labour Rights may be a useful 
shorthand device for purposes of debate but as a concept for theoretical and 
empirical inquiry, it was not manageable for this project.  I came to realize that the 
most useful or relevant unit of analysis was not each “Core Labour Standard.” 
Based on feedback from the case study I set out to try again with a more modest 
goal to compare two forms of forced labour—trafficking and obligatory overtime 
across the DR-CAFTA countries. 
3.  Freedom of Association Case Study 
Based on modest success with the smaller comparisons I set out to expand 
the scope of the work in the next case study on freedom of association. Freedom 
of Association and Right to Collective bargaining was selected as the second case 
for three main reasons.  First, it was in the context of association and bargaining 
rights working with immigrant union janitors that my interest and curiosity for 
understanding more about labour rights violations as institutional employment 
practices began.  Second, association and bargaining rights are directly responsive 
to the puzzling convergence of the CIRI scores and method I had examined at 
very early stages in the research.  Finally, it presented a worthwhile test for the 
analytical approach that I had developed because there are so many inter-related 
aspects of freedom of association.  It presented an opportunity to work at 
institutional analysis at a finely grained level of one aspect of freedom of 
association as well as at a higher level of abstraction examining freedom of 
association as a whole system.  
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  I also selected freedom of association because it was directly relevant for 
comparison purposes to Cingranelli and Richards’ system.  Additionally, freedom 
of association has also been among the most neglected of the core labour 
standards.  For example, since the establishment of Core Labour Standards in 
1998, the ILO Committee of Experts has done no further work on freedom of 
association in general surveys.  Some of its former work and general surveys are 
being removed from access the ILO’s web site because they are so dated. 
To do this case study, I took a different approach than the forced labour 
case study and experimented with two different levels of institutional analysis.  
The first, like the obligatory overtime study, examines anti-union discrimination, 
one aspect of freedom of association.  The second level of analysis was at the 
configurational level by categorizing the complex web of inter-related rights into 
categories: rules that prevent workers from organizing into unions, rules that 
control/limit unions once they come into existence and rules that help unions go 
out of existence.  For this, I used the idea of characterizing a state’s policy 
towards trade unions or regulatory objective based on Roy Adam’s 1992 work.  
Looking at the overall configurational level, state policies and institutions could 
be regarded as repressing, tolerating or encouraging freedom of association and 
right to collective bargaining.   I also, tested an idea about the role of institutional 
hierarchies on state policy and institutions related to freedom of association based 
on the work of Roberts (2007) arguing that union roles in politics is an 
institutional hierarchy influencing respect for freedom of association. 
III. Overcoming Obstacles in the Research Process 
For both case studies I returned to the National Academy of Science 
project and the problems it identified as necessary to deal with in labour standards 
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monitoring:  (1) problems defining specific obligations of countries to comply 
with labour standards, (2) problems with identifying indicators of compliance or 
non-compliance, (3) problems associated with sources of information and (4) 
problems associated with making appropriate inferences (National Research 
Council 2004, Moran 2005).  Below is how I addressed the challenges: 
A. Identifying Specific Obligations of DR-CAFTA Countries 
 
In this project, the obligations of DR-CAFTA countries to comply with 
labour standards is defined explicitly by ILO Conventions and their interpretation 
by the ILO Committee of Experts as well as the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association.  These obligations are well established, but not necessarily broadly 
known although spelled out in the Conventions themselves as well as in 
subsequent ILO publications and cases.  All six DR-CAFTA countries have 
ratified all of the ILO Conventions underlying the Core Labour Standards.  Even 
if they had not all ratified the standards, the ILO Conventions would still be useful 
benchmarks for purposes of defining country obligations.   
B.  Identifying Indicators of Compliance or Non-Compliance 
 
The National Research Council did not seek to authoritatively delineate 
between categories of compliance or set authoritative thresholds (Moran 2005 p. 
150).  Nevertheless there have been attempts to create indicators based on the ILO 
(Böhning 2003) and U.S. labour standards (Cingranelli Richards 2004).  My 
initial goal was to create an indicator system based on ILO Conventions because I 
thought it would make comparisons between countries meaningful.  In the end, I 
simply made my own qualitative assessment based on comparing the evidence I 
had gathered in each case to the ILO obligations.  Very often there were 
diplomatic yet explicit indications of non-compliance in the documentary 
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evidence from the ILO Committee of Experts observations and direct requests that 
were part of the documentary evidence. 
C.  Problems Associated with Sources of Information 
 
A tremendous amount of information and guidance has emerged since 
1998 on collecting and evaluating data concerning labour rights.  This has 
emerged from the ILO as well as from independent academics and from 
government sponsored research such as the U.S. National Research Council 
(National Academy of Sciences 2004).  There is also an increasing amount of 
information available from wide-ranging sources such as trade unions, non-
governmental organisations, government ministries (trade, labour etc.), 
international human rights groups and international trade union confederations.  
Despite this expanding body of information, there were challenges in 
data/evidence collection because (1) some rights still suffer from low levels of 
data (Bales 2005), (2) the glut of data on other rights brings its own challenges 
and limits which need to be dealt with (Compa 2005; Moran 2005) and (3) 
research processes and selection of sources of data and evidence needs to be 
transparent so that assessments and inferences based upon them may be contested 
(Moran 2005).   
On balance, in looking for evidence upon which to construct patterns of 
rights enforcement, two overarching goals were important. First, it was important 
to expansively look for a variety of sources because it broadens the base upon 
which the patterns are established and secondly it is important to critically 
evaluate the sources in terms of whether they are individually and collectively: 
• Reliable 
• Representative 
• Comparable 
• Unbiased 
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The data collection process began over the course of producing country 
studies that included investigating preliminary patterns of labour rights and 
violations.  Given the nature of holistic assessment, which is “problematic and 
contingent,” these problems cannot be erased but rather accounted for in research 
design by having a structure and research process which is revealed transparently 
and explicitly (Moran 2005 p. 150).  Such a process of “thorough, transparent” 
assessment “allows alternative evaluators to identify where they disagree in 
assessment” (Moran 2005 p. 147). 
D.  Identifying and Solving Problems Associated with Making Appropriate 
Inferences 
 
The research process and design outlined above should lead to the creation 
of a body of evidence with which qualitative comparative analysis could be used.  
The strategy in answering the research questions involves using the analytical tool 
to systematically assess labour rights enforcement outcomes relative to ILO 
obligations and then linking the outcomes to “combinations of causally relevant 
conditions” in the form of formal and informal institutional arrangements (Mills et 
al 2006 p. 624).  Comparative analysis is well suited to this goal and entails 
“comparing similarities and differences… to uncover empirical relationships 
between the presence of key explanatory factors” (Landman 2006 p. 66).  Two 
different research designs enable the isolation of explanatory factors and an ability 
to link them to observed outcomes: ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD) and 
‘most different systems design’ (MDSD) (Przeworski & Teune 1970).  MSSD 
compares different outcomes across similar countries, and MDSD compares 
similar outcomes across different countries (Landman 2006 p. 66).   
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Both designs originate in Mill’s ‘method of difference and logic of 
agreement’ (Landman 2006 p. 66).  Ragin argues that comparative methods based 
on Mill’s method of difference and logic of agreement, if used in a step-wise 
process, can help to categorise different “patterns of multiple causation” and help 
to elaborate “crucial differences between positive and negative cases” (Ragin 
1987 p. 44).  In this way, qualitative comparative analysis “leaves room for 
complexity” (Rihoux 2006 p. 682).   The case studies bear out that complexity and 
multiple causal pathways are relevant in studying labour rights.  One example can 
be seen in the freedom of association case, where Guatemala and El Salvador 
achieve similar outcomes but through distinctive institutional arrangements, the 
former relying on social conventions of violence and the latter relying on the 
enforcement of repressive rules.  
Systematic comparisons of labour rights outcomes allow evaluative 
inferences to be drawn based on comparing the outcomes of each right to 
international obligations.  Comparisons and inferences can also be made across 
countries with respect to one or more labour rights.  Using the institutions and 
compliance frameworks including concepts of complementarities and 
internalization to make such assessment creates a holistic alternative to current 
quantitative assessment methods (National Research Council 2004; Böhning 
2003; Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset).  It is modelled on transparent 
replicable methodologies from labour rights monitoring and newly emerging 
human rights methodologies (Moran 2005; Landman 2006).  Transparent, 
replicable assessment of labour rights enforcement may also contribute important 
information to debates about the effectiveness of the current international labour 
rights regime.  
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 Comparing labour rights outcomes with patterns of institutional 
arrangements sheds light on the complex interactions that protect labour rights or 
alternatively sustain their violation.  As the evidence shows, labour rights 
violations result from multiple and combinatorial causation (Ragin 1987).  
Systematic analysis helps to identify different recipes for violations as well as 
recipes for respect and what differentiates them.  The inferences that are drawn 
from the research are very limited.  First, inferences are limited to particular case 
and context and relate the particular labour rights problem to the corresponding 
intervention based on Koh’s compliance framework.  One other area where 
inferences may be usefully drawn is where an institutional hierarchy is found to 
influence respect for labour rights. 
In sum, the advantages of employing qualitative comparative analysis as a 
methodological strategy and approach is its usefulness in explaining and 
interpreting diverse experiences and in helping to corroborate or refute theories-
theory testing (Ragin 1987 p.53; Rihoux 2006 pp. 683-684).   The process by 
which this occurs has been described as a ‘dialogue of ideas and evidence’ by 
engineering a confrontation between theory and data (Ragin 1987).  With respect 
to labour rights enforcement debates and controversies, this project seeks to utilize 
qualitative comparative analysis to interpret the diverse experiences of Central 
American countries in enforcing labour rights and to test a theory about why states 
and actors do or do not comply and enforce norms (Koh 1998). 
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Chapter 3 
DR-CAFTA Countries in Comparative Perspective 
 
I.  Introduction and Background 
A.  Why Country Studies? 
 
During the first year, my research focused on in-depth studies of each of 
the five Central American countries, including learning and documenting the main 
sources of information and data.  The objective was to prepare comprehensive 
literature reviews for each of the countries that would provide background and 
understanding of the political economy of each country in the study, as well as an 
introduction to the employment systems in the countries.   It also made evident the 
specific labour rights violations in the region generally and in each country 
specifically.  The country studies also served to document sources that address all 
six countries, to become familiar with areas where information and data is lacking 
and to design the research for the coming years to account for these shortcomings.  
The in-depth studies provided the background on which the methodology for data 
collection and cross-country comparison could be tailored.  
B.  Comparative Method  
 
In contrast to the individualized country studies, the research project is 
comparative with the goal of examining respect for labour rights across Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua—the countries that are treaty participants in the Dominican Republic- 
Central America Free Trade Agreement.  Comparative research and its design 
raise questions about the purpose of comparisons to be made and the 
appropriateness of “things” being compared.  In this case, the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 4 guides the comparisons.  In addition to theory, 
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comparative methods can also be fruitfully guided by close attention to history 
and context (Ragin1987).  
The appropriateness of the countries for purposes of comparison is based 
on “most similar” comparative design (Przeworski and Teune 1970).  Chapter 1 of 
the dissertation began to outline the appropriateness of this group of countries as 
comparable cases.  Important similarities and shared characteristics are historical 
and include Spanish Colonialism, Catholicism, their relatively small size as 
peripheral economies, their parallel development paths and models, first as small 
primary product export-based economies, followed by a period of import-
substitution from the 1940’s through the 1980s and a return to export-led models 
of development since the 1980s  (Bulmer-Thomas 187; Perez-Brignoli 1989). 
There are, however, important differences among the countries and these 
may help to explain different levels of respect or disregard for labour rights.  The 
country studies drilled down in each country and examined in great detail its own 
context including: 
 
• Historical, Political, Economic Contexts  
• Employment Systems 
• Migration Patterns and Impact 
• Legal Frameworks 
• Labour Rights Obligations 
• Labour Rights Enforcement Assessments 
 
The point of this chapter is different than the country studies even though 
it is largely based upon them.  The purpose of this chapter is to re-examine the 
social facts in each of the countries and find meaningful patterns of differences 
that may account for what is found later in applying the theory to the empirical 
evidence.  Re-examining the country studies is undertaken to (1) identify 
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meaningful differences and (2) to identify possible explanations and sources of the 
differences 
C.  Chapter Plan 
Following this introduction, Section 2 explains the two main organizing 
principles behind categorizing the countries in the study.  They are state capacity 
for institutional action based on work by Evans (1995) and Guy Standing’s (1991) 
labour market regulatory regimes. This is followed by an explanation for how 
each of country falls within the two sets of categories.  Section 3 presents a 
discussion of why countries fall into the different categories based on critical 
junctures in which divergences occur. Four specific junctures are proposed and 
explained as relevant for the purposes of Central America and the Dominican 
Republic.  These are (1) colonial experience, (2) state formation, (3) import 
substitution and (4) export-oriented development and structural adjustment.  
Section 4 presents illustrations of how the critical junctures influenced divergent 
paths for each of the categories represented in the study.  Costa Rica is presented 
for the developmental paternalistic category.  Nicaragua is presented for the 
predatory protective category and the Dominican Republic is presented for the 
predatory repressive category.  As part of the discussion of critical junctures there 
is also, where relevant, a discussion of the strong influence the United States has 
played in the internal affairs of the countries.  Section 5 presents some discussion 
of the comparisons and conclusions. 
II. Framework for Categorizing Differences 
 
For the purposes of carrying out this re-examination of the country studies, 
I have adopted the approach taken by Itzigsohn in his book comparing 
development policy in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (Itzigsohn 2000).  
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Itzigsohn  (2000 p. 140) borrows from other theorists setting up the following 
typologies as points of divergence among the countries: (1) State Capacity for 
Institutional Action (Evans 1995), and (2) Labour Market Regulatory Regime 
(Standing 1991).  The two conceptual guides help in the interpretation of the 
individual country study documents.   
The sources for these comparisons and analyses are the individual country 
studies I authored in the first year and a half, comparative institutional analysis of 
Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic done by Itzigsohn (2000) and updated 
data on sources in my original country studies from Bertelsmann as well as 
Itzigsohn’s analysis of Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic and updated 
country reports from Bertelsmann. 
A.  State Capacity for Institutional Action 
 
States are actors with authority to establish and implement policy, 
maintain order, enforce laws, collect revenue etc but their capacity (institutional 
and political) and objectives vary (Skocpol 1985).  State capacity for institutional 
action refers to a state’s regulatory orientation over numerous state institutions 
and bureaucracies. How a state performs its role has been usefully conceptualised 
in ideal types by Evans (1995). 
Predatory states are states in which central control and bureaucratic norms 
have disintegrated and corruption rules.  Different groups in the state bureaucracy 
attempt to maximize their own profits by selling their services in the market.  
There is a market- logic to the state apparatus in every area of state functions and 
services, contracts and justice.  Those with wealth have access and buy state 
services and others exit the state institutional system (Evans 1995).   When 
predatory states are headed by dictators they take on a specific form of predation 
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called neopatrimonialism (Hartlyn 1998).  There are two key characteristics of 
neopatrimonial states.  The first is a centralization of power through patron-client 
relationships and the second is a blurring of boundaries between the state’s public 
interests and the ruler’s private interests. 
Developmental states are states in which there are well functioning and 
centrally coordinated state bureaucratic agencies.  These agencies are connected to 
the main economic actors through different organizational networks.  The linkages 
involve the flow of ideas and people between state and economic organizations 
creating feedback for both.  These networks do not, however, diminish the 
autonomous nature of work in state bureaucracies.  These have been called 
socially connected bureaucracies (Evans 1995). 
B.  Labour Market Regulatory Regimes   
 
In addition to this general capacity for institutional action, it is useful to 
also examine the state’s specific role in labour market regulation.  The state as an 
actor plays an essential role in establishing the regulatory mechanisms governing 
relations and conflict between the working class and elites (Howell 2005 p. 21).  
Guy Standing (1991) developed a typology to characterize distinct state roles in 
establishing regulatory regimes within labour markets.  Overall, the character of 
the State’s labour market regulation may be characterized as tending towards the 
one of three ideal types: 
Protective regimes are those in which workers achieve protective 
regulations through negotiating with employers and the state and result from the 
strength of workers’ organizations.  Resulting regulations (institutional 
settlements) reflect the relative balance of power.  To Standing’s definition, I have 
also incorporated into this category labour market regimes that enable collective 
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worker organization and negotiation through the absence of repressive 
regulations. 
Paternalistic regimes are those in which the regulations are those 
legislated by the state either as an attempt to co-opt segments of the working class 
or as a result of values about the issues held by the elites in office.  In other words, 
regulations do not necessarily reflect the relative class balance of power in 
society. 
Repressive regimes are those in which labour market regulation is 
designed to limit or completely eliminate collective action on the part of workers.   
States may straddle more than one category along these dimensions in 
their labour market regulation.  For example, a state may strongly limit collective 
action by workers but provide paternalistic regulations on minimum wages or a 
social safety net for unemployment.  Each of the six countries in the study can 
nevertheless be located within the dimension they fit best in an overall sense.  I 
have categorized the countries in the study based on the country studies performed 
at the outset of the research project, Itzigsohn’s (2000) analysis and updated 
material from Bertelsmann (2010). 
C.  Groupings of Countries 
 
Based on these typologies three different groups of DR-CAFTA countries 
emerge. They are: 
Table 3.1 
 
 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
 
Predatory 
Protective 
(non-repressive) 
 
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Costa Rica Nicaragua Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
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D.  Assignment of Countries within Classifications 
 
 Re-examining the updated country studies and the work on Itzigsohn, 
countries are assigned into the above groups and brief explanations and rationale 
are provided for each country’s placement below. 
1.  Developmental Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica is a developmental state with a paternalistic labour market 
regulatory regime.  It has a relatively highly functioning autonomous government 
apparatus free from the kinds of elite capture found in predatory states.  It also has 
had a stronger ability to enforce regulations and a more highly developed and 
broader coverage by its welfare state than any other country in the study. Costa 
Rica’s economic development and state apparatus has not exclusively focused on 
enriching a small oligarchy as in predatory states.  It suffers from great inequality 
like the rest of the region but much of its development policy has been directed at 
maintaining a middle class.  There is corruption among public officials 
particularly in procurement contracts and clientalistic relationships exist but these 
are not the primary basis of organization of the government and its apparatus. 
Costa Rica is among the longest-lived and most peaceful and stable 
democracies in Latin America.  It is the only DR-CAFTA country that put 
ratification of the trade agreement forward for approval in a popular vote.  Much 
of its bureaucratic structure and agencies are completely free from legislative and 
presidential control and oversight including their budgets.  It is also known for 
having an independent judiciary.  It is the only country in the study that does not 
rely on the export of labour to provide income support in the form of remittances.   
Costa Rica’s economy has been relatively successful and the state has 
played and continues to play a major role in the economy leading and supporting 
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innovative growth strategies.  A good example of this orientation is the historic 
concern that the country has had with preserving its natural resources and 
environment as public goods.  It has used its environmental quality as a means to 
develop its tourism industry, which now accounts for 20% of total export earnings 
(Bertelsmann 2010 p. 4).  
Costa Rica is oriented towards a paternalistic labour market regulatory 
regime based on its historic discouragement of trade union activity accompanied 
by a strong emphasis on minimum wage and other laws regulating working 
conditions.  When structural adjustment related policy changes increased poverty, 
the government prioritized poverty alleviation in food support and housing.  Costa 
Rica was the only country not plunged into a domestic economic crisis during 
structural adjustment largely because of the government’s emphasis on social 
consensus and support. 
2.  Predatory Protective 
 
Nicaragua is a predatory state with periods of time in which it adopts more 
developmental characteristics and elements.  Its regulatory regime in labour 
markets is protective based on its startling lack of repressive regulations.  In many 
ways, Nicaragua is a hybrid.  It shares a solidly neopatrimonial past with the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.   It is highly 
politically polarized but more peaceful than similarly polarized El Salvador and 
Honduras.  It retains a small economic elite and there remains a massive chasm 
between the rich and the poor.  It also continues to suffer from corruption in its 
state apparatus and judiciary but these no longer follow narrow demarcations of 
economic elites and are instead based on political competition between two highly 
polarized political parties.  The parties and their members are organized around 
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deep programmatic and ideological differences. The leaders of the parties have 
informally agreed to share power to through government institutions by 
influencing them in traditionally predatory ways.  There is blatant politicization of 
state institutions. 
The Sandinistas took power in a revolution in 1979 and ruled 
democratically until their electoral loss to the liberals in 1990.  The Sandinistas 
came back into power in 2006 elections, defeating the liberal party.  Both parties 
share predatory tendencies but there have been moments and elements of a more 
developmentalist approach.  After the Sandinista Revolution in 1979 the 
government expropriated lands, companies and wealth and broadly collectivized 
them.  Samoza era elites lost their central place in politics and politics became 
dominated by political collective actors who compete in elections rather than 
through violence.  When the Sandinistas lost the elections in 1990 to the liberals, 
the liberals did not reverse the Sandinista’s expropriations or revert to 
neopatrimonialism.  Instead, liberals implemented orthodox structural adjustment 
policies beginning in the 1990s.  When they returned to power in 2006, the 
Sandinistas resisted further neoliberal reforms but have not sought to reverse 
existing policies. 
Nicaragua is very poor, the second poorest country in the region and is 
highly dependent on foreign aid.  Nevertheless there has been more effort and 
resources of its own spent in trying to address poverty and education under both 
Liberal and Sandinista rule.  In stark contrast to all the other countries, Nicaragua 
is not repressive and there is some evidence of protection in the form of 
meaningful bargaining with public sector unions.  Its lack of repression can be 
seen in its unrestricted freedom of association and evidence of workplace 
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organization dating from the Sandinista Revolution.  Much of the agricultural 
sector is organized and overall about half of the workforce is organized.  Its lack 
of repression is also seen in the sharp public debates about policy.  The Sandinista 
government continues to emphasize collective organization since coming back 
into power in 2006 establishing local collectives (Consejos del Poder Ciudadanos 
(Citizen Power Councils) to consolidate Sandinista political control at local levels. 
3.  Predatory Repressive States 
a. The Dominican Republic 
 
The Dominican Republic is considered a Moderately Predatory State.  It is 
also repressive and mildly paternalistic.   Its repressive regulatory orientation 
differs from others such as El Salvador in that its repression is expressed through 
inaction and non-enforcement rather than by design.  Itzigsohn argues that the 
country has more recently begun to drift towards a developmental orientation 
(Itzigsohn 2000 p. 35).  Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic has a long history 
of military dictatorship followed by democratically elected leaders who maintain 
neopatrimonial governance.  Its military and police are implicated in narcotics 
related crime, trafficking in persons and repression.  It’s a country known for 
enacting patrimonial legislation that is not applied in practice.  The Dominican 
Republic is one of the cases that is more fully explained in reference with specific 
critical junctures in the next section.   
b.  El Salvador 
 
El Salvador is predatory and repressive.  Despite its peace agreement and 
democratic elections since 1992, the state apparatus is firmly in service of the 
country’s small oligarchic elite even while the country has enthusiastically 
implemented neoliberal reforms.  Only oligarchic elites benefit from market 
activity and also benefit from the country’s judicial system and many other 
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agencies.  There are few efforts to remove corrupt government officials.  The 
military has been implicated in participating in and directing narcotics trafficking.   
The state safety net is very small and foreign donor governments, not the 
government of El Salvador largely finance poverty reduction projects. It has a tax 
burden that is among the lowest in the region.  There is a low level of schooling 
partially due to the state’s maintenance of illegal school fees.  Poverty has 
increased and has led to more subsistence agricultural activity and the exit of poor 
people from the market economy.  The social security system is privatized and 
foreign owned.  Remittances from Salvadorans working abroad have increased 
during the global financial crisis and play a significant role in poverty reduction 
but Salvadoran migrants do not have political rights at home.  
El Salvador is repressive in its labour market regulatory regime. The 
country differs from the Dominican Republic in its failure to soften its repressive 
regulations or co-opt segments of the workforce with paternalistic regulation. 
  It is highly polarized along class lines with active left and right wing 
political party rivals. Along with Guatemala and Colombia, El Salvador is among 
the most violent societies in Latin America.  It has recently criminalized popular 
protests by enacting anti-terrorism laws and applying them to protests against 
privatization.  This has enabled the country to respond to social protests with 
military intervention.  Salvadorans have the lowest level of faith in the practical 
effects of protest in Latin America.  Trade unions are prohibited in the public 
sector.  After the country ratified ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association, El Salvador’s Supreme Court declared the Convention 
unconstitutional under Salvador law. 
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c.  Guatemala 
 
Guatemala is a predatory and repressive state. Guatemala’s development 
model has remained consistent despite the 1996 peace accords ending a civil war 
that started in 1960.  The economy remains based on the extraction of natural 
resources (gold, silver, copper etc), low utilization of formal labour and 
remittances from Guatemalan migrants abroad.  Enactment of neoliberal reforms 
such as privatization have perpetuated and deepened the inequalities and 
privileges of the elites. 
There are three different groups composing Guatemala’s elite.  Military 
leaders control some state institutions and are connected to another group of elites 
who head criminal and drug trafficking networks.  Elites from among criminal 
networks have also gained access to state agencies and even pay congressional 
representatives.  There is also a small group of urban oligarchic elites. Their 
organization successfully opposes policy reform challenges to the status quo such 
as tax reform.  Guatemala has one of the lowest tax rates in the world. In surveys, 
Guatemalan elites have said that they support democracy only as long as it does 
not challenge their position of dominance.   
In Guatemala, the oligarchy does not have its own political party and 
instead financially supports multiple parties through formal and informal 
channels. There are numerous fragmented political parties that are based on 
personality and clientalistic relationships, not policy or programmatic differences.  
No governing party has been reelected to the presidency since the 1996 peace 
accords.   Predatory influence of elites over the state apparatus remains constant 
however.  Much of the former state apparatus has been dismantled as a result of 
the peace accords, but the new apparatus remains influenced or undermined by the 
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elites.  Access to state services and resources remains firmly based on power 
relations.   Even efforts to decentralize bureaucratic institutions to more local 
levels provide opportunities for earmarking government resources along 
clientalistic lines at local levels.  When people in government institutions exhibit 
independence, as has occurred occasionally in the judiciary, invariably threats of 
violence and often actual violence including assassination follows.   
Guatemala is also strongly repressive in its labour market regulatory 
regime.  It is the next most violent country after El Salvador and like El Salvador 
is highly polarized along class and racial divides.  Unlike El Salvador, Guatemala 
does not have an organized left, leaning party.  Repression in Guatemala is largely 
based on pervasive violence that is committed with impunity.  The government 
calls upon long shelved cold war era laws that allow them to suppress protests and 
strikes.  Protests are considered criminal and can result in lengthy prison sentences 
if the protest disrupts private enterprises that contribute to Guatemala’s economic 
development.   
Like El Salvador, there is a near total absence of paternalistic labour 
regulation or a welfare state.  The absence of paternalistic labour market 
regulations is so severe that the main option for Guatemalans is exit and legal or 
illegal work abroad.  The real minimum wage has declined 11% between 2008 
and 2009.  Remittances from Guatemalans working abroad are the main form of 
income support. 
d.  Honduras 
 
The overall character of Honduras is predatory and repressive.  In contrast 
to El Salvador and Guatemala there are some counter tendencies in enclaves 
among urban middleclass areas where the state apparatus is more independent of 
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oligarchic elites. There are also some exceptions to the repressiveness of the state 
evidenced in the incorporation of some labour unions and union activity in the 
public sector. 
The elite in Honduras do not appear to be as unified as those in El 
Salvador and Guatemala.  Like Guatemala and El Salvador there is a military 
element, an economic oligarchic elite and also clandestine criminal networks tied 
to drug trafficking.  The criminal elite work inside state agencies and appear to be 
connected to military, economic and political elites.  Conflicts and competition 
between and within elite factions as well as between factions and the government 
are often settled violently.  Efforts to combat corruption and clientalism in state 
bureaucracies are largely coordinated campaigns to improve the reputation of the 
political parties without any change in bureaucratic governance.  
Elites also define the policies of the two political parties that dominate 
election competition and so there are not ideological or programmatic differences 
between the parties.  The leaders of opposing parties are often linked to each other 
and the same families and interests.  The competition between the parties is over 
the clientalistic spoils of electoral victory that are then delivered through the state 
apparatus. 
Overall, like El Salvador, the expansion of the economy from its 
traditional agricultural exports into textile assembly and other low cost consumer 
goods and greater integration in the global economy have benefited Honduras’ 
oligarchic elites.  In addition to acting through state institutions and the judiciary, 
elites also control the country’s media through ownership, informal networks or 
bribery and intimidation when necessary. 
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Honduras is repressive with some possible contrary elements of 
protection.  Like El Salvador and Guatemala it is extremely violent.  Labour and 
civil society activists who challenge social and political power elites are 
threatened and victimized by violent attacks and assassination.  The state violently 
represses protests.  On the other hand, middleclass unions of state employees, 
teachers and physicians with strong political ties to the parties are tolerated and 
are even able to exert pressure on the government through strikes as occurred in 
public health.  Only one-third of the population lives above the poverty line.   
Structural adjustment inspired policies cutting government social spending 
and public sector employment have deepened inequalities in health and education.  
Like El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras is heavily reliant on remittances for 
support of its poor.  Unlike the Dominican Republic there is no evidence of 
ameliorating paternalistic regulation to offset its repressive nature but given its 
tolerance of unions in at least some sectors, it is possibly more protective.  
Notably, protective regulation in the case of Honduras, may well be an outcome of 
clientalistic relationships between the unions and elites.  It is unclear if Standing 
anticipated this possibility in his ideal type.  
III. Critical Junctures 
 
Each country comes to belong somewhere on a continuum within the 
dimensions as a result of the cumulative effects of history and the divergent 
choices made over the course of that history.  Power relations in systems of 
politics and economic production explain divergence particularly during periods 
of transformation or ‘critical moments’ in which power balances shift, resulting in 
new areas of conformity and diversity.  These shifts in turn influence variations in 
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the trajectory of the state, labour movements and industrial relations within each 
society (Collier and Collier 1991; Bulmer-Thomas 1987, p.267).  
At these critical moments a country’s tendency to be developmental or 
predatory and its tendency to be oriented towards protective, paternalistic or 
repressive labour market regulation may be reinforced, amended or overthrown.  
As part of locating the six countries in terms of their respective capacity for 
institutional action and labour market regulatory regime, four critical moments 
will be examined.  These are based on Bulmer-Thomas (1987) Itzigsohn (2000): 
(1) Colonial Experience:  Some institutional inheritances had origins in colonial 
times.  These institutional traits came in the process of establishing Spanish rule.  
They include the geographic location of elites, their cohesiveness and 
competitiveness, their proximity to and relations with colonial centres of power in 
Guatemala.  A key inheritance is the forms of coercion in labour that developed 
based on the kinds of work performed and the availability of land. 
(2) State Formation: The formation of newly independent nations in Central 
America and the Dominican Republic were critical moments and the countries 
diverged between relative peace and unity or protracted conflict and war.  The 
first formal state institutions for production and politics were established and, 
depending on the process and choices, some countries developed strong military 
institutions rather than social democratic institutions.  
(3) Import Substitution:  From the end of World War Two, Latin American 
countries attempted to industrialize, transforming their economies from their 
agricultural exports base to domestic production and consumption of 
manufactured goods.  They did this by creating barriers to the import of products 
to protect local producers of the same products.  They also indirectly subsidized 
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industrial development by enhancing public expenditures and services and 
increasing the social wage (Itzigsohn 2000 p. 43).  The process began in the 1930s 
in Latin America, but started much later in the Dominican Republic and Central 
America. 
(4) Post Import Substitution/Structural Adjustment: Import substitution was 
not a sustainable development model due to its resulting trade imbalances from 
extensive imports of capital and intermediate goods to support industrialization 
and rapid exhaustion of internal markets for newly produced consumer goods.  Oil 
shocks in the late 1970s worsened deficits and world-wide recession was 
accompanied by a decline in prices for agricultural exports.  The totality of these 
circumstances led to a crisis in debt, as well as in social and economic spheres and 
led to a change from import substitution back to export-oriented development.  
These changes were accompanied by neoliberal ideology and policy frameworks 
of opening economies to foreign trade, downsizing of the state and its 
expenditures and diminishing its interventions in the economy (Roberts 2007; 
Itzigsohn 2000).  There were changes in the economy and also in the State’s role 
in the economy including labour market regulation (Itzigsohn 2000 p. 46).  
Remodeling the economy based on primary exports, low skilled services, low 
wage manufacturing and in some cases export of citizens to work abroad and 
support families through remittances.  Nevertheless, there were important 
differences in how neo-liberal reforms have been implemented and economies 
restructured. 
Using Itzigsohn’s model and analysis as a starting point, I used and then 
extended it beyond Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic to the other countries 
in the study.  This entailed re-examining the country studies to be able to create a 
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profile of each of the countries in terms of its institutional capacity for action and 
labour market regulatory regime. Next some expectations for the country’s 
performance are presented based on its categorizations. Finally, in addition to 
placing the country within appropriate categories and discussing expectations 
based on its categorization, the historical material in the country studies is re-
organized and summarized along the lines of the critical moments to identify 
potentially important historical underpinnings. 
IV. Selected Country Profiles: 
A.  Costa Rica (Developmental Paternalistic) 
1.  Historical Contexts  
 a.  Colonial Times 
 
During the period of Spanish colonial rule, Costa Rica was an ignored 
backwater of little importance to the center of Spanish Colonial power in 
Guatemala.  Land was plentiful and access to it remained open to peasants.  
Coerced labour was not part of Costa Rica’s colonial development.    
b.  State Formation Background 
 
Dating from colonial time, Costa Rica’s elites settled in the country’s 
central valley and did not disperse geographically.  In addition, elites were more 
cohesive than in other countries, sharing the same economic interests and activity 
focused on coffee production.  When conflict among elites occurred, it was not as 
protracted or destructive as the Dominican Republic and other countries in Central 
America.  There was a brief civil war in 1935 and military rule occurred 
sporadically between 1905 and 1924.  Since the second half of 19th century the 
Costa Rican state actively promoted its coffee economy but in addition also 
promoted and funded expansion of education dating from the last quarter of the 
19th century. 
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2.  Critical Juncture of Social Reform and Democracy in State Formation 
 
From 1940-1948, Costa Rica was led by two reform minded leaders in 
succession who had support from a coalition of other reform-minded elites, the 
communist party, trade unions and the Catholic Church.  During this time Costa 
Rica enacted a labour code, progressive income tax system and created a social 
security system.  By 1948, the election of the next hand-picked successor was 
contested by an opposing group of conservative elites and young social democrats 
from the rising middleclass.   This latter group prevailed. 
The leader of the winning side was a military leader who offered to govern 
through a junta for eighteen months after which he would hand over the 
government to the elected leader.  This was agreed to and during this time the 
junta repressed the coalition partners on the losing side including the communists 
and already weakened trade unions.  Nevertheless, the junta also continued to 
implement the reforms initiated by the reformist group it had defeated.  These 
reforms included abolition of the armed forces, nationalization of banks and 
insurance companies.  The state became an active promoter of economic 
development in service of the middleclass.  When the conservatives took over the 
government after the junta, they too continued the reforms. 
Neither side in the conflict opposed the reforms. Further, the reforms did 
not fundamentally challenge the coffee oligarchy but rather opened an economic 
and political space for inclusion of the middleclass.  To do this, the elites decided 
to defeat some of their own more recalcitrant segments but they also defeated the 
organized communists and trade unionists. 
The institutions of the state that developed from Costa Rica’s political and 
economic development were not completely free of clientalism but there was a 
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higher degree of bureaucratic autonomy allowing them to function freely relative 
to the Dominican Republic and other Central American countries. 
a.  U.S. Role 
A key element of the process and outcome of Costa Rica’s 1948 crisis was 
the absence of a destabilizing U.S. intervention.  Costa Rica was a close ally of 
the U.S. throughout the cold war and even outlawed its communist party.  Further, 
none of the reforms directly threatened U.S. private or government interests. 
b.  Import Substitution Era 
 
In Costa Rica, import substitution was implemented by addition to the 
existing agricultural base rather than as a replacement to it.  The state continued to 
support agricultural exports throughout the import substitution era.  Unlike 
predatory states, in Costa Rica, import substitution had a strong social as well as 
industrial aspect.  The already advanced welfare state was further extended and 
the state increased its enforcement of regulation of labour markets.  Minimum 
wage laws and the labour code were “seriously enforced” (Itzigsohn 2000 p. 44).  
Coverage by the social security system increased from 17.7% in 1961 to 83.4% in 
1991 (Itzigsohn 2000 p. 44).  These improvements occurred in a solidly 
paternalistic labour market regulatory regime.   The state improved social 
conditions in line with its class consensus model while unions remained weak and 
fragmented and the state discouraged trade union organization (Itzigsohn pp. 44-
45).  The state encouraged formation of alternatives to unions called Solidarista 
associations at the firm level and discouraged trade union organization (Itzigsohn 
2000 p. 45).  Roberts calls this import substitution model “elitist” because it did 
not rely on mobilizing workers or their organizations and was not as deeply 
redistributive as other cases such as Nicaragua (Roberts 2007)  
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c.  Export Oriented Development & Neoliberal Reforms 
 
In Costa Rica, the return to export oriented development and neo liberal 
reforms caused the deterioration but not the dismantling of welfare state.  There 
were more poor people and fewer resources for the welfare state to address the 
poverty.  Similarly, the public sector was reduced but still remained important. 
Pressures and protests led to ad-hoc policies and social consensus against 
structural adjustment helped to delay and soften the impact of its implementation.  
Costa Rica’s transition was gradual, with a safely intact developmentalist 
orientation.  
These modifications of Costa Rica’s neoliberal transition were supported 
by United States foreign aid during its conflict with Nicaragua.  The United States 
used Costa Rica as a development ideal model and alternative to Nicaraguan 
revolution.  Immediately after the war ended, the United States withdrew the 
financial support that had enabled the gradualism to occur.  Also the aid that Costa 
Rica received was conditioned on the country’s privatizing public companies, the 
banking system and creating new private institutions to take over formerly public 
institutional functions.  In effect Costa Rica was required to dismantle elements of 
its system that made it an ideal model in the first place. 
Costa Rica’s social consensus democratic model also contributed to its 
relatively gradual implementation of structural adjustment policies.  The public 
popularly opposed cutting social spending and increasing costs of products like 
electricity.  As a result, Costa Rica’s structural adjustment was not accompanied 
by a recession or the devastating social costs that occurred elsewhere.  In contrast 
to its prescribed role retreating from the economy, the government retained its 
developmental orientation.   
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The state actively promoted traditional and new non-traditional 
agricultural exports beyond the Central American market.  It also, supported the 
development of maquilas and Export Processing Zones with tax incentives.  What 
changed was how the state performed its development role.  Instead of directly 
leading development, it switched to facilitating private sector actors to do it 
(Itzigsohn 2000).  Itzigsohn argues that Costa Rica’s decision to emphasize low-
wage textile assembly nudged Costa Rica away from its developmentalist tradition 
towards a more predatory orientation. 
Paternalistic labour market regulation remained evident in the neoliberal 
structural adjustment era with the government focused on the provision of food 
and housing for the poorest and for the homeless.  In addition, the government 
initiated programs to support self-employment and micro enterprises. Throughout 
the process, Costa Rica continued to support and enforce its minimum wage laws.  
Over this period, Costa Rica’s overall enforcement capacity suffered as evidenced 
by the increasing rates of complaints from workers who despite the law were paid 
below the minimum wage. 
B.  Nicaragua (Predatory Protective) 
1.  Historical Contexts 
a.  Colonial Times 
 
Like Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua was unimportant 
to Spain’s Colonial center.  There were multiple forms of forced labour practiced 
in early colonial times.  Indigenous people were captured and sent into slavery in 
Panama and Peru to work in mines and others were allowed to remain working in 
traditional cultivation of cacao, which the Spaniards taxed (Weaver 1994 p. 14).  
Forced labour was also used in mines, forests, shipyards and indigo plantations 
and began to decline due to disease (Whisnant 1995 p. 20; Weaver 1994 p. 15).  
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Labour was scarce but systems to extract labour were less successful and 
regulated (Europa 2005 p. 654). 
b.  State Formation Background 
 
Fierce competition over labour, landholdings and wealth developed during 
colonial times between two competing groups of elites, with former Spanish 
soldiers becoming the liberals in Leon and upper-class Spaniards becoming the 
conservatives in the city of Granada. Nicaragua was weak and its independence 
from Spain in 1821 did not lead to the formation of the state until 1838.  There 
were frequent conflicts between rival groups of elites.  Conservative elites 
dominated in Nicaragua until the late 1890s partly due to miscalculation by and 
the unpopularity of liberals when they hired a lawyer from the United States, 
William Walker to invade Nicaragua at their behest.  He did so but immediately 
sought to make the country a U.S. slave state.  
State formation and even the “liberal revolution” were incompletely 
accomplished in Nicaragua.  New infrastructure was built to support coffee, 
bananas, gold and timber export products but the process left significant 
conservative enclaves largely untouched (Weaver 1994 p. 69 and 89).  The 
process of taking land away from peasants so that they could be made to work 
through vagrancy laws and other coercive forms of labour were largely 
ineffective.  When coercion was attempted peasants walked off finding vacant 
land further away.  The divided elite could not form an effective alliance to coerce 
peasants. 
2.  Critical Juncture of Social Reform and Democracy in State Formation/U.S. 
Role 
 
In Nicaragua, the critical juncture related to social reform and democracy 
was largely influenced by United States intervention.  The liberal revolution 
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included creating a separation of church and state, modernizing state apparatus 
and building a canal through Nicaragua to compete with the Panama Canal.  This 
provoked an invasion by the United States to protect its canal monopoly in 
Panama. The occupation involved running the Nicaraguan government as well as 
the economy, including collecting customs revenues on behalf of US banks and 
companies and established a professional national guard  (Weaver 1994 p. 99). 
Like the Dominican Republic, occupation by the United States helped to bolster 
strong military institutions rather than democratic institutions. 
The invasion and occupation was opposed by liberals led by Sandino and 
the U.S. could not win so it negotiated a deal to run any possible canal in the 
future and to run elections and to help set up a neutral national guard with General 
Anastasio Samoza at the head.  A liberal won the election, signed a peace treaty 
with Sandino who was killed in 1934 by Samoza’s national guard. Fraudulent 
elections in 1937 installed Anastasio Somoza García as President and he ruled 
until his assassination in 1956 when his son Luís Somoza Debayle took over until 
his death 1967 followed by his younger brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle.  The 
last Somoza ruled until 1979. 
Under the Somoza dictatorships, the Nicaraguan export economy based on 
beef, sugar, cotton and coffee grew and some industrial development occurred 
(Europa 2005 p. 655).  State apparatus also grew to support the economy and 
essentially acted to service (Somoza’s) own business interests (and those of their 
closest allies) (Europa 2005 p. 655).  Consistent with Trujillo in the Dominican 
Republic, Samoza controlled 40% of the Nicaraguan economy (Europa 2005 p. 
655). 
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a. U.S. Role 
United States intervention has influenced other critical junctures in 
Nicaragua as well.  The resignation of the last Somoza dictator (Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle) in 1979 was the product of both organised internal insurrection 
by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación (FSLN) and withdrawal of support from 
the US after reports of human rights abuses, stealing humanitarian aid in the wake 
of a 1972 earthquake and the assassination of conservative opposition politician 
Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in 1978 (Europa 2005 p. 655, Economist Country Report 
2005 p. 4).  Once the FSLN won democratic elections, the U.S. worked to 
destabilize the government through trade embargoes and supporting anti-FSLN 
‘contra’ fighters (Economist Country Report 2005 p.  4).   It is estimated that 
250,000 people were forced to flee their homes during the war and approximately 
45,000 Nicaraguans were killed, injured or abducted (Europa 2005 p. 656).  Peace 
negotiations began in 1987 leading to disarmament and a framework for elections 
in 1990 (Europa 2005 p. 656).  The FSLN lost the 1990 election to Violeta Barrios 
de Chamorro and an alliance of opposition parties (UNO) (Europa 2005 p. 656, 
Economist Country Report 2005 p. 4). 
b.  Import Substitution 
The import substitution era in Nicaragua overlapped with the coming to 
power of the FSLN and its leader Daniel Ortega.  At the time of the revolution in 
1979, the economy was devastated by the Samozas.  GDP had fallen significantly 
during the fighting and Samoza’s thefts, and homelessness and hunger were 
widespread.   Import substitution in Nicaragua was deeply redistributive with the 
nationalization of the entire wealth of the Samoza family and its associates and all 
of their assets including domestic and foreign banks.  They redistributed land to 
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collectives rather than to individuals. They completely dismantled and replaced 
the military and police forces and did so through organized groups of workers.  
The Sandinista built a publicly funded social safety net with government share of 
GDP rising from 15% to 41% (Bertelsmann 2010 p. 4). 
c.  Post Import Substitution/Structural Adjustment 
 
 The Export Oriented Development model and neoliberal structural 
adjustment period began towards the end of Sandinista rule by the end of the 
1980s in response to mounting debt and inflation resulting from hostilities of the 
U.S. and economic policies implemented upon coming to power.  Structural 
adjustment began weakly under Sandinista rule and accompanied protests and 
divisions within the party and between the party and trade unions.  With the defeat 
of the Sandinistas in 1990 to the liberals, structural adjustment policies deepened 
but did not dismantle redistributive policies arising from import substitution.  
Poverty reduction continued to be a priority for the liberal party as well. 
C.  The Dominican Republic (Predatory Repressive)  
1.  History 
a. Colonial Times 
 
The Dominican Republic was a backwater and largely ignored and 
peripheral to Spanish Colonial centers of power in Guatemala.  Land was 
accessible to peasants.  Coerced labour of indigenous people occurred but was for 
a relatively short period of due to the rapid decimation of indigenous populations 
and short duration the gold extraction in mines before the Spanish left to look 
elsewhere (Levitt 2001 p. 31.)  By 1520 African slaves were imported to replace 
the decimated populations of the indigenous (Levitt 2001 p. 31). 
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b.  State Formation Background 
 
Economic elites in the Dominican Republic were not cohesive and 
historically weaker than military centers of power.  Elites were separated 
geographically and by different economic interests and activities.  There were 
protracted conflicts among elites who did not unite despite external aggression by 
Haiti.   Unlike the countries in Central America, the Dominican Republic gained 
its independence from Haiti not Spain.  State formation began during periods of 
dictatorship (1886-1889, 1906-1911) and ultimately was consolidated during and 
after U.S. occupation in 1916-1924.  U.S. occupation helped to further develop the 
status of the military as the strong united elite in the country. Its leader, Trujillo 
was dictator for thirty years. The consolidation of Dominican state occurred as an 
authoritarian neopatrimonial regime—the economy, development and state 
institutions were subordinated to supporting the wealth and welfare of Trujillo. 
2.  Critical Juncture of Social Reform and Democracy in State Formation 
 
A critical juncture occurred after Trujillo’s assassination and the first 
return to democratic elections.  A reform-minded social democrat was elected 
campaigning on reforms similar to those in Costa Rica but more explicitly 
invoking divisions between rich and poor.  Elites feared reforms.  Neither military 
nor economic elites had a commitment to democracy or saw electoral defeat as an 
obstacle since they maintained control of state bureaucracy.  
A coalition of military, business and church interests campaigned against 
the reform candidate as communist infiltrated.  A coup in 1963 prevented the new 
president from taking office.  In 1965, a pro-reformist military/civilian coalition 
attempted to return the elected candidate to office and this was strongly opposed 
by the conservative military.  The United States once again invaded and occupied.  
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The next democratically elected President was a conservative who continued 
patron-client politics of the former dictatorship apportioning the state apparatus to 
reward elites for their support.  
a. U.S. Role 
 
The U.S. had actively helped with the transition from Trujillo to the first 
democratic election but did not comment or intervene when the democratically 
elected reform candidate was overthrown in a coup.  In contrast, during the 
attempt by the pro reform military/civilian coalition to return the elected candidate 
to office, the U.S. denounced it as communist and invaded.  During occupation, 
former leaders of the reform coalition were violently repressed by the police and 
military.  The U.S. supervised the next democratic election in which conservative 
ally of Trujillo won popular support and the election.  
b. Import Substitution Era 
 
The government of the Dominican Republic promoted the expansion of 
industry, education and public employment for mobility of the urban middleclass.  
This model was still predatory and repressive however.  It was based on granting 
cheap labour to capital by freezing the salaries of the working class in the absence 
of a rising minimum wage or welfare safety net.  The state protected private sector 
employers from increasing costs of urban labour.  The state in turn subsidized its 
low paid urban labour by freezing prices on rural agricultural products bought by 
the urban working class.  Rural people migrated to cities and as their standard of 
living declined, the city working class drifted into increasingly informal work 
arrangements as their standard of living declined (Itzigsohn 2000 p. 45).  Import 
substitution in the DR was more oriented towards “modernization” than 
redistribution or social transformation. 
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The labour market regulatory regime in the Dominican Republic remained 
nominally paternalistic but effectively repressive.  The labour code dated from 
intellectuals linked to Trujillo during his reign and updated from time to time so 
as to be  “modernized” to accommodate international standards, but the code and 
its reforms were seldom implemented in practice. The very small working class 
was largely unorganized despite industrializing that was occurring.  There were 
few protections for workers and, what few protections existed were seldom 
enforced (Itzigsohn 2001 p. 45). 
c.  Post Import Substitution/Structural Adjustment 
 
Structural adjustment and a return to export oriented development were 
precipitated by a debt crisis in the Dominican Republic.  The first response was a 
reduction in imports and the spending of collective savings to pay down the debt 
obligations.  The Dominican Republic also began reorganizing its economy away 
from industry and towards the service sector in tourism, low skill, low wage 
textile assembly and the export of workers for remittances.  
Like Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic benefited during structural 
adjustment from its relationship with the United States.  The Dominican Republic 
gained access to a trade program sponsored by the United States to prevent 
political destabilization as a result of the worsening economy in the region.   The 
U.S. promoted imports from the region through the U.S. Caribbean Basin 
Initiation. (CBI).  Under the CBI the U.S. would import textiles from Caribbean 
basin countries like the Dominican Republic.  The U.S. also facilitated a 
substantial and rapid increase in the number of Dominicans it allowed to enter the 
U.S. as the economic situation worsened in the DR. 
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Four different administrations implemented structural adjustment policies 
and did not always take a consistent or orthodox approach to neo-liberal reforms.  
Though policy approaches varied, clientalism was a constant.  The size of the 
public sector decreased, and public sector resources were invested for construction 
projects for housing, roads and dams targeted for the benefit of political 
supporters and financed through discretionary presidential budgets.  The predatory 
nature of this program can be seen in the fact that the construction investment and 
development actually contradicted the export-oriented development plan since the 
construction was not directed at export-oriented industries (Itzigsohn 2000 p. 49).   
There was a continual decrease in role of the state in social services and 
cuts in social wages, health and education.  Overall expenditures in health 
increased but only because of rising costs, which were shifted from the state to 
private individuals and families through privatization.  Part of the clientalistic 
construction program resulted in the investment of money to build hospitals for 
patronage purposes but for which no budget existed to provide health care 
services at the newly constructed facilities.  Similarly, the Dominican Republic 
decreased expenditures on its social security system to the point where the state 
was violating its own social security law.  Increasing social polarization followed 
the decline in real incomes.  Poverty grew and the government did not have 
policies or plans to alleviate the consequences of the poverty.   
One aspect of structural adjustment changed the shape of clientalism and 
predatory government at the time. The downsizing of the state in the Dominican 
Republic included both decreasing its size as well as public sector salaries.  Public 
sector salaries were increasingly below poverty level wages and state 
bureaucracies became less important centres of power and resources than they had 
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been formerly.  This may have helped to disrupt the predatory arrangements 
between presidents and the elites running different agencies of government.   Of 
course, this may also have contributed to the construction investment and 
development program as well. 
V.  Discussion  
The six countries have much in common.  They all owe their modern 
existence to colonization by Spain followed by eventual independence and 
statehood.  They have consistently followed generally similar economic 
development models including import substitution followed by neoliberal 
structural adjustment.  Nevertheless, at each moment, the countries have made 
distinctive choices or alternatively failed to make choices that would have led a 
different path.  In all cases, choices are constrained by the asymmetrical 
relationship with the United States.   Costa Rica’s relatively cohesive elites 
escaped attention from Colonial Guatemala and were united in a common idea 
about development and a route to development not based on coercing labour.   
Neither did elites encourage collective labour organization and negotiation.  
Instituting reforms to create a social safety net and preserve the middleclass came 
at a cost of de-mobilizing unions and communists.   
The Dominican Republic was also relatively independent from colonial 
Guatemala but had a geographically divided elite not engaged in the same 
economic activities and much more reliant on coerced labour in its initial 
development approach. Strong military leaders and the institutions they created 
became dominant and the state developed to serve their interests and needs.  
Democratic challenge to reform the system may have won as it did in Nicaragua, 
but instead was truncated by United States interests and intervention.  Throughout 
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the dictatorship period, the Dominican Republic enacted labour policies that 
looked paternalistic on their face and continued to ratify ILO conventions because 
to do so was a symbol of modernization and civility.     
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras share many of the critical traits with 
the Dominican Republic including periods of dictatorship, internal conflicts and 
steadfast and effective support for the status quo from the United States.  Their 
economies and state systems of bureaucracy have consistently served the interests 
and well-being of the elites.  Such good long-standing service of the state 
apparatus for the elites is dependent upon the prevention and repression of 
organized challenges to it.  
Nicaragua is the example of the predatory repressive state that had a 
different outcome in its organized challenge to the oligarchy.  Despite 
dictatorship, a history of a neopatrimonial state and the strong opposition of the 
United States, the old oligarchic elites were overthrown in Nicaragua in 1979.  In 
addition, their neopatrimonial institutions were dismantled, their wealth 
distributed, rather than stolen by the victors and new policies were implemented 
with a logic not based on enriching and preserving the status of the oligarchic 
elite.  The transformation was possible due to collective mobilization of workers 
expressed in fighting, and in continued organization in civil society and in unions.  
In contrast to its undemocratic past, after years of pressure from the United States, 
economic collapse and worsening social and economic situation for the people, 
there was an election and liberals came back into power.   Unlike Costa Rica in 
1948, the return to power by the liberals in Nicaragua did not result in repression 
of the losers.  Instead there was accommodation and fortunately or unfortunately 
predatory deals cut between leaders of the ideologically opposing parties. 
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VI.  Summary 
 
The chapter presented two ways to frame how the countries in the study 
are distinctively different based on State Capacity for Institutional Action (Evans 
1995) and specific labour market regulatory regimes (Standing 1991).  Using this 
framing, there are significant differences among the countries.  El Salvador, 
Honduras and Guatemala represent predatory repressive systems.  Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua each represent a different ideal type.  Costa Rica is developmental and 
paternalistic and Nicaragua is, like El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala 
predatory.  Unlike all of the other countries however, Nicaragua is not repressive.  
The framing and grouping of countries within the framing raise several issues for 
the project. 
First, in the institutions literature it will be is necessary to account for 
these distinctions and how they might influence core labour rights in the countries.  
This is part of what is addressed in Chapter 4 reviewing the literature and 
presenting a theoretical framework.  Second, the grouping can help guide the 
comparisons in specific cases of labour rights and make the comparisons more 
meaningful.  Without groupings, the case studies could result in lots of 
information on different dimensions and aspects of labour rights that are not 
anchored in any historical or social context.  These contexts are critical in why 
countries might perform better or worse on their respect for core labour rights. 
Finally, the grouping can help to highlight the meaning of comparisons of 
countries in the same group.  El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras belong to the 
same ideal type i.e. predatory repressive. There may be, however, significant 
differences in how each country expresses repression over different rights.   If 
change in respect for labour rights is to be possible, it must begin with a picture of 
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how labour rights violations exist as employment practices embedded in a web of 
formal and informal rules in societies that differ in important ways. 
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Chapter 4 
Literature and Theory Supporting the Diagnostic Tool 
I.  A Labour Rights Diagnostic Tool Based on an Institutional and 
Compliance Theory 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
DR-CAFTA countries share with many other countries sharp and 
persistent contradictions between the formally adopted rules establishing labour 
rights on the one hand and the reality of labour practices violating the rules on the 
other.  This chapter presents a diagnostic tool to better understand these gaps as 
well as a review of the relevant literature and theoretical foundation for the 
diagnostic tool based on a close examination and synthesis of institutions theory 
from political economy and compliance theory from international law.  
Illustrations are drawn from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Core 
Labour Standards in Central America.  These rights include (1) freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining,  (2) non-discrimination in 
employment, elimination of (3) child and (4) forced labour. 
Borrowing from comparative political economy, this chapter contrasts 
Core Labour Standards with labour rights institutions or ‘rules of the game’ 
comprised of rules, norms and actual behaviours.  The diagnostic tool allows 
analysis of (a) the formal institutions, including the rules, norms, and enforcement 
behaviours; (b) interactions between formal and informal institutions, such as 
corruption and blacklisting; and (c) interactions between formal institutions such 
as hierarchies and complementarities.  
Incorporating the institutional framework into the diagnostic tool makes it 
possible to identify problems and combinations of problems in labour rights 
protection.   For example, norms may exist that contradict articulated rules.  
Alternatively, there may be rule-based problems in which a written rule may 
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contradict or fail to adequately give effect to its normative goal and therefore 
undermine it.  Of course, even well-written rules may not be effectively enforced.  
Additionally, these formal labour rights institutions interact with informal 
institutions such as corruption, bribery or blacklisting, and in the face of weak 
formal institutions, they may prevail in structuring social behaviour.  Finally, 
formal institutions beyond the labour sphere may impact on labour protections.  
These institutional complementarities include, for example, immigration 
institutions interacting with labour rights.  
These insights from institutional theory are useful in understanding labour 
rights violations but limited in terms of providing strategies for overcoming 
obstacles to achieving protection of labour rights.  To address this shortcoming the 
diagnostic tool also incorporates an approach to labour rights compliance that 
draws on Harold Koh’s compliance theory in international law.  Compliance 
theory is well suited to institutional approaches because it, like institution theory, 
treats norms, rules and behaviours as critical components in achieving change and 
compliance.  Koh’s compliance theory allows a critical evaluation of labour rights 
enforcement and reform in terms of the coercive/self-interest effects of rules, the 
enhancement or deterioration of norms underlying the rules and the existence or 
absence of multiple processes of reinforcement.  To be successful, interventions 
must be integrated, multiple and mutually reinforcing, creating circumstances 
where actors adopt norm-based behaviours because they are internalized. 
After this introduction, the chapter sets out the institutional theory 
underpinning the diagnostic tool by examining various kinds and combinations of 
obstacles to achieving protection of labour rights and their theoretical context 
within institutional theory.  This institutional underpinning includes an 
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explanation of the components of institutions and how institutions change.  Part 
three of the chapter explains the literature on compliance theories upon which the 
other half of the diagnostic tool is based.  It also explains the compliance theory 
based on work by Harold Koh, which is incorporated into the diagnostic tool.  Part 
four brings the two theoretical frameworks together into a diagnostic tool for 
examining problems with labour rights protection. 
The diagnostic tool is explained at two levels.  The first is the international 
level (Table 4.2) in which ILO Conventions can be thought of as institutional 
settlements and also compliance benchmarks.  The international-level institutional 
settlement and compliance benchmarks that arise from ILO Conventions as 
depicted in Table 4.2 can then be applied as a diagnostic tool for examining 
national-level labour rights problems in Table 4.3. 
II.  Institutions Theory Underpinning the Diagnostic Tool 
A.  Obstacles to Realizing Labour Rights 
What are the obstacles to realizing the rights to freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and non-discrimination as well as eliminating child and 
forced labour? There are many obstacles.  First, there may be problems with the 
laws themselves.  For example, in El Salvador retaliation against trade unionists is 
illegal but there is no provision in law requiring reinstatement of illegally fired 
workers (U.S. State Department 2006 p. 10). Second, even if the law is ‘well-
written,’ it may not be enforced as evidenced, for example, by employers 
routinely ignoring judicial orders in Guatemala (ICFTU 2005 p. 3). Third, social 
norms may exist that undermine or contradict a right as in the case of Honduras, 
where child labour is widely accepted (ILO 2005 p. 226).  Such obstacles may 
also occur in combination so that the law, its enforcement and/or wider social 
norms are inadequate, ambiguous or even contradict respect for the rights.   
 107 
As the case of child labour in Honduras illustrates, in addition to the 
explicit, there may be informal influences (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 725).  
Corruption and bribery — among and between employers, the state and workers 
— may interfere with respect for labour rights.  Examples of this kind of 
corruption have been reported among state labour inspectors in El Salvador (U.S. 
State Department 2006 pp.11-12).  Even without corruption, employers may 
follow the rules of the law “to the letter” but not comply with the law’s intent, 
taking a creative compliance approach (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 729).  
Finally, institutions beyond the labour sphere may interact with and impede 
protection of labour rights.  For example, immigration institutions in the 
Dominican Republic make Haitian immigrants as well as Haitian descended 
Dominicans vulnerable to labour rights violations despite formal protection in 
labour law (Lizin 2003 p. 6; U.S. State Department 2003 pp. 14-16; U.S. State 
Department 2007 p. 17).  In addition, economic development relying on labour-
intensive, wage-sensitive industries may create incentives for exploitive and 
predatory employment relationships.  All of these examples involve problems 
with labour rights institutions, which are “the rules of the game” with respect to 
work. 
B.  The Concept of Institutions 
Institutions are “durable systems of established and embedded social rules 
that structure social interactions” (Hodgson 2006 p. 13). They are “humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North 1990 p. 3). Institutions 
structure and enable human interactions by constraining them (Crouch 2005 p. 14; 
Mantzavinos, North and Shariq 2004 p. 77). Institutions inform agents of the 
behaviours that are expected.  They are recognizable to other agents and are 
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common knowledge (Amable 2003 p. 36).  In this way, institutions help influence 
strategic choices (Amable 2003 p. 36, Scharpf 1997).  Institutional constraints are 
therefore not necessarily ‘the antithesis of freedom’ but instead can be ‘its ally’ 
(Hodgson 2006 p. 2).  
Institutions influence individuals and groups of individuals acting together 
such as political parties, labour unions, corporations and the state (Scharpf 1997 p. 
39).  They define the membership of these composite actors as well as their 
resources, purposes, collective powers, powers of individuals with differing roles 
within them, the “values they are to consider” in arriving at choices and how 
“outcomes as a result of choices are evaluated” (Scharpf 1997 p. 39).  This 
concept of institutions does not require that people and actors be “perfectly 
rational” or perfectly “grasp all of the institutional interdependencies or 
consequences of their actions” but rather requires only “enough rationality to be 
able to decide what constitutes a desirable course of action in a strategic context” 
(Amable 2003 p. 12). 
The emergence of institutions has been explained in two different ways.  
First, outcome-based explanations maintain that institutions emerge because of the 
role they play in producing collective benefits such as optimal or efficient social 
or economic outcomes (Knight 1992 p. 10).  Alternatively, process-oriented 
explanations emphasize various means through which institutions are established 
and change: by spontaneous, evolutionary or intentional design (Knight 1992 pp 
10-11).  From a labour rights perspective, institutional outcomes do not 
necessarily produce collective benefits for workers.  For purposes of the 
diagnostic tool, the process-oriented approach is adopted and institutions represent 
on the equilibrium, ‘rules of the game’ in any one moment that results from 
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political compromise (Amable 2003 p. 10; Knight 1992).  Compromise is a result 
of conflict over disparate interests and power asymmetries (Amable 2003 p.10; 
Knight 1992).  As such, rather than simply coordinating the interaction among 
actors, institutions have distributional consequences (Amable 2003 p. 39; Knight 
1992).  States have a central role in employment institutions since in the “absence 
of action on the part of the state, employers, workers and their collective 
organizations are rarely able to create stable mechanisms for regulating class 
conflict” (Howell 2005 p. 21). 
Institutions exist at different levels.  They encompass operational rules, 
such as national laws prohibiting race or gender discrimination in employment, 
but also at other levels such as the rules about legislative procedures and strategies 
to enact national anti-discrimination laws, as well as how legislators are elected.  
Institutions also exist at the international level such as operational rules in ILO 
Conventions that underlie core labour rights and the membership and legislative 
procedures at the ILO to adopt Conventions.  Institutions exist between national 
and international levels as can be seen in how national actors interact within the 
international labour rights regime of the International Labour Organisation to 
enact, adopt and comply with ILO Conventions (Ostrom 2005 p. 59).   
C.  Components of Institutions 
Broadly speaking, institutions express values beyond mere wealth-
maximizing human motivation (North 1990 p. 25).  Although a widely used 
concept, there is little consensus on many aspects of the component parts of 
institutions (Hodgson 2006 p. 1; Crawford and Ostrom 1995 p. 589).  Drawing 
upon North’s work, the diagnostic tool incorporates the view that constraints may 
take different forms, including (1) formal rules and their enforcement, unwritten, 
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informal rules such as (2) informal social norms — which are values, beliefs, 
ideologies and codes of conduct; and (3) informal social conventions, which are 
widely held expectations (North 1990 p. 4; p. 23).  These sources of institutional 
constraints are next defined before turning to how they act and interact to create 
labour rights outcomes.  
Formal rules are the written, enforced regulations or prescriptions that 
“allow, require, or forbid” actions and outcomes and indicate the mechanisms that 
exist to enforce the rules (Ganz 1971; Ostrom 1980; Commons 1968 cited in 
Ostrom 2005 p. 18; Crawford and Ostrom 1995 p. 583).  These rules are openly 
codified and non-compliance brings a codified formal sanction delivered by a 
legitimate authority within the relevant community (Amable 2003 p. 26, Black 
1962 cited in Ostrom 2005 pp. 16-17).  For analytical purposes, formal rules can 
be reduced to “institutional statements” with five components: (1) to whom the 
statement applies, (2) deontic verbs of permission, obligation or forbiddance, (3) 
the particular actions or outcomes to which the verbs apply, (4) conditions 
defining when, where, how and to what extent that action or outcome in question 
is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden and (5) the “or else” statement defining the 
sanctions to be imposed for not following the rule (Crawford and Ostrom ‘1995 p. 
584).  One example of a formal rule as an institutional statement is the national 
law that employers are forbidden from discriminating in hiring practices “or else” 
face fines.  Institutional grammar can also be found and analyzed at the 
international level within the text of ILO Conventions. 
This formal institutional “grammar” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995) can help 
with the sorting of formal labour rules into the various kinds of typologies of 
labour rights such as (1) for whom labour rights exist -citizens vs. non-citizens; 
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(2) types of obligations — respect, protect, fulfil; (3) whether the right is 
individual or collective; and (4) whether the obligation applies vertically to 
governments or horizontally to private actors or both (Fudge 2007 pp. 28-31).  
The “or else” portion of the grammar is more problematic because law is evolving 
away from relatively simple questions of what happens in the event of non-
compliance with the rule.  Law, as formal rules, increasingly fulfils other 
functions beyond complaint-based processes focused on judicial enforcement 
(Fredman 2006 p. 59 cited in Fudge 2007 p. 31).  In place of “hard” substantive 
rules and outcomes, law is becoming “soft” and reflexive, naming merely guiding 
principles and procedures (Teubner 1987 in Fudge 2007 p. 33).   The shift in 
orientation has been attributed to the decreasing effectiveness of law in regulating 
and impacting on social life (Fudge 2007 p. 32).  This recent evolution in law 
requires modification of Crawford and Ostrom’s five-component notion of 
institutional grammar. 
Whether hard or soft and no matter how detailed, formal institutions are 
never entirely complete.  They leave gaps because all contingencies cannot be 
anticipated (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 730).  Further, actors who do not like 
the formal rules but lack the political power to change them may use informal 
strategies and skirmish within the rules as a “second best alternative to changing 
the formal rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 730, Streeck and Thelen 2005 p. 
19).   Lastly, actors pursue some goals knowing that they are counter to socially- 
accepted norms and will never be formalized (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 730). 
Informal institutions invariably emerge as a result of formal institutional design, 
strategic interactions before, during and after formal institutional design, or as 
unintended consequences of conflicts and compromises within an institutional 
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context (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p.731).  For these reasons, it is insufficient 
for the diagnostic tool to consider formal institutions in isolation from the 
informal (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 726).  
Informal institutions are “created, communicated and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 725).  Informal 
institutions include social norms that are based on values and are “observed 
irrespective of others’ behaviour” (Amable 2003 p. 37).  They correspond with the 
concept of “precepts” or “maxims for prudential behaviour” and North’s “codes of 
conduct” (Black 1962 cited in Ostrom 2005 p. 17, North 1990 p. 4).  North’s 
example of a social norm is “good sportsmanship,” which constrains players from 
injuriously fouling other players even though they could successfully do so 
without detection or penalty (North 1990 p. 4).  To Ostrom, particular precepts of 
prudential behaviour may be shared to greater or lesser degrees depending upon 
“the extent of homogeneity in the value preferences of those living in the 
community; the size and composition of the relevant community; and the extent of 
inequality of basic assets among those affected” (Ostrom 2005 p. 27).  
Unlike social norms, social conventions refer to socially-accepted 
behaviour and depend on the fact that others observe the convention rather than 
precepts or prescriptions of prudential behaviour (Amable 2006 p. 26; Black 1962 
cited in Ostrom 2005 p. 17).  In this way, social conventions focus on “shared 
expectations” rather than “shared values” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 728).  
For example, corrupt behaviour of government officials in predatory systems is an 
expected and common occurrence but “prevailing norms” prevent its 
legitimization (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 730).  Therefore corruption, like 
torture, is a social convention in some countries but is not an accepted social 
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norm.  In other cases, a social convention can become “elevated to the status of 
social norm” (Amable 2003 p. 37).  In the case of informal institutions, the 
sanctions are not official or codified, as in the case of formal rules. Penalties for 
non-compliance and rewards for compliance with informal institutions – social 
norms and social conventions – nonetheless exist (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 
726).  Penalties and rewards include social exclusion, loss or gain of social status, 
self-esteem, reputation or utility, or violent retaliation (Amable 2003 p. 37; 
Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p.731). 
D.  An Institutional Framework for Labour Rights Compliance Outcomes 
Returning to the examples, respect for labour rights – and alternatively, the 
absence of respect – can be understood as outcomes in three related institutional 
dimensions:  (1) the formal institution itself (Amable 2003; Helmke and Levitsky 
2004),  (2) the interaction between formal and informal institutions (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004), and (3) interactions between institutions in different spheres of 
social and economic life (Hall and Soskice 2001; Crouch 2005).  In the first 
dimension, formal institutions are effective if they are “resistant to transgression 
within certain limits” such that “deviance” from the formal rules, “does not 
become the convention” (Amable 2003 p. 45).  Alternatively, formal institutions 
are ineffective if the rules that ‘”exist on paper are widely ignored or 
circumvented” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 727).   
Costa Rica’s developmentalist state with its autonomously functioning 
apparatus would be expected to look more like the former case with more 
effective formal institutions.  In contrast, predatory systems such as the 
Dominican Republic would be expected to exhibit more of a tendency towards 
ineffective formal institution.  Amable argues that changes in the formulation of 
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the formal rules or in their enforcement can alter respect for the rule, increasing 
the incidence and rationality of deviance or compliance (Amable 2003 p. 45).   
Formal institutions are insufficient alone to explain labour rights 
outcomes.  In addition to the formal institution, relevant social norms and social 
conventions interact with and can contribute to outcomes that either converge or 
diverge from the normative intent of the formal institution (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004).   As shown below in Table 4.1, informal institutions may complement 
effective formal institutions strengthening incentives to comply by filling 
ambiguities and gaps in the formal rules with supportive informal social norms 
and social conventions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 728).  As shown in Box B, 
even in the absence of effective formal institutions, respect for labour rights is still 
a possible outcome if social norms and social conventions consistent with respect 
for labour rights substitute for the ineffective formal institutions (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004 p. 729).   
Similarly, the absence of respect for labour rights is a possible outcome 
with or without effective formal institutions.  In the former case, shown in Box C, 
the formal institution is not openly violated and the formal rules are followed but 
the substantive effects of the rules are altered as a result of creative compliance, 
violating the spirit of the rule while complying with “the letter” of the law 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 729; Amable 2003 pp. 10-11). This occurs when 
actors do not like the outcome generated by the formal institutions but are unable 
to change or openly violate it (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 729).  Finally, as 
shown in Box D, social norms and social conventions can compete with and 
displace ineffective formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004 p. 729). 
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Table 4.1 
 
Labour Rights 
Outcomes 
 
 
Effective Formal Institutions 
 
 
Ineffective Formal 
Institutions 
 
 
Respect 
 
A 
Complementary Informal 
Institutions 
 
B 
Substitutive Informal 
Institutions 
 
Absence of  
Respect 
 
C 
Accommodating Informal 
Institutions 
 
D 
Competing Informal 
Institutions 
       Adapted from Helmke and Levitsky 2004 
E.  Institutional Complementarities and Hierarchies 
Labour rights institutions  – formal and informal – interact with 
institutions in other spheres of economic and social life and in combination affect 
outcomes of respect or absence of respect for labour rights.  Here, notions of 
institutional complementarity, hierarchy and overall institutional gestalt or social 
embeddedness matter.  Crouch’s concept of institutional complementarity is one 
where components of a whole compensate for each other’s deficiencies in 
constituting the whole, and each can be defined by what is lacking in the other in 
order to produce a defined whole (Crouch 2005 p. 50).  Consistent with this 
version of complementarity, labour protection institutions prohibiting 
discrimination based on gender or race compensate for employment-at-will 
institutions, which allow employers to hire and fire any and all employees at their 
sole discretion. 
Amable, as well as Hall and Soskice offer another concept of 
complementarity.   Institutions cluster together and complement and reinforce one 
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another, making them resilient against pressures to change (Amable 2003 p. 54; 
Hall and Soskice 2001 p. 18).  Amable argues that institutional complementarities 
stem from the “interdependence of institutional influences on agents’ decision-
making” (Amable 2003 p. 59).  In this view of institutional complementarity, the 
performance of each institution is affected by the existence of others that are 
mutually strengthening and reinforcing (Crouch 2005 p. 54).  The example often 
given for this kind of complementarity is the mutually reinforcing effects of 
corporate governance and collective bargaining institutions that can lead to 
distinctive employment regimes. Liberal market economies more easily lend 
themselves to low-road employment strategies because there are few incentives to 
establish long-lasting reciprocal relationships with employees (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Amable 2003).  
When multiple institutions impact on respect for labour rights, the source 
of influence may well be hierarchy rather than complementarities.  Crouch 
defined institutional hierarchy as, “a configuration in which, for a given era and 
society, particular institutional forms impose their logic on the institutional 
architecture as a whole, lending a dominant tone to the mode of regulation” 
(Crouch et all 2005 p. 367).  Hierarchy may result from design or evolution 
(Crouch et all 2005 pp. 367-368).  Concepts of predatory and developmental state 
orientations fit very well with this view of institutional hierarchy.  The presence of 
this kind hierarchy can be seen in neopatrimonial systems in which dictators 
impose on the entire state apparatus a logic of placing all of the state’s resources 
and functions for their own benefit.   
It is possible to envision an era in a given society in which institutions 
governed by one hierarchy are replaced with another.  In liberal market systems 
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such as the United States, the 1970’s era with its social attention to discrimination 
saw a reversal and newly enacted anti-discrimination laws trumped employment-
at-will employment institutions.  Nicaragua’s former neopatrimonial hierarchy 
was overthrown in 1979, still retaining predatory characteristics but no longer 
retaining its former repressive labour market regulatory regime.  All of these 
changes implicate fundamental changes of institutional hierarchy within and 
between periods of time. 
Beyond complementarity and hierarchy, Crouch has argued that there is an 
overall institutional architecture and that the logic of a society forms a “gestalt” 
considered to be the general congruent shape of a set of institutions (Crouch 2005 
p. 23).  Nicaragua’s transformation seems to contradict the idea of predation as a 
permanent gestalt.  In contrast the longstanding combination of predatory and 
repressive regulatory regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala could conceivably be 
considered such a gestalt. 
F.  Institutional Change 
There are many theories about institutional change.  One theory is that 
path dependence prevents institutional change and maintains inertia until critical 
junctures – exogenous shocks – disturb institutional equilibria making new 
choices and alternatives available—the so-called “strong punctuated equilibrium 
model (Streeck and Thelen 2006 p. 1).  Institutional complementarities help 
explain this inertia through mutual reinforcement among distinct institutions.  This 
view of path dependence has come under increasing criticism, however, as overly 
deterministic, structural and functionalist (Streeck and Thelen 2006, Crouch 
2005).  Crouch demonstrates that actors are able to defeat such path-dependent 
structural limits through their efforts to (1) search actively for alternative paths, 
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(2) transfer past experiences gained in multiple settings and (3) to learn from other 
agents connected to them by networks (Crouch 2005).  Additionally, Streeck and 
Thelen elaborate on multiple forms of gradual yet transformative change 
including some of which have been applied directly to the work of the 
International Labour Organization (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Helfer 2006) 
Another argument is that failure of institutions to change may indicate the 
presence of “a more complex sociological embeddedness at work” (Thelen 1999 
cited in Crouch 2005 p. 96). Beyond institutional complementarities, 
embeddedness is a kind of institutional gestalt, or “general congruent shape of sets 
of institutions” (Crouch 2005 p. 23).  Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness refers to 
how markets “are always influenced by the structures of the societies within 
which they emerge” (Polanyi 1944, Crouch 2005 p. 14).  Markets are socially 
embedded to the extent that market transactions serve non-economic purposes and 
are supported by non-economic social ties (Streeck 2001 in Crouch 2005 p. 14).  
In this way, institutions “inhibit immediate maximizing activity” (Crouch 2005 p. 
14).   Failure of labour institutions to change may indicate embeddedness in 
markets of a distinctly non-social character. 
Since institutions are political compromise equilibriums that 
“circumscribe” conflict, change is possible when conflict cannot be solved within 
the existing institutional arrangement (Amable 2003 p. 10).  According to 
Amable, change may take different forms such as use of  “rule-circumventing 
strategies” or establishment of new institutional arrangements as a result of 
political bargaining and compromise (Amable 2003 pp. 10-11). The power and 
distributive struggles inside existing institutional equilibrium, as well as in 
establishing new equilibriums, corresponds with social movement approaches to 
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change.  Two kinds of relevant political change processes are theorized in social 
movement theory—contained and transgressive – (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
2001).  Even if gradual transformative change without exogenous shock is not 
possible, social movement theory has demonstrated that new collective political 
struggles – transgressive contention – “often grow out of constrained contention” 
between previously established actors within well-established institutions 
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001 pp. 7-8).  
The institutional side of the diagnostic tool helps with analysis of the 
presence or absence of respect for labour rights provides useful but limited 
insights.  First, it reminds us that beyond struggles to change the written laws — 
social norms, social conventions and interactions among institutions— matter.  
Second, the diagnostic tool assumes that similar labour rights outcomes may result 
from different yet functionally equivalent institutional arrangements. (Calmfors 
and Drifil 1988 in Crouch 2005 p. 60).  Third, the tool reminds us that it is 
important to anticipate and investigate what kinds of institutional arrangements 
encourage compliance and it cautions us to anticipate the complexity of 
institutional change with multiple potential sources of inertia and change.  Lastly, 
the institutional theory side of the diagnostic tool can tell us approximately what 
institutions respecting labour rights look like: an outcome of respect aligned with 
— or at least not contravened by — rules, social norms and social conventions.  
What is absent in institutions theory side of the tool is a specific strategy and 
approach to change in order to establish new or reform existing institutions to 
improve respect for labour rights.  For this, the diagnostic tool incorporates 
frameworks from compliance theories. 
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III. Compliance Theory Underpinning the Diagnostic Tool 
 
A.  Introduction 
Concepts and frameworks from institutional theory form one half of the 
diagnostic tool because they are helpful in identifying and explaining labour rights 
outcomes as well as the obstacles to achieving respect for labour rights.  The other 
half of the diagnostic tool is based on distinct but related concepts and 
frameworks from compliance theory that can help identify and explain potential 
solutions to obstacles preventing respect for labour rights.  Compliance is a “state 
of conformity or identity between an actor’s behaviour and a specified rule” 
(Fisher 1981 p. 20; Mitchell 1994 p. 30 cited in Raustiala and Slaughter 2002 p. 
539).  Compliance theories provide insight into why individuals and actors from 
firms to nation states comply or fail to comply with rules and laws (Grossman and 
Zaelke 2005 p. 73).  In light of the institutional understanding of the obstacles to 
gaining respect for labour rights, compliance theories provide insight into how 
such respect can be achieved through formal and informal institutional 
arrangements.   
Theories about compliance, like institutions operate at different levels of 
analysis with some focused on the international level, considering why nations 
obey, others on the domestic level, considering why domestic actors obey, and 
finally others on the transnational level, considering interactions between 
international and domestic compliance (Grossman and Zaelke 2005).  Compliance 
theories have been applied to diverse problems and challenges ranging from 
game-theoretical prisoner dilemmas (Axelrod 1986), to practical problems such as 
international treaties, treaties establishing the European Union, human rights law, 
court decisions, banking regulations, taxes, neighbourhood dispute settlements, oil 
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spills, air quality and why people obey speed limits or use of seatbelts.  Much of 
the work theorizing on compliance has come from the fields of international 
relations (regime theories), international law (compliance theories) and regulation 
theory (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; Baldwin and Cave1999).    
Compliance theories emphasise different and some theorists argue, 
competing, “explanatory pathways” to compliance (Koh 1997 p. 2632), and based 
on their orientations, link compliance strategies with different aspects of 
institutional components—rules and their enforcement, social conventions and 
social norms—(Amable 2003).  March and Olson categorise compliance theories 
as associated with either a logic of consequences, based on enforcement and 
deterrence strategies, or a logic of appropriateness, based on identities and 
normative orientations and resulting strategies of assistance to prevent non-
compliance (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 74; March and Olsen 1998 p. 949).  
B.  Logic of Consequences Approach to Compliance 
The logic of consequences approach is rationalistic and instrumentalist 
(Koh 1997 p. 2632).  First, the “realist” version of this orientation suggests that 
conduct conforms to rules not through internal compulsion or rules themselves, 
but rather through power as it is exercised in coercive sanctions or rewards (Koh 
1998 p. 634).  At the international level, in the realist or neo-realist approach, a 
state’s compliance with a rule is a result of one of three possible situations: (1) a 
hegemonic state or group of states force another state to comply (2) the rule 
merely reflects current or expected future practice or (3) the rule resolves a 
problem that no state has an incentive to violate (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 
74).  In sum, compliance results from coincidence or international power 
dynamics (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 75).  
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A second strand emphasizes pathways to compliance arising from 
instrumentalist calculations based on actors’ interests (Keohane 1988 p.387; 
Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 75).  This is described as “compliance as winning 
long-term strategy” (Koh 1997 p. 2632).  Unlike the realists, these 
“institutionalists” argue that states have long-term interests making compliance 
and prevention of short-term defections strategically advantageous (Grossman and 
Zaelke 2005 p. 75).  The resulting “regimes” are sets of institutions in 
international space that establish and enforce norms or rules of the game for 
public and private actors (Krasner 1983 cited in Trubek et al 2000 p. 1194).  The 
emphasis is on structure and rules (Trubek et al 2000 p. 1194).  Enforcement 
theory originates with a similar view that costs of non-compliance in the form of 
punishment are critical in gaining compliance and further that increasing 
punishments are necessary when rules require deeper, more demanding changes in 
behaviour (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 75; Downs et al 1996 pp. 382-383).   
Both the realist and institutionalist approaches assume states are unitary 
actors unaffected by domestic or transnational actors and have been criticised 
because they ignore powerful non-state actors such as multinational corporations, 
multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and non-
governmental organisations (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 74; Trubek et al 2000 
p. 1194).  This shortcoming is addressed in a third rationalistic, logic of 
consequences approach, which disaggregates the unitary state and makes domestic 
actors key factors in compliance.  This “liberal international theory” holds that 
compliance results from the convergence of domestic actors interests with 
international rules (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 75).  Domestic actors mobilize 
and pressure the state to adopt, implement and comply with the international rules 
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when they view the rules to be in their interests (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 
75).  Liberal theories fall within the logic of appropriateness orientation as well.  
In the liberal Kantian version, the nature and identity of liberal states is critical in 
creating baseline conditions for compliance such as democracy and rule of law 
(Koh 1997 p. 2633; Slaughter-Burley 1993 cited in Koh1996 p. 202).  For 
example, liberal states tolerate mobilization of domestic interests to influence state 
policy in contrast to authoritarian states (Keohane 1998 p. 711).  
In relation to our components of institutions, the key compliance strategy 
arising from logic of consequences approaches dates from Jeremy Bentham and 
focuses on the enforcement of rules to effectively raise the cost of non-compliance 
to first cancel out its potential profit and then impose additional costs through 
punishment (Scholz 1997 p. 253; Fisher 1981 p. 40).   The self-interested 
preferences of actors are assumed to be “a given,” created outside and 
independent of compliance processes (Koh 1997 p. 2633).  In domestic 
compliance theories, this is best characterised by Gary Becker’s work on criminal 
law in which potential offenders respond to both the probability of detection and 
the severity of punishment (Becker 1968).  Mechanisms to improve compliance 
include increasing monitoring activities, raising penalties and formulating rules to 
increase the probability of conviction (Becker 1968).   Deterrence theory extends 
Becker’s work from criminal to corporate compliance and contends that the job of 
enforcement agencies is to make non-compliance irrational because actors 
perceive that non-compliance will, in all likelihood, be detected and sanctions will 
be swift and certain including non-monetary penalties to reputation (Grossman 
and Zaelke 2005 p. 76; Kagan and Scholz 1984; Thornton, Gunningham and 
Kagan 2005 pp. 265-267).  
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C.  Logic of Appropriateness Approach to Compliance 
In contrast to the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness 
explains actors’ behaviour in relation to their identity, sense of obligation and 
conception of appropriate behaviour rather than as a result of calculations and 
consequences (Ruggie 1998; Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 74; March and Olson 
1998 pp. 951-952).  The logic of appropriateness approach is essentially 
“constructivist” focusing on the “normative power of rules” and how an actor’s 
identity and interests are shaped by shared knowledge, discourse and ideas (Koh 
1997 p. 2634; Keohane 1988, Kratochwil 1989 cited in Raustiala and Slaughter 
2002 p. 540).  From this constructivist approach, compliance with rules is a matter 
of “internalized identities and norms” (Koh 1997 p. 2634; Raustiala and Slaughter 
2002 p. 540).  The classical origins of constructivist approaches come from 
Durkeim and Weber focusing on “how ideas of which individuals are carriers 
come to express a social force” (Durkheim cited in Ruggie 1998 p. 858).  As with 
a logic of consequences view, there are numerous compliance theories within the 
logic of appropriateness orientation.   
Legitimacy theory, like other constructivist approaches is process-oriented 
and argues that rule-making processes create clarity and fairness and thus give 
rules credibility and encourage compliance (Franck 1990 cited in Raustiala and 
Slaughter 2002 p. 541; Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 75).  Franck, for example, 
argued that the rule-making process and the quality of the rules themselves create 
the perception of legitimacy creating a “compliance pull” (Franck 1990 cited in 
Raustiala and Slaughter 2002 p. 541).  Chayes and Chayes argued in their process-
oriented “managerialism” theory that the interaction among states in creating 
international commitments creates a tendency to comply with the resulting 
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international rules (Chayes and Chayes 1995 cited in Grossman and Zaelke 2005 
p. 75).  They argue that the rules generated in such international treaties are 
widely accepted, that states have an interest in complying with rules they 
participate in creating and that, as a result, compliance is efficient (Chayes and 
Chayes 1995 cited in Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 75).  In this view, non-
compliance is viewed as a result of time lags, limited resources, capacity or 
ambiguity about commitments (Chayes and Chayes 1995 cited in Grossman and 
Zaelke 2005 p. 75).   
Domestic compliance theories based on the logic of appropriateness share 
many characteristics of managerialism at the international level (Grossman and 
Zaelke 2005 p. 77).  There is a presumption that domestic actors want to comply 
and that social norms encouraging compliance exist and influence actors 
regardless of formal rules and enforcement (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 77).  
The social norm of compliance is enhanced by a rule’s “legitimacy” in terms of its 
fair creation and implementation (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 77).  In contrast 
to the rationalist focus on enforcement and punishment, managerial approaches in 
international and domestic spheres argue for non-confrontational compliance 
interactions and processes, such as technical assistance, transparent information 
sharing and dispute resolution procedures (Grossman and Zaelke 2005 p. 76). 
D.  Koh’s Transnational Compliance Theory 
The compliance side of the diagnostic tool is taken from Harold Koh who 
sees these various approaches to compliance as additive pathways and strategies 
that complement one another and can be accumulated into an effective approach 
to compliance.  Koh’s theoretical approach to compliance is three-fold.  First, he 
argues that neither international nor domestic levels are sufficient to explain 
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compliance and that the transnational legal processes provide key, often 
overlooked dynamics to questions of compliance.  Second, he argues that 
compliance is a result of interests, as well as identity, thereby bridging the logics 
of consequences and appropriateness.  Finally, he describes an institutional 
change process or “compliance process” of interactions through which 
international norms may become internalized, thus becoming domestic norms 
(Koh 1997 p. 2634).   Each of these three threads in Koh’s approach to 
compliance is first explained and then correlated to distinct concepts in 
institutional theory.  In this way, Koh’s compliance framework, for purposes of 
the diagnostic tool, helps to identify a parallel set of solutions to the problems 
identified with the institutional side of the diagnostic tool.   
E.  Transnational Legal Processes 
Koh’s compliance framework is based on transnational legal processes, 
which he defines as the “theory and practice of how public and private actors 
including nation states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, 
nongovernmental organizations and private individuals, interact in a variety of 
public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, internalize, 
and enforce rules of transnational law” (Koh 1997 p. 2626).  Koh builds upon 
ideas first developed by Roger Fisher’s work on compliance through transnational 
processes (Koh 1997 p. 2627; Fisher 1981).  Fisher emphasised the importance of 
(1) promoting compliance, (2) regular institutional interaction, (3) norm 
interpretation and (4) norm internalization in improving compliance (Fisher 1981 
in Koh 1997 p. 2627). 
Koh argues that transnational legal processes are often overlooked as key 
determinants of compliance even in work exploring political linkages and 
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interpenetrations between international and domestic politics (Koh 1998 p. FN 47; 
Putnam 1988).  Further, Koh contends that the transnational level of analysis 
breaks down traditional dichotomies between domestic and international and 
between public and private realms (Koh 1996 p. 184).  Rather than reject 
theoretical explanations for compliance at domestic and international levels of 
analysis, Koh maintains that they are complementary and not mutually exclusive 
(Koh 1997 p. 2649).  Koh contends that transnational legal processes are 
transactional, and they highlight the dynamic processes and interactions that 
“transform, mutate and percolate up and down from public to private, from 
domestic to international and back down again” (Koh 1996 p. 184).  
Koh’s transnational legal process approach is distinctly “non-statist,” 
giving necessary weight to non-state actors involved in transnational interactions 
(Koh 1996 p. 184; Keohane 2005 p. xvii).  From this view, and consistent with 
Amable and Scharpf, not only do “interactions among transnational actors shape 
laws, but also… law shapes and guides future interactions” and identities among 
actors (Koh 1996 p. 184; Amable 2003 p. 12; Scharpf 1997 p. 39).  In this way, 
Koh’s framework is consistent with process-oriented compliance and institutional 
theories and mirrors ILO Committee of Expert’s (CEACR’s) supervisory 
interactions with countries that ratify Conventions.  Processes are “normative” in 
that interactions among actors result in the emergence of new rules, which are 
“interpreted, internalized and enforced” in an institutional equilibrium thus 
beginning the process all over again” (Koh 1996 p. 184; Amable 2003 p. 10; 
Knight 1992).  For Koh, transnational legal processes are not legalistic or static 
but rather “foster the interactions, interpretations and internalization of global 
norms into domestic law” (Koh 1998 FN47).  This point is supported by theorists 
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who note that transnational legal processes create opportunities for contention and 
struggle in transnational arenas, which may become sources of social regulation 
(Trubek et al. 2000 p. 1193).  
F.  Compliance based on Consequences and Appropriateness 
Koh intends his approach to be a strategy for encouraging compliance 
(Koh 1997 p. 2655).  According to his theory, there are a myriad of reasons for 
non-compliance and therefore multiple pathways and processes are required to 
achieve compliance (Koh 1997 p. 2655).  Unlike a singular mechanism, Koh 
argues that states and actors comply with rules for a variety of reasons, including 
(1) being coerced into adopting and enforcing them, (2) acting out of self-interest 
because non-compliance is costly and irrational, (3) responding to communitarian 
legitimacy of the norms underpinning the rules because they are reinforced as 
company, community, national and international values (Koh 1998 pp. 634-635). 
Koh’s compliance framework incorporates both the logic of consequences 
and the logic of appropriateness as necessary elements to achieve compliance.  He 
argues however, that the ‘best chance of success’ for gaining long-term 
compliance is to create circumstances in which states and actors adopt norm-based 
behaviours because they have internalized them into their own system of values 
(Koh 1998 p. 4). This is similar to March and Olsen’s description of a 
developmental relationship between consequence- and appropriateness-based 
compliance in which the former changes over time to compliance based on the 
latter--appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998 p. 953).   For Koh, the switch from 
consequence-based compliance to appropriateness-based compliance is an 
evolutionary process in which “repeated compliance gradually becomes habitual 
obedience” (Koh 1997 p. 2602).  Koh argues that the shift that occurs in the 
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transition to obedience involves a shift from external (consequences) to internal 
(appropriateness), from instrumental reasons for compliance to normative reasons 
and from coercive to constitutive persuasion (Koh 1998 pp, 628-629). 
According to Koh, the transition to habitual obedience results from 
internalizing rules through domestic social, political and legal processes (Koh 
1998 pp. 634-635).  Social internalization is the condition in which a norm 
acquires such a degree of public legitimacy that “there is widespread general 
obedience to it” (Koh 1997 p. 2656).  Political internalization occurs when 
political elites accept an international norm and incorporate the norm into 
domestic policy (Koh 1997 pp. 2656-2657). Koh also distinguishes specific 
legislative internalization in which “international law norms become embedded 
into binding domestic legislation” (Koh 1998 p. 643). Legal internalization is the 
judicially triggered incorporation of an international norm into the domestic legal 
system via “executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative action or some 
combination of all three actions (Koh 1997 p. 2657; Koh 1998 p. 643).  These 
forms of compliance internalization match institutional elements of the diagnostic 
tool (Table 4.3). 
G.  Compliance and Internalization: Actors and Processes 
Social, political and legal internalization does not require “precise 
sequencing” but rather a set of actors and processes unfolding in four distinct 
phases: interaction, interpretation, internalization and obedience (Koh 1998 pp 
643-644).   Koh builds his compliance processes and actors upon the work of 
other theorists.  The interaction phase involves provocations initiated by 
“transnational moral entrepreneurs” who “mobilize popular opinion and political 
support, . . . stimulate and assist in creation of like-minded organizations in other 
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countries, . . . elevate their objective beyond its identification with national 
interests…and direct efforts towards persuading foreign audiences, especially 
foreign elites that their objective reflects a widely shared or even universal moral 
sense rather than a particularistic national moral code“ (Koh 1998 p. 647; 
Nadelmann 1990 p. 482).   
Nadelmann developed his concept of transnational moral entrepreneurs 
within the specific context of global prohibition regimes such as the abolition of 
slavery and piracy (Nadelmann 1990).  Sunstein conceptualized the domestic 
equivalent of Nadelmann’s transnational norm entrepreneur, similarly defined as 
one who “can alert people to the existence of a shared complaint and can suggest a 
collective solution through . . . signalling their own commitment to change, 
creating coalitions, making defiance of the norms seem to be less costly and 
making compliance with new norms seem to be more beneficial” (Koh 1998 p. 
647; Sunstein 1996 p. 929).  Ideas about institutional entrepreneurship have 
expanded significantly beyond the prohibition regimes drawn upon by Koh 
(Dorado 2005; Crouch 2005).  The motivation and creativity driving actors to 
“break away from scripted patterns of behaviour” vary based on “temporal 
orientations” (Dorado 2005 p. 388).  Tarrow contends that there are different 
kinds of transnational actors (Tarrow 2001).  Transnational “social movements” 
are distinguished from “institutionalized, passive and service oriented-groups” 
based on socially mobilized and sustained contentious interaction with power 
holders” (McAdam et al 2001 cited in Tarrow 2001).   
Norm entrepreneurs provoke interactions with other actors.  Koh 
highlights the efforts of norm entrepreneurs to enlist actors within the government 
to support and act as allies becoming “governmental norm sponsors” (Koh 1998 p. 
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648).  As allies, the governmental norm sponsors are able to promote, inside 
governmental forums, the changes advocated by the norms entrepreneurs from the 
outside (Koh 1998 p. 648).  Some governments, and intergovernmental agencies 
and actors within them, become themselves norm entrepreneurs (Koh 1998 p. 
648).  Drawing on work done by Sikkink, Koh explains that norm entrepreneurs 
and their governmental norm sponsors work together creating transnational issue 
networks along the lines of “epistemic communities” in political science terms 
(Koh 1998 p. 649).  The transnational networks that emerge develop expertise 
forming epistemic communities within the issue areas in which they work (Koh 
1998 p. 649).   
Epistemic communities are “networks of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992 cited in 
Koh 1998 p. 649).  Included in such communities or networks are government 
agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international and domestic non-
governmental organizations, academics and private foundations (Koh 1998 p. 
649).  Transnational issue networks generate regional and global “political 
solutions” within their issue domains (Koh 1998 p. 649).  Koh’s emphasis mirrors 
the work of institutional scholars interested in the concept of “leveraging,” in 
which actors define a project and then gain support from subsidiary actors and in 
tandem with the actors bargain for support and acceptance from external 
constituencies (DiMaggio 1982, cited in Dorado 2005 p. 390).  In terms of social 
movement theory, Koh’s process represents the mobilization of support and 
acceptance based on the opportunity and likelihood that actors gain access to 
power (McAdam 1996 cited in Dorado 2005 p. 391). 
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Transnational communities necessary to Koh’s compliance process also 
include “interpretive communities” “competent to declare both general norms of 
international law (e.g. treaties) and specific interpretations of those norms in 
particular circumstances (Koh 1998 p. 649).  Through interpretation of norms in 
specific circumstances these communities create “law-declaring fora” and include 
private as well as public stages such as treaty regimes, domestic, regional, and 
international courts, ad hoc tribunals, domestic and regional legislatures, 
executive entities, commissions and non governmental organizations (Koh 1998 p. 
650).  To be considered an “interpretive community” an entity must be capable of 
“receiving a challenge to a nation’s conduct, then defining, elaborating, and 
testing the definitions of particular norms and opining about their violation” (Koh 
1998 p. 650).  The ILO CEACR acts as an interpretive community in its 
supervisory role with countries that ratify ILO Conventions. 
Responding to these interpretive communities are domestically based 
“bureaucratic compliance procedures” (Koh 1998 p. 651).  Here, Koh argues that 
once a ruling has been made interpreting and applying an international rule to 
specific domestic circumstances, “domestic governmental institutions adopt 
symbolic structures, standard operating procedures, and other internal 
mechanisms to help maintain habitual compliance with internalized international 
norms” (Koh 1998 p. 652).  Koh further points out the long-standing existence of 
domestic and inter-governmental organizations with “institutional mandates to 
ensure that the government’s policies conform to international legal standards that 
have become embedded in domestic law” (Koh 1998 p. 652).  The interchange 
between international interpretations and domestic bureaucracy produces an 
enmeshment of the domestic with the international as the “making and 
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maintenance of international law norm[s] become entrenched in domestic and 
legal political process” (Keohane 1992 cited in Koh 1998).  
Finally, Koh argues that the creation of strong “linkages across issue 
areas” promotes internalization of norms since non-compliance in one area is 
connected with frictions and repercussions in other issues areas (Koh 1998 pp. 
653-654).  This further reinforces domestic bureaucracies role in developing 
“default patterns of compliance,” which “channel routine governmental conduct 
along law-compliant pathways” (David 1994 cited in Koh 1998 p. 654, FN 136).  
Koh argues that avoidance of such frictions provides domestic bureaucracies with 
“powerful institutional incentives to press their governmental leaders to adhere 
generally to policies of compliance over policies of violation” (Koh 1998 pp. 654-
655).  It is through these repeated patterns of interaction, interpretation and 
internalization that compliance becomes “habitual” and “self-interested” rather 
than coerced and externally driven (Koh 1998 p. 655).  These latter two aspects of 
Koh’s compliance process introduce the idea that multiple institutional 
arrangements such as complementarities and hierarchies matter and should be 
anticipated and incorporated into compliance strategies (Koh 1998; Crouch 2005; 
Amable 2003).  
In institutional terms, interactions, interpretations and resulting political, 
legal and social internalization processes create an homogenization in which 
internationally elaborated norms become domesticated norms and converge across 
those countries interacting in the same international and transnational environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Drezner 2001; Koh 1997 p. 2625).  DiMaggio and 
Powell identify three mechanisms closely related to Koh’s compliance theory, 
through which homogenization, or as they call it “isomorphic change,” occurs 
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(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Koh 1998).  Coercive isomorphic processes occur 
when formal and informal pressures including “cultural expectations” are exerted 
through “force, persuasion or invitation” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983 p. 150).  
Mimetic processes of isomorphic change involve imitation and modeling of 
solutions with imitation encouraged by uncertainty and ambiguity (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983 p. 151).  Finally, normative isomorphic processes stem from 
professionalization and the establishment of a collective cognitive base and 
legitimation of those involved in a sphere of activity such as epistemic and 
interpretive communities (Koh 1998; DiMaggio and Powell 1983 pp. 152-153).  
IV.  The Diagnostic Tool 
A.  Diagnostic Tool at International Level 
Koh’s compliance process when joined with institutional theory creates a 
model upon which a diagnostic tool can be built to assess problems in labour 
rights implementation as well as to suggest possible interventions to improve 
compliance.   As shown below in Table 4.2, the text of ILO Conventions define 
labour rights rules and represent an institutional settlement among the ILO 
constituents: employer organizations, worker organizations and governments.  
The ILO Conventions as institutional settlements can also be treated within 
compliance theory terms as compliance ideals and benchmarks for countries that 
ratify specific ILO Conventions.   
Once an ILO Convention is adopted by the ILO and ratified by countries, 
the ILO continues to articulate its definition of the institutional settlement through 
its role supervising countries and interpreting the written texts of the Conventions.  
The meaning and content of the compliance ideals and benchmarks established by 
the ILO to supervise countries are based on these interpretations as well as the 
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written text of the Conventions.  Changing interpretation and reinterpretation of 
the Convention texts in turn changes the compliance ideals and benchmarks 
embodied in the Conventions over time.  
The ILO Committee of Experts (CEACR) is an interpretive community 
within Koh’s meaning being charged with evaluating a country’s compliance with 
the Convention obligations as written and interpreted.   Their interpretive role 
arises as a result of their involvement in enforcement of the Conventions.  The 
CEACR reads reports submitted by countries detailing their implementation of 
ratified Conventions.  The country reports are evaluated by the CEACR in light of 
information and shadow reports provided by actors such as national trade union 
confederations potentially critical of the country’s implementation.   The CEACR 
also perform general surveys of ILO Conventions in which they evaluate the 
performance of all ILO member states regardless of their ratification of the 
Convention.   
Through these enforcement mechanisms the CEARC evaluate the 
congruence between facts and conditions in the country and the compliance ideals 
and benchmarks in the Conventions.  The institutional settlement is the 
compliance ideal and benchmark serving as the comparator against which the 
state’s performance is judged.  The CEACR decides what to examine and 
emphasize in their supervision and what judgments to make about a country’s 
performance.  Circumstances and conditions reported by countries may lead the 
CEACR to maintain and strengthen its articulation of the institutional settlement 
or alternatively abandon or modify the terms of institutional settlement via re-
interpretation of the Convention or the decision not to focus on a particular aspect 
of compliance.  
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Table 4.2 Diagnostic Tool at International Level 
 
International Level: ILO Conventions as Institutional Settlements and Compliance Benchmarks 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
 
Description 
 
Institutional Theory 
 
 
Compliance Theory  
 
Institutional/Compliance  
Changes 
 
Text 
 
ILO Convention 
texts are adopted 
 
 
The Conventions text 
articulates an institutional 
settlement among ILO 
actors. 
 
 
The Convention text 
establishes compliance 
ideals and benchmarks 
for countries that ratify 
the Convention.    
 
The Conventions may be 
abandoned and/or 
replaced 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
Convention texts 
are interpreted by 
the ILO 
Committee of 
Experts (CEACR) 
 
 
 
 
The institutional 
settlements articulated in 
texts of Conventions are 
further defined through 
interpretations by the 
CEACR. 
 
 
The ILO incorporates its 
interpretations of 
Convention texts into 
compliance ideals and 
benchmarks for countries 
that ratify the 
Conventions. 
 
 
Convention 
interpretations may be 
modified 
 
Enforcement 
 
Convention texts 
and interpretations 
are enforced by the 
ILO through 
supervision of 
countries that 
ratify the 
Convention 
 
 
The institutional 
settlement is maintained 
through ILO supervision 
of countries that ratify the 
Conventions.  
 
 
 
The CEARC identifies 
incongruence between 
domestic performance 
and Convention 
compliance ideals and 
benchmarks. 
 
 
Enforcement through 
supervision evolves to 
address changing 
circumstances and 
conditions 
 
  
B.  Diagnostic Tool at Domestic Level 
At the domestic level, the diagnostic tool takes as its starting point the 
compliance ideals and benchmarks established by the Conventions as interpreted 
by the CEACR.  The diagnostic tool is a representation of the ingredients of 
institutions and compliance theory that help to identify problems implementing 
the compliance ideals/benchmarks as handed down by the ILO as well as to 
identify some possible avenues of intervention to improve compliance. 
The first and second columns of table 4.3 identify and explain the 
domestic obstacles that may prevent implementing the compliance ideals and 
benchmarks that arise from an ILO Convention as interpreted by the CEACR.   
The obstacles that are identified: text, interpretation, enforcement, informal social 
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norms, informal social conventions and other institutions are first described in 
relation to their role as potential obstruction to compliance with an ILO 
Convention.  The label “text” for example indicates that the text of the domestic 
law may be faulty because it is written poorly, failing to conform to the 
corresponding rules of the relevant ILO Convention. 
The third column of table 4.3 explains the obstacles identified in columns 
one and two in relation to institutions theory.   For example, the text based 
obstacle to compliance described in column two as “rules are poorly written” 
corresponds to the institutional theory explanation in column three that the 
domestic, formal institutional grammar contradicts the institutional grammar of 
ILO Conventions   (Crawford and Ostrom 1995).  As indicated in Institutional 
Theory Explanation  (column three) a text problem means that the formal 
domestic rules are ambiguous, contradictory and/or be attached to ineffective rules 
governing sanctions for violations of the rule in comparison to the compliance 
ideal and benchmark arising from the ILO Convention as interpreted by the 
CEACR. 
If the domestic formal institutional rules, interpretation, enforcement, 
informal social norms, informal social conventions or other institutions are faulty, 
then column four Compliance Theory Explanation provides an explanation of the 
fault or deficit in terms of compliance theory.   For example, if formal institutional 
grammar is incongruent with the grammar of the ILO Convention, then column 
four Compliance Theory Explanation provides an explanation of the deficit in 
terms failure of domestic actors to internalize the substance of the ILO 
Convention into domestic legislation.   
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Column five, identifies possible interventions to bring problematic 
domestic institutional components into line with the compliance ideals and 
benchmarks arising from ILO Conventions.  For example, in the case of text 
problems, the Compliance Theory Explanation (Column four) identifies the 
problems as related to legislative internalization of the ILO Convention.   In this 
case, the possible intervention is to align domestic rules and sanctions with those 
found in the ILO Convention.  In this way, legislative reform further internalizes 
the ILO Convention into domestic formal institutional rules and grammar. 
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Table 4.3 Domestic Level Diagnostic Tool 
 
Domestic Level: ILO Conventions as Institutional Settlement and Compliance Benchmarks 
 
 
Obstacles 
 
Description 
 
Institutional Theory 
Explanation 
 
 
Compliance Theory 
Explanation 
 
Possible  
Intervention 
 
Text 
 
Rules are poorly 
written 
 
 
Rules are ambiguous or 
contradictory - sanctions 
are ineffective 
 
 
Legislative internalization 
of international rules 
 
Align domestic rules and 
sanctions with 
international norms 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
Well-written rules 
are interpreted 
poorly by courts 
 
 
 
 
Defections from rules are 
formally supported and 
legitimized 
 
 
 
 
Judicial internalization of 
international rules enacted 
in domestic law 
 
 
Align interpretations of 
domestic rules and 
sanctions with 
international norms 
 
 
Enforcement 
 
Well-written and 
faithfully 
interpreted 
rules are poorly 
enforced 
 
Defections from rules are 
tolerated becoming de facto 
social conventions 
 
 
 
Political internalization of 
follow through on 
enforcement intended by 
international rules 
 
 
Align enforcement of 
domestic rules with 
international norms 
 
Informal 
Social Norms 
 
Well-written and 
faithfully 
interpreted rules are 
undermined by non-
supportive social 
norms 
 
 
Formal institutions are 
undermined by informal 
institutions – Actors pursue 
socially-legitimate 
behaviours counter to 
formal institutions 
 
 
Social internalization of 
legitimacy of norms 
underlying the rules 
 
 
 
 
Align social norms with 
domestic rules by 
enhancing the normative 
legitimacy of the rules 
 
Informal Social 
Conventions 
 
Well-written and 
faithfully 
interpreted and 
enforced rules are 
undermined by 
social conventions 
 
 
Formal institutions are 
undermined by informal 
institutions- Actors pursue 
“expected” but not socially-
approved behaviours 
counter to formal 
institutions 
 
 
Social internalization of 
legitimacy of norms 
underlying the rules 
 
Align social conventions 
with domestic rules by 
enhancing the normative 
legitimacy of the rules 
 
Other 
Institutions 
 
Well-written and 
faithfully 
interpreted and 
enforced rules are 
undermined by 
other institutions 
 
 
Formal institutions 
undermine (or reinforce) 
each other – Institutional 
complementarities and 
hierarchies 
 
 
Enmeshment and linking of 
issues ensuring institutional 
hierarchy in line with 
international rules 
 
 
Align multiple institutions 
to create hierarchies 
intentionally reinforcing 
compliance outcomes 
 
 
C.  Using the Diagnostic Tool  
The institutional side of the tool is on the left side of the table with 
headings Obstacles, Text, Enforcement, Informal Social Norms, Informal Social 
Conventions and Other institutions and these come from both institutions 
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literature as well as from evidence of employment practices in DR-CAFTA 
countries that violate ILO Conventions.  The institutional ingredients on the left 
side are matched to, and anchored on the right hand side by, the corresponding 
compliance obligations that ILO Conventions create for states that ratify them.  
The content of the compliance obligations is drawn from relevant ILO Convention 
texts as well as by its authoritative interpretation by ILO bodies such as the 
Committee of Experts (See table 4.2).  The right side of the table presents, from 
the perspective of compliance with an ILO Convention obligation, what 
institutions should look like if they are to be congruent with the institutional 
settlement at the international level embodied in ILO Conventions.  
Overall, both tables represent a diagnostic tool through which domestic 
institutional arrangements can be systematically compared to the international 
institutional settlements and the compliance obligations that arise from them in the 
form of ILO Conventions.    The tool can be used as a guide in investigating and 
evaluating evidence of labour rights in any particular domestic context.  The left-
hand institutional side of the tool helps to suggest that the investigation must 
account for all of the institutional components relevant to a particular labour right.  
The right-hand compliance side of the tool suggests that the investigation must 
account for all of the compliance obligations relevant to a particular labour right.  
The left-side institutional components are structured to match the compliance 
components on the right side. 
By systematically using and accounting for both sides of the tool to guide 
an investigation of a labour right, the tool helps to diagnose specific areas and 
combinations of areas of discordance between the domestic institutional 
arrangements and international compliance obligations.  Once these areas of 
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discordance are identified, compliance theory helps to identify possible 
intervention(s) to improve alignment between domestic institutions and 
international obligations. 
The tool mirrors the interactive and interpretive processes of the CEACR 
in which reports and shadow reports are submitted to the Committee and form the 
basis of its interpretations and judgements about compliance with ILO 
Conventions.  In the resulting CEACR Direct Requests and Individual 
Observations, the Committee often mentions allegations contained in shadow 
reports and government responses to them.  Yet these interactive exchanges occur 
offstage and remain offstage since the CEACR does not publish the reports 
themselves.  Given this limitation, the tool has been devised so that diagnosis may 
be offered using publicly available information.  Even if incomplete, the tool 
offers a theoretically informed way to initiate debate. 
The overarching goal of using the diagnostic tool is to identify obstacles 
and inform debates about reforms needed to achieve compliance with 
international labour rights.  The objectives of using the tool include: (1) to analyze 
compliance by modeling a methodology to both mirror Koh’s concepts and 
amplify the work done by the ILO Committee of Experts, (2) to produce 
meaningful diagnostic categorizations and typologies of obstacles to achieve 
labour rights and (3) to identify possible interventions aimed at improving respect 
for labour rights.  
In order to replicate the process of the CEACR, use of the tool is meant to 
be based on a variety of perspectives on labour rights, including narrative 
documentary evidence from U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports and 
nongovernmental organisation reports from International Trade Union 
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Confederation (ITUC) and regional non governmental organisations such as the 
Asociación Servicios de Promoción Laboral (ASEPROLA).  The Individual 
Direct Requests and Individual Observations of the CEACR are a key source of 
the information considered with the tool.  The use of these distinctive perspectives 
in documentary form also reflects the interactions envisioned by Koh.  
The distinct perspectives in these documents represent at least some of the 
collective voices in debates over decent work.  The organizational authors of these 
documents are also actors participating in debates over international labour 
standards.  The documents are not chosen with the expectation that each source 
will uncover different or unique information concerning compliance with labour 
rights, although that may occur.  Instead, they are chosen because each contains 
its own interpretation and judgment of the social facts that are deemed to be 
relevant. These judgments include characterizing the degree of compliance with 
specific labour rights and whether particular problems with formal or informal 
institutions are relevant.  In the end, the goal is not a technical debate over labour 
rights monitoring but a wider debate about how to involve all sectors of society 
toward progressively achieving compliance.   Ultimately, an assessment based on 
these transparent documentary publicly available sources explicitly allows 
independent evaluators to identify where they disagree within the assessment 
(Moran, 2005).  
The diagnostic assessment involves three interrelated steps.  First, 
evidence of a given labour right is analyzed in relation to institutional outcomes 
and arrangements—formal institutional components, social norms and social 
conventions, and institutions from other realms of social and economic life.  
Second, the institutional outcomes and components are compared to compliance 
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criteria derived from international legal norms from the relevant ILO Convention.  
This allows for the identification of at least some of the complex and often 
multiple interactions and combinations of conditions and causal paths to 
observance and non-observance of work-time limits (Ragin 1987).  Third, using 
Koh’s compliance theory framework, it is possible to link institutional deficits 
with compliance interventions, or alternatively, to potential gaps in the 
compliance ideals themselves. 
Two case studies were undertaken to put the diagnostic tool to work and 
evaluate its usefulness.  One of the challenges of using the tool is that labour 
rights, as institutions exist at different levels of complexity.  The first case study 
examines a relatively simple application of the tool on two forms of forced labour-
- obligatory overtime and trafficking.  The second case study examines the more 
complex labour right of freedom of association.  Freedom of association is not 
actually one labour right but rather a composite of multiple inter-related rights.  
The freedom of association case study represents a distinct scale and attempts to 
account for how the individual component rights contribute to the whole.  In both 
cases however, the diagnostic tool is used as a guide to more deeply examine the 
evidence.  
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Chapter 5 Forced Labour Case Study 
I.  Introduction  
A.  Forced Labour as a Case a Study 
 
This chapter presents the first case study using the analytical framework 
and methodology.  It examines forced labour in Central America and the 
Dominican Republic.  The case involves both theoretical and empirical aspects of 
the research project examining two forms of forced labour obligatory overtime 
and trafficking (Ragin and Becker 1992 p. 8).  In answering Ragin’s question, 
what is it a case of—the following themes apply:  
(1) It is a close examination of the rules, their interpretation and 
enforcement along with informal social norms and conventions and influences 
from other realms of social life underpinning the practice of obligatory overtime 
(2) It is a comparison of: (A) the institutional arrangements supporting 
obligatory overtime with those supporting trafficking; (B) how institutional 
arrangements supporting obligatory overtime are distributed among the countries 
by category, developmental paternalistic (Costa Rica), predatory protective 
(Nicaragua) and predatory repressive (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras) and (C) how obligatory overtime and trafficking 
practices within the countries compare to compliance obligations of the ILO 
Committee of Experts and Convention Nos. 29 and 105. 
B.  Chapter Plan 
The chapter briefly discusses the origins and history of the forced labour 
and its prohibition.  Part three presents institutional and compliance discussion on 
trafficking, state imposed forced labour and obligatory overtime.  Each form of 
forced labour is presented and explained using the ILO Conventions and their 
authoritative interpretations by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application 
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of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) as a benchmark.    
C.  Selection of Forced Labour as a Case Study 
Forced labour was selected as a case study for several reasons.  First, 
forced labour played an essential historical role in the Spanish conquest and 
development of Central America and the Dominican Republic.  Forced labour was 
central to the colonizing encomienda system, in which Spanish colonists received 
tracts of land and the right to force native people to labour in return for the 
promise to instruct them in religion (Carozza 2003 p. 289).  Use of forced labour 
in Colonial times was one of the contributing factors in discussion of critical 
junctures in Chapter 3 that help to distinguish developmentalist Costa Rica from 
the other countries categorized as predatory.  It may also be relevant to relative 
labour market regulatory regimes that have evolved into the repressive labour 
market regulatory regimes in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras.  Finally, empirical evidence from examining DR-CAFTA countries 
indicated that these two forms of forced labour occur in the region and provide an 
opportunity to explore the compliance obligations arising from the ILO 
Committee of Experts and the two ILO Conventions that govern forced labour, 
Convention Nos. 29 and 105. 
D.  Research Process and Evidence for Case Study 
The research process for the case study on forced labour follows the steps 
outlined in Chapter 2.  Table 5.1 lists the specific documents from the sources 
used in the study.  
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Table 5.1 Evidence for the case came from the documents outlined below. 
 
Forced Labour Evidence 
 
 
Countries 
 
 
US State Department  
Human Rights Reports 
 
 
NGOs 
 
ILO Committee of 
Experts 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
2006 
 
Asociación Servicios de 
Promoción Laboral 
(2003) 
 
International 
Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2005) 
 
Individual Direct 
Request: 
1999  
2000 
 
 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
Asociación Servicios de 
Promoción Laboral 
(2003) 
 
International 
Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2005) 
 
 
Individual Direct 
Request: 
2006 
2007 
 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
2006 
 
International 
Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2002) 
 
Individual Direct 
Request: 
2005 
2007 
 
El Salvador 
 
2006 
 
Asociación Servicios de 
Promoción Laboral 
(2003) 
 
International 
Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2005) 
 
Individual Direct 
Request: 
2006 (2) 
Individual 
Observation: 
2006 
 
 
 
Guatemala 
 
2006 
 
Asociación Servicios de 
Promoción Laboral 
(2003) 
 
International 
Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2005) 
 
Individual Direct 
Request 2005 
Individual 
Observation 2005 
 
 
 
Honduras 
 
2006 
Asociación Servicios de 
Promoción Laboral 
(2003) 
 
International 
Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2005) 
Individual 
Observation: 
1997 
2000 
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E.  Historical and Evolving Forms of Forced Labour 
From the first moments of Spanish Colonization forced labour had 
devastating effects on the region.  Along with disease and starvation, forced 
labour and enslavement contributed to the deaths of 90% of the indigenous 
population of Central America (5.5 million people) who died during the period of 
conquest.  Overall, Latin America’s estimated population of 80 million before 
conquest (compared to 60 million in Europe) declined from 20% of the total world 
population, to 3% (Booth and Walker 1999 p. 21, Weaver 1994 p. 12).   
Forced labour practices have evolved but continue in the region today.  
Private agents force undocumented Haitians to work on Dominican sugar cane 
plantations, force women, men and children to work as prostitutes or perform 
other non-sexual work.  Employers impose obligatory overtime hours on their 
employees under the threat of physical harm, loss of pay or dismissal from 
employment.  Between 20 to 25 % of all forced labour is an outcome of 
trafficking (ILO 2005 para 57).  States retain laws allowing them to force 
incarcerated prisoners to work although it is sometimes unclear whether these 
practices continue and whether the practice would violate compliance obligations.  
In 2005, the ILO Global Report on Forced Labour estimated that there 
were 12.3 million victims of forced labour worldwide (ILO 2005a para 46).  Latin 
America and the Caribbean account for 1,320,000 estimated victims (ILO 2005a 
p. 13).  State imposed forced labour in Latin America and the Caribbean accounts 
for 16% of the total and forced labour for commercial sexual exploitation 
accounts for 9% of the total (ILO 2005 para 53).  Strikingly, the most dominant 
form of forced labour in Latin America and the Caribbean is forced labour 
extracted by private agents for the purpose of nonsexual economic exploitation, 
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which accounts for 75% of all forced labour in the region (ILO 2005a para 53). 
The next section examines the occurrence of forced labour practices related to 
obligatory overtime and trafficking. 
II.  Obligatory Overtime and Trafficking as Durable Practices 
A.  Obligatory Overtime 
 Obligatory overtime and trafficking are common practices in all of the 
countries in the study regardless of their categorization as developmental or 
predatory and regardless of their paternalistic, protective or repressive orientation 
towards labour market regulation. (Table 5.2) 
Table 5.2 
 
Obligatory Overtime and Trafficking as Employment Practices 
 
  
Obligatory Overtime 
 
 
Trafficking 
Developmental Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Predatory Protective 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Predatory Repressive 
 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
B.  Where Forced Labour Occurs 
1. Obligatory Overtime 
 Obligatory overtime is common across all of the countries in textile 
assembly in maquilas and also in free trade zone assembly plants (Table 5.3).  
There are some surprising and notable similarities between countries in different 
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categories.  Reports of obligatory overtime occur across as many sectors in Costa 
Rica and Guatemala.  It is possible that obligatory overtime is outside of the realm 
of paternalistic labour market regulation in Costa Rica compared to other areas of 
regulation such as the minimum wage. 
Nevertheless there are some distinctive characteristics found in at least a 
subsection of the predatory-repressive country category.  El Salvador and 
Guatemala are the only countries reported to impose obligatory overtime on their 
own state employees.  Evidence on Nicaragua is relatively silent on specific 
locations where obligatory overtime occurs, but the US State Department and the 
regional NGO concur that obligatory overtime is a common practice in many 
companies (USSD Nicaragua 2006 paragraph 17; ASEPROLA Nicaragua 
paragraph 7).  A list of the specific jobs and industries in which obligatory 
overtime is reported to occur is in Appendix 1.1. 
The distribution of obligatory overtime is presented below.  It is important 
to note that although obligatory overtime is reported to occur in many industries 
and kinds of work, discussion of its institutional underpinning is confined to 
textile assembly in maquilas and export processing zones. 
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Table 5.3 
 
Reports of Obligatory Overtime 
 
 General Textile 
Assembly 
Agriculture Services 
Commercial 
Public 
Sector 
Domestic 
Work 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Cost Rica 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
  
 
 
Yes 
Predatory 
Protective 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
    
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
2. Trafficking 
Trafficking of persons occurs within, to and from all of the countries 
without regard to country category for both commercial sexual exploitation and 
for non-sexual exploitation (Table 5.4).  Three-quarters of all forced labour is for 
non-sexual economic exploitation but there is much less discussion of specific 
kinds of work and industry in which trafficking occurs for non-sexual exploitation 
(ILO 2005 a para 53).  Often the evidence indicates only that it occurs, not where 
it occurs. (Table 5.5)   In regard to trafficking for sexual exploitation there is 
much more detail locating its occurrence in terms of prostitution for brothels, bars, 
near agricultural work centres etc.  As with obligatory overtime there is overlap 
between the country categories.  Costa Rica has reports of trafficking for domestic 
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work and agriculture all of which also occur in predatory repressive countries.   
There was evidence of forced labour in begging, debt bondage and sex tourism in 
a subsection of predatory repressive countries.  Notably, although Costa Rica has 
a large tourism industry, trafficking is not reported to occur there.  
Table 5.4 
 
Trafficking for Sexual and Non-sexual Exploitation 
 
 Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation/Prostitution 
Non-sexual Economic 
Exploitation 
Developmental Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Predatory Protective 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Predatory Repressive 
 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 5.5 
 
Reports of Trafficking  
 
 Un-
Specified 
Non- 
Sexual 
 
 
 
Tourism 
 
Domestic 
Work 
 
Agri-
culture 
 
 
Fishing 
 
 
Begging 
 
 
Debt 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
  
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
  
Predatory 
Protective 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
      
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
  
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
C.  Trafficking and Obligatory Overtime as Practices 
Trafficking and obligatory overtime occur in every country.  The 
distribution of forced labour practices indicates that being developmental rather 
than predatory does not insulate Costa Rica from forced labour practices. Costa 
Rica has trafficking for forced labour in domestic work, agriculture and fishing 
but not in its large tourism industry.  It is possible that Costa Rica does not have 
sex tourism identified as a problem as it is in the Dominican Republic and 
Honduras because Costa Rica has less corruption and greater enforcement 
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capacity. All of the countries share a common employment practice of obligatory 
overtime in textile production. 
Notably, all of the reports of obligatory overtime occur in the private not 
public spheres with the exception of El Salvador and Guatemala who have 
adopted it as an employment practice of their own. 
Despite their presence as common practices, it is not clear whether the 
institutional arrangements supporting obligatory overtime and trafficking are 
similar or different either across the different forms of forced labour or across the 
different country categories where they occur.  A closer examination of the 
institutional ingredients and their distribution across the countries can help in this 
regard.  
III.  Institutional Arrangements Associated with Forced Labour Practices 
 
Obligatory overtime and trafficking for sexual and non-sexual exploitation 
are common practices across all of the countries.  As practices, they are embedded 
in a web of formal and informal rules, social norms and social conventions as well 
as influences from other spheres of social life that help to sustain or undermine 
their durability as practices.  To see if there are distinct institutional arrangements 
underpinning obligatory overtime and trafficking across the country categories it 
is first necessary to identify the institutional components and then examine their 
combination and distribution across the different categories of countries: 
developmental paternalist (Costa Rica), predatory protectionist (Nicaragua) and 
predatory repressive (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras). 
A.  Obligatory Overtime Rules 
1.  Formal Institutional Rule Ingredients 
Rules are institutional statements and include: (1) designations identifying 
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to whom the statement applies, (2) verbs that permit, obligate or forbid, (3) the 
particular actions or outcomes to which the verbs apply, (4) conditions defining 
when, where, how and to what extent that action or outcome in question is 
permitted, obligatory, or forbidden and (5) the “or else” statement defining the 
sanctions to be imposed for not following the rule (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, p. 
584).  The substance of the rules on obligatory overtime and work-time limits, 
whether in national law or ILO Convention, can be analyzed using this 
institutional grammar.  From the evidence of obligatory overtime, distinctive rules 
could be identified that are associated with the practice of imposing obligatory 
overtime.  These rules are:  
 (1) Faux rules, in which a rule appears to limit work time but does not 
actually function as a limit.  For example, in El Salvador the law establishes a 
maximum normal workweek of 44 hours but overtime can occur without limit as 
long as it is agreed to freely between sides and never mandatory (USSD para 24; 
ASEPROLA para 6).  Other countries have faux normal work days and weeks but 
in addition have a rule that actually limits work time either by maximum hours per 
day or days per week or alternatively as minimum hours per day or days per week 
of rest. 
(2) Contradictory rules in which a rule setting a limit is contradicted by 
another rule allowing employers to surpass the limit.  For example in Nicaragua, 
one rule establishes work time limits but another grants employers flexibility to 
set work schedules beyond the limits (ASEPROLA N; Frey 2010 p.141);   
(3) Rules without sanctions in which a violation of the rule entails a 
meaningless sanction or no sanction at all. For example, in Honduras the law 
provides no specific penalties for its violation (ASEPOLA H para 6);  
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(4) Rules without application occur where a rule establishes a work-time 
rule but fails to apply the rule to workers or employers.  For example in El 
Salvador the law establishes that workers may only work overtime by mutual 
agreement but does not protect workers from employer threats to fire them for 
refusing to work beyond the limit (ASEPROLA ES para 7);  
(5) Rule exceptions occur when the rule establishing work time limits is 
accompanied by additional rules exempting categories of workers or employers 
from the rule. For example, Costa Rica, and other countries allow work time 
beyond national limits for categories of workers such as those in transport and 
domestic work (ASEPROLA CR para 9; Frey 2010). 
(6) Procedural impediments occur when the rules are applied through 
administrative procedures that delay or derail the application of the rule.  For 
example Guatemalan administrative procedures are very slow and are considered 
exhausted if the employer fails to appear (ASEPROLA G para 16).   
2.  Distribution of Obligatory Overtime Rules by Country Category 
 
Obligatory overtime results from multiple mechanisms associated with 
formal institutional rules and their grammar.  Much of the discussion in the 
evidence is from the regional NGO and the ITUC describing the ways that rules 
help to facilitate the imposition of obligatory overtime.  A common rule across all 
the categories enabling obligatory overtime practices is to exempt workers and 
employers from work time limits, which then affirmatively allows the imposition 
of overtime work. 
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Table 5.6 
 
 
Formal Rules Supporting Obligatory Practices 
 
 Faux 
Rules 
Contradictory 
Rules 
 
Exceptions 
No 
Sanction 
No 
Application 
Procedural 
Rules 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
  
 
 
X 
   
Predatory 
Protectionist 
 
Nicaragua 
 
  
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
   
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
3.  Discussion:   
In general there are more rules facilitating obligatory overtime in the 
predatory repressive category.  This is the only category in which there were 
procedural rule problems and inadequate or entirely missing sanctions to 
undermine substantive rules.  In the predatory category faulty rules may reinforce 
each other and the logic of enabling obligatory overtime as a practice.  Although 
obligatory overtime is common in the Dominican Republic, absolutely no 
problems were reported with its formal rules.  There is very little to distinguish 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua from each other in terms of rules.  Both countries have 
actual limits on work time.   
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B. Interpretation of Rules 
 
Interpretation is an authoritative decision on whether the rule has been 
violated.  The process often involves a challenge, for example, in an 
administrative or judicial proceeding, followed by a decision, defining and 
elaborating on the rules and their definitions in relation to particular circumstances 
(Koh 1998). 
1.  Ingredients 
 
There were only three examples of interpretation-based influence on 
formal institutions that contributed to obligatory overtime practices in DR-
CAFTA countries and helped to sustain its practice.   
(1) Dismissal interpretations occur when a worker challenges his/her dismissal 
from employment based on a violation of work time limits and the court or 
administrative hearing officer decides on the dismissal and imposition of 
obligatory overtime.   
For example, a Guatemalan court upheld the dismissal of worker for 
failing to show up for three days of work.  The court found that the worker 
incurred dismissal by failing to turn up for the twenty hour shift, which the court 
found to be the equivalent of three full working days (CEACR 9 IO 2005 Para 9). 
(2) Pay for Overtime interpretations occur when a worker challenges non-
payment of money owed by an employer for the worker’s overtime work.   For 
example, a Salvadoran company owner was fined U.S. $144,724.05 for retaining 
social security payments owed to the government on behalf of workers but the 
court failed to order the company to pay workers the money owed to them which 
continued pending in the courts.  Overtime wages were not identified distinctly 
from other pay and benefit issues in the case (USSD ES para 17). 
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(3) Obligatory overtime interpretations occur when workers challenge the 
employer’s right to impose obligatory overtime in excess of legal limits and 
judges decide whether the overtime violates the law.  For example, Nicaraguan 
courts have allowed the extension of the workday beyond the legal limits in court 
decisions (ASEPROLA N para 9). 
2.  Distribution of Interpretation of Rules underpinning Obligatory Overtime 
Practices 
 
Court decisions related to obligatory overtime are shown in Table 5.7 below 
 
Table 5.7 
 
 
Interpretation of Formal Rules Supporting 
Obligatory Overtime Practices 
 
 Legality 
of 
Dismissal 
for 
Refusal 
 
Legality of 
Overtime  
Pay 
Legality 
of 
Overtime 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Predatory 
Protectionist 
 
Nicaragua 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
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3.  Discussion 
 
Court decisions in Nicaragua most directly support obligatory overtime 
practices.   This is not surprising and fits Nicaragua’s predatory regulatory 
orientation.  Nicaraguan courts are famously politicized and flexible and have 
continued to be so since transitioning to democratic rule. 
C.  Enforcement  
 
The third element of formal institutions that work with formal rules and 
interpretation of the rules to help to sustain the imposition of obligatory overtime 
is enforcement or non-enforcement of the rules by governments.  The enforcement 
of a rule is the application of the corresponding sanction, which raises the cost of 
noncompliance by eliminating potential profit as well as imposing additional costs 
as punishment (Scholz 1997; Fisher 1981). Enforcement mechanisms include 
monitoring and penalties, such as fines and prison sentences, as well as the 
procedural rules through which the mechanisms are applied, which may increase 
or decrease the probability of conviction (Becker 1968). 
1.  Enforcement-based Formal Institutions 
 
Evidence of enforcement focused on the various methods and styles of 
non-enforcement of rules. Varieties of non-enforcement included: 
(1) Open non-enforcement occurs when government ministries formally and 
affirmatively approve company practices that violate work time and over time 
limits.   For example in Costa Rica, the Ministry of Labour acknowledged it had 
granted permission to eight companies to operate workday practices that violate 
its laws including permanent overtime (ASEPROLA CR para 16, 17, 19). 
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(2) Silent non-enforcement occurs when the rules are not enforced by authorities 
but not as a stated policy choice.  This is the case in every country except Costa 
Rica. 
(3) No Records is a means to non-enforcement by virtue of not having evidence of 
violations of work time rules.  The non-maintenance of records is done by 
companies and/or the governments.  For example, Costa Rican companies do not 
keep records of work time making it difficult for employees to check their 
compliance with laws and similarly, the Ministry of Labour does not have a 
record keeping system to track cases of “extreme working conditions” 
(ASEPROLA CR para 16).  
(4) Inadequate Resources problems occur when there is a rule-based obligation to 
enforce a rule but inadequate resources to allow the enforcement to occur as for 
example in Guatemala and El Salvador (USSD para 14 and 19).  Inadequate 
resources can also be expressed as inadequate training.   Lack of Training of 
Inspectors in which non-enforcement occurs as a result of untrained inspectors 
who are not capable of carrying out inspections to enforce the law. (ICFTU Para 
4).  
(5) Procedural non-enforcement problems occur when procedures take place such 
as hearings or mediations but those participating for the government do not fulfil 
their role in the proceedings.  For example in Guatemala, labour inspectors sit 
passively in proceedings rather than propose solutions or take an active role in any 
way (ASEPROLA G para 19).  This also occurs in Honduras where complaint 
procedures are slow and often fail to result in any action by the Ministry of 
Labour (ICFTU H para 4). 
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(6) Bureaucratic failure occurs when those charged with investigating and 
prosecuting violations of the rules fail to do so. For example, in Nicaragua if a 
worker complains to a labour inspector that she/he is required to work beyond the 
mandated limit, the labour inspector does not find this to be the fault of the 
employer (ASEPROLA N para 7).  In Guatemala the Ministry of Labour does not 
carry out or even try to carry out investigations of piece work-based forced labour 
(USSD G).  
(9) Unspecified non-enforcement occurs when a rule is not enforced but no reason 
or mechanism is given as in the Dominican Republic.  
2.  Distribution of Enforcement/Non-enforcement underpinning Obligatory  
Overtime Practices 
  
The distribution of enforcement problems is presented below in Table 5.8 
 
Table 5.8 
 
 
Enforcement/ Non-Enforcement of Rules Supporting Obligatory Practices 
 
 Open 
Silent 
Bureaucratic Procedures Training 
Resources 
No 
Records 
Not 
Specified 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
 
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
X 
 
Predatory 
Protectionist 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
Silent 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
X 
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
Silent 
 
 
Silent 
 
Silent 
 
Silent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
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3.  Discussion of Enforcement/Non-enforcement 
 
The distribution and patterns of enforcement related problems across the 
categories are distinctive.  Costa Rica is the only country that transparently 
concedes and affirmatively announces that it does not enforce its laws on 
obligatory overtime.  Its announcement was made in relation to its championing 
the practice for development purposes and as support for changing and loosening 
the rules (ASEPROLA).  Non-enforcement by absence of records does not 
necessarily contradict its developmental paternalistic orientation.  There would 
possibly be greater pressure to uphold the rules and protect the victims if there 
was evidence of law breaking in Costa Rica relative to countries that are not 
developmentalist or paternalistic in regulatory orientation. 
In the predatory repressive category there are also some distinctive results. 
Procedural hurdles in Guatemala and Honduras give the impression that 
enforcement procedures and steps occur but without enforcement intentions, 
content or result.  El Salvador with the formal rules allowing obligatory overtime 
does not employ the same enforcement procedural hurdles as Guatemala and 
Honduras.  The United States notes that lack of resources is an enforcement 
problem in EPZs in El Salvador.  It’s not clear, what if anything, additional 
resources would add, given that the law allows obligatory overtime.  
Interestingly, enforcement problems related to inspectors as bureaucratic 
problems occur in both Guatemala and Nicaragua.  Other bureaucratic problems 
are mentioned in the evidence related to general corruption among labour 
inspectors and as a result it’s difficult to determine whether obligatory overtime 
inspection problems are different than general corruption problems in labour 
inspection. 
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Finally, as was the case with formal rules, very little is said of specific 
enforcement problems in the Dominican Republic. This is surprising since 
obligatory overtime is described as common and at times is imposed by locking 
workers in factories, but there is no discussion whatsoever about enforcement or 
non-enforcement (USSD, ASEPROLA, ICFTU).  In Honduras, there is discussion 
of lack of effective enforcement by the Ministry of Labour but no further 
explanation (USSD H). 
Overall, it is not surprising that obligatory overtime occurs based on the 
numerous flawed rules, interpretations and enforcement problems that support its 
sustainability as a practice.  There is an implicit, and in Costa Rica’s case, an 
explicit message in the rules, their interpretation and enforcement, that in every 
regulatory orientation, countries want to say that they are against obligatory 
overtime, or at least, want to be perceived as saying they are against obligatory 
overtime.  Nevertheless, the formulation of the rules, their interpretation and 
enforcement actually facilitate the imposition of obligatory overtime albeit in 
different styles. 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras from the predatory repressive 
category rely on multiple and mutually reinforcing rules including the absence of 
sanctions in combination with either procedural obstacles as in the case of 
Guatemala and Honduras or in the case of El Salvador rules that do not require 
sanctions or procedures because the substance of the rule allows obligatory 
overtime.  These rule arrangements seem solidly in line with their regulatory 
orientations. In keeping with its developmental paternalistic orientation, Costa 
Rica has more transparent rules with clear work time limits but so does Nicaragua, 
at least on paper, despite its predatory orientation.  Court decisions in Nicaragua 
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also contribute to imposition of obligatory overtime. Enforcement differs between 
Costa Rica and all the other countries based on the openness with which Costa 
Rica does not enforce the rues. 
The Dominican Republic is more difficult to interpret based on formal 
institutions because there is almost no evidence of their failings or indeed their 
relevance.  In the case of the Dominican Republic the relevant guiding rules 
actually governing obligatory overtime are expressed in social conventions not on 
paper. 
D.  Informal Institutions 
  
The second dimension of institutional analysis is the interaction between 
formal and informal institutions.  Informal institutions include social norms and 
social conventions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Informal institutions interact 
with formal institutions and contribute to the observance or non-observance of 
work-time limits and constraints on obligatory overtime.  They can contribute to 
observance by strengthening incentives to comply and can even substitute for 
deficits in ineffective formal institutions such as ambiguous substantive rules 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2006).  Alternatively, informal institutions can undermine 
observance of rules prohibiting or limiting obligatory overtime by displacing 
formal institutions and thereby contributing to their irrelevance (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2006).  Lastly even when formal institutions are not openly violated, 
informal institutions can undermine observance through, for example, creative 
compliance, meaning situations where actors comply with the letter of the law 
while violating its normative spirit (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). 
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E. Social Norms 
Social norms are values that are observed irrespective of the behaviours of 
others and correspond to ideas of prudential behaviour (North 1990, p. 4; Ostrom 
2005). Evidence indicates that social norms contribute to tolerance of obligatory 
overtime as an employment practice among DR-CAFTA countries.   
1.  Ingredients  
(1) Defence of Worker Exemptions:  Normative underpinnings support longer 
work hours for groups of employees exempted from national limits (Costa Rica, 
Guatemala).  For example, security guards and bus drivers are said to enjoy the 
benefit of freedom from close supervision and this, it is argued, offsets their 
longer hours (Costa Rica).  Domestic workers in Costa Rica enjoy in-kind benefits 
and are argued to be like housewives who are constantly available.  
 (2) Defence of Employer Exemptions:  Sometimes the normative support for 
obligatory overtime through employers rather than specific categories of workers, 
as with social norms that support the setting of work schedules based entirely on 
employer needs rather than in conformity with work-time limits (El Salvador, 
Honduras).  
 (3) Work Ethic:  (Defence of Long Work Hours) More diffusely, social norms 
support obligatory overtime when they invoke traditions of long work hours 
(Guatemala) or 
(4) Modernization: when obligatory overtime is framed by the government to be a 
new and modern idea with its acceptance promoted by governments (Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Honduras). 
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(5) Violation Tolerance:  In addition to normative support for obligatory overtime 
there is also a culture of tolerance for violations of labour rights (El Salvador, 
Honduras).  
2.  Distribution of Social Norms 
 
 The distribution of social norms supporting obligatory overtime is 
presented below in Table 5.9 
Table 5.9 
 
Social Norms      
  
Modernization 
 
Defence of 
Worker 
Exceptions 
 
Defence of 
Employer 
Exemptions 
 
Work 
Ethic 
Social 
Tolerance 
of Labour 
Rights 
Violations 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
   
Predatory 
Protectionist 
 
Nicaragua 
 
     
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
3.  Discussion 
 
The startling thing about social norms underpinning support for obligatory 
overtime is that they are not exclusively a characteristic of developmental Costa 
Rica.  Predatory regimes also generate a number of normative supports for 
 167 
obligatory overtime practices.  Repressive regimes also create normative 
justifications for employment practices rather than rely solely on rules and non-
enforcement alone.   Some predatory normative justifications overlap with 
developmentalist justifications.  Costa Rica shares with El Salvador and Honduras 
a similar normative effort to champion obligatory overtime as a way to modernize 
and develop the country.  Finally, the total absence of discussion of social norms 
in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic is also surprising. 
F.  Social Conventions to Impose Obligatory Overtime 
 
In contrast, to social norms, social conventions depend on the fact that 
others adhere to them as well.  Bribery and corruption and violence are common 
examples of social conventions.  Predatory and neopatrimonial states do not 
necessarily always enact directly into law, the despotic ruler’s or elite’s right to 
extract resources and wealth.  Informal institutions, particularly social conventions 
are expected to be significantly more important among predatory than 
developmental states.   
There was evidence of many different kinds of social conventions 
sustaining obligatory overtime practices and not a single social convention 
counter to its acceptance as a practice.  For ease of analysis of the many varieties, 
they are divided here into social conventions that function as direct coercion to 
work obligatory overtime and indirect coercion that comes about through systems 
such as pay and piece rate systems.  A third related area of social conventions 
enable employers to avoid paying overtime pay rates for overtime hours worked.  
They are not included here but are in Appendix 1.3. 
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1. Ingredients:  
a. Direct Coercion 
(1) Dismissal of workers or threats to do so. (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras). 
(2) Physical coercion through threats of violence or locking doors (Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras).   
(3) Economic withholding or threatening the withholding of pay or other 
accumulated benefits (Dominican Republic, Guatemala).   
 b. Indirect Coercion 
(4) Manipulation of pay/piece rate and bonus systems (Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala and Honduras) 
(5) Quid pro Quo: demanding that unions accept piece rate pay systems without 
regard to hours worked as a condition of employer’s agreement to engage in 
collective bargaining (Guatemala). 
(6) Intensity: simply maintaining very high volumes of work to create urgency 
with delivery deadlines (El Salvador, Honduras).   
(7) Ignorance: Employers simply refrain from informing employees that limits to 
work-time exist (Dominican Republic).   
(8) Voluntary: In some cases workers volunteer and even request to work beyond 
legislated work time limits due to poverty (El Salvador, Nicaragua). 
2. Distribution of Social Conventions (Direct Coercion) 
 
The distribution social conventions exerting direct and indirect coercion 
supporting obligatory overtime are presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 below. 
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Table 5.10 
 
 
Social Conventions Direct Coercion 
 
 Physical 
Coercion 
Dismissal  
(or threat) 
Withhold Pay 
(or threat) 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
   
Predatory 
Protectionist 
 
Nicaragua 
 
   
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
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Table 5.11 
 
2.  Distribution of Social Conventions (Indirect Coercion) 
 
 
Social Conventions Indirect Coercion 
 
 Pay/Piece 
Rates 
Work 
Intensity 
Information Collective 
Bargaining 
Workers 
Volunteer 
Developmental 
Paternalistic 
 
Costa Rica 
 
     
Predatory 
Protectionist 
 
Nicaragua 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
Predatory 
Repressive 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
3. Discussion 
 
All of the directly coercive social conventions are confined to predatory 
repressive countries and all of the countries dismiss or threaten to dismiss workers 
who refuse to work obligatory overtime.  In addition, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala and Honduras use physical coercion.  It is surprising that in El 
Salvador there is only evidence of dismissal as direct coercion, but perhaps other 
forms of direct coercion are unnecessary because more of its institutional coercion 
comes through rules. 
Indirect coercion is also predominantly found in predatory repressive 
countries.  The indirect form, of workers volunteering in El Salvador and 
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Nicaragua relates to other institutions influencing overtime in the form of poverty 
discussed below.  Pay systems coerce overtime hours except in El Salvador, 
which relies on general work intensity.  Guatemala was unique in term of 
evidence that employers condition bargaining with unions on the union’s 
acceptance of piece rate systems that cause workers to work overtime. 
G. Institutions in other Realms of Social Life 
The third dimension of institutional analysis is the influence of institutions 
in spheres of economic and social life that are not directly related to work-time 
limits and constraints on obligatory overtime.  Institutions in different spheres 
interact and reinforce each other in several ways (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 
2001).  One example is where workers in general are protected against obligatory 
overtime by specific institutions, but have difficulty gaining effective access to 
protection because citizenship institutions put them at risk of deportation if they 
file complaints.  Another example is when one set of institutions imposes its logic 
on another institution. 
1.  Ingredients 
(1) Wage Setting: Some institutions, such as wage setting rules, are separate but 
very closely related to obligatory overtime (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua). 
(2) Labour Rights: Such as freedom of association and collective bargaining 
influence obligatory overtime practices. (Guatemala, Honduras). 
(3) Macro policy: At the macro economic policy level, economic development 
policies contribute to obligatory overtime practices through unemployment and 
underemployment. (El Salvador, Honduras).  Also, at the international level, 
market institutions in which currency values fluctuate make workers’ poverty 
wages lower still. (Honduras, Nicaragua) 
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(4) Development/FDI policy: Government policy institutions to attract foreign 
direct investment influence obligatory overtime by undermining formal 
institutions (Costa Rica, Honduras).  Development policy: Similarly, international 
export market institutions create industry fluctuations adding to worker insecurity.  
Examples: Honduras, Nicaragua. 
(5) Gender and race institutions influence are more in the background related to 
families and single motherhood (El Salvador) as well as racism (Dominican 
Republic). 
2. Distribution 
Indeed there is evidence that diverse sets of institutions beyond national 
work time limits influence obligatory overtime practices presented in Table 5.12 
Table 5.12 
Other 
Institutions 
     
 Wage 
Setting 
Labour 
Rights 
Macro 
Policy 
Development 
Policy 
Gender 
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X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
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3.  Discussion 
  In every country, at least one institution outside of those directly 
governing work time is discussed as influencing its practice.  Development policy 
related to export oriented production in textiles discussed in the evidence crosses 
all of the categories.  In Costa Rica it is related to normative support for overtime 
as modernization.  Development policy and connection to obligatory overtime are 
also evidenced in Honduras from the predatory repressive category.  Wage policy 
is named as an important contributing factor in Nicaragua and two of the 
predatory repressive countries El Salvador and Honduras.   
The interactions between multiple institutions may indicate an institutional 
hierarchy but the source of the hierarchy is not possible to determine.  It is 
possible that neoliberal export-oriented development and structural adjustment 
oriented institutions impose their logic on work-time and overtime limits.  This 
would be indicated by Costa Rica’s inclusion under the rubric of development 
policy, in common with Nicaragua and Honduras.   Structural adjustment-oriented 
policies (SAP) involve creating a friendlier environment for domestic and 
international businesses by weakening labor policy and labor policy enforcement 
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007).   Alternatively, with respect to the predatory 
repressive countries such as Honduras, obligatory overtime may be influenced by 
its general logic of predation and repression masked in the language of and 
legitimacy of neo-liberal policy. 
H. Summary of Obligatory Overtime as Employment Practice 
Obligatory overtime is a common employment practice across all 
categories of countries in the study.  It is supported by rules of differing varieties 
that facilitate its imposition and in a few cases (Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
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Guatemala) further supported by judicial decisions.  Enforcement problems are 
extensive with the worst problems occurring in predatory repressive Guatemala 
and Honduras.  There is evidence that social norms support the imposition of 
obligatory overtime and that at least some of the social norms transcend 
regulatory orientation.  Social norms in both developmental paternalistic Costa 
Rica and predatory repressive El Salvador and Honduras support obligatory 
overtime through defence of the practice as a modernization strategy.  Also, 
crossing country categories are social norms supportive of exempting some 
workers from protections against obligatory overtime in Costa Rica and 
Guatemala.  Institutions related to poverty and economic development were 
contributing factors to obligatory overtime and economic development institutions 
transcend regulatory orientation occurring in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and 
Honduras. 
The most striking divide that occurs in obligatory overtime between 
predatory repressive countries on the one hand and developmental paternalistic 
Costa Rica and predatory protective Nicaragua is the prevalence of direct and 
indirect coercive social conventions. For predatory repressive countries a 
common feature is threats and actual dismissal for refusing to work overtime and 
physical coercion in every country except El Salvador. Indirect forms of coercion 
such as pay and piece rate systems were also exclusively found in predatory 
repressive systems.  The only evidence of an indirectly coercive social convention 
in Nicaragua concerns institutions from other realms of social life.  Nicaraguan 
workers volunteer for overtime based on their poverty.  The practice of obligatory 
overtime in Costa Rica and Nicaragua is common and durable but not embedded 
in the same coercive direct and indirect social conventions.   
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There was a degree of variety and distinctive flavours and style among 
predatory repressive systems as well.  The Dominican Republic relies almost 
exclusively on direct and indirect coercive social conventions with formal 
institutions and social norms all but irrelevant.  El Salvador relies much more 
heavily on rules rather than social conventions (other than dismissals).  Guatemala 
and Honduras are over-achievers relative to other predatory repressive countries.  
They have a mutually reinforcing system of dysfunctional rules including absence 
of sanctions, rule-based procedural and enforcement problems as well as 
supportive social norms and coercive social conventions. 
A similar fine-grained institutional analysis is possible with other forced 
labour practices for the purpose of identifying and untangling the specific 
institutional arrangements.  It is also possible to compare institutional 
arrangements across practices.  The next section of the case study provides such a 
comparison between institutional arrangements in obligatory overtime and 
trafficking.   It provides an opportunity to further examine the institutional 
diversity among countries but also an opportunity to see how ILO prohibitions 
against forced labour deal with its diverse forms.  
IV. Trafficking  
 
Trafficking of persons occurs within, to and from all of the countries 
without regard to country category for both commercial sexual exploitation and 
for non-sexual exploitation (Table 5.4).   Like obligatory overtime, trafficking 
occurs within a web of formal and informal institutions that either support or 
challenge its durability as a practice.  The institutional analysis that follows is not 
directed at identification of institutional ingredients at the same micro level as 
obligatory overtime but to identify patterns for comparison purposes. 
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A.  Trafficking Rules 
 
Unlike obligatory overtime rules, trafficking rules are not discussed in 
relation to their facilitating trafficking. Trafficking practices occur despite the 
rules not because of them.  There are fewer kinds of rule-based problems with 
respect to trafficking and there are no common rule problems across all of the 
countries. When trafficking rules are criticized, it is for not being comprehensive 
enough.  This concern is expressed for countries in every category, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua and Honduras. A good example is Nicaragua, which is criticized for 
excluding from its law some non-sexual economically exploitive labour, some 
adolescents and attempted trafficking.  Similarly, Costa Rican law was called 
problematic by the U.S. because it did not address all forms of trafficking.  In the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala there are no specific criticisms 
of the rules associated with trafficking but an acknowledgement that despite the 
rules, trafficking is a problem.   
In contrast to obligatory overtime where most of the discussion of rules 
centres on describing their dysfunctional qualities, there is also more evidence of 
attempts to adjust rules to improve their efficacy with respect to trafficking.  All 
of the countries except Guatemala are mentioned for improving the rules in some 
way to further challenge the practice of trafficking.   
At least on paper, it appears that El Salvador and Honduras are willing to 
directly confront their predatory system’s role in trafficking practices.  Honduras 
broadened its law to cover more forms of trafficking, increased penalties and 
created a special category of offence for corrupt public officials who engage in 
trafficking.    Similarly, El Salvador amended its court proceedings to increase the 
likelihood that perpetrators would not go free.  Formerly, one judge would hear 
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the proceedings commonly leading to release of the accused. The law was 
changed to require three judges to hear the cases making clientalistic court 
proceedings more difficult and more transparent. 
B. Interpretation of Rules 
 
The interpretation of rules is less prominently discussed in obligatory 
overtime and trafficking compared to other institutional components.   Obligatory 
overtime court decisions were discussed relative to deciding the legality of 
dismissing workers in Guatemala, paying workers for overtime work in El 
Salvador and the legality of imposing overtime work in Nicaragua.  In contrast, 
trafficking related court decisions and legal interpretations centre on one theme 
only and that is whether the totality of the process leads to convictions, fines and 
prison sentences or alternatively acquittals.  Thematically it relates to the 
enforcement scorecards relevant to all of the countries but specifically discussed 
with regard to court decisions in the predatory countries the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador and Honduras.  Judges and processes that lead to acquittals are 
criticized in El Salvador and Honduras and these are presented as failures of 
reasoning and understanding.  In Honduras the problem is identified as the 
judiciary’s failure to appreciate the complexities of trafficking practices (ITUC; 
USSD).  El Salvador’s case is interesting in its connection to social conventions 
discussed below.  In the Salvadoran case the accused argued that he had not 
trafficked the young person into the country because she travelled and entered the 
country on her own and further that he had not profited from her prostitution. 
C.  Enforcement 
Trafficking-related enforcement receives more extensive attention than 
enforcement related to obligatory overtime.  For the most part, discussion of 
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obligatory overtime-related enforcement is limited, its absence due to bureaucratic 
and judicial failings or policy choice.  In trafficking enforcement, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua are the only countries identified for their failure to 
sufficiently prosecute and enforce the trafficking laws.   
Ultimately, trafficking enforcement, unlike obligatory overtime, includes 
evaluating and keeping score of enforcement outcomes.  There are success stories 
across the spectrum of regulatory regimes.  Guatemala and the Dominican 
Republic are noted along with Nicaragua for successful rescues and repatriations 
of victims and raids of suspected trafficking establishments.  The score keeping 
crosses all categories of countries and includes investigations, arrests, 
prosecutions, convictions and imposition of fines and prison sentences.  Further, 
the score keeping metric is applied to all of the countries and so Costa Rica’s 
successes and failures are noted as well as Nicaragua’s and all of the countries in 
the predatory repressive category.  Tallies and descriptions of enforcement efforts 
also address corrupt predatory systems and examples of their official role in 
trafficking, such as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua 
Beyond conviction scorecards, in contrast with obligatory overtime, there 
is discussion of many more facets of enforcement with regard to trafficking and 
these do not fall along particular country regulatory categories.  For example, 
Costa Rica’s enforcement agencies are named and their efficacy is evaluated, as 
are those in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua.  Part 
of the discussion crossing country regulatory categories includes the need to 
improve enforcement coordination among government agencies, which is applied 
to Costa Rica, as well as Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. 
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Inadequate funding for enforcement agencies is cited as a problem in Costa Rica 
as well as El Salvador.   
Some specific criticisms are, nevertheless, reserved for predatory systems.  
Honduras is criticized for lacking an enforcement strategy.  The Dominican 
Republic and Nicaragua are said to lack effective enforcement targeting.  
Preventative campaigns and studies to analyze the problem to better inform 
strategies were criticisms levelled at the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua.  Nevertheless Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and 
Honduras were recognized for improved enforcement efforts as well.  
Like rules in trafficking, there was also much more discussion devoted to 
improvements that occurred over the previous year in enforcement of anti-
trafficking laws.  There were no reported improvements in the laws or 
enforcement of the laws to prevent obligatory overtime.  Trafficking-related 
enforcement improvements were found across every country category.  Costa Rica 
was lauded for its public awareness campaigns to warn potential victims along 
with Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.   Official and unofficial victim 
assistance was discussed positively in reference to every country. 
Some of the improvements were found only in predatory systems 
including improved training for government officials in Nicaragua, El Salvador 
and Honduras and the incorporation of non-governmental organizations in 
enforcement efforts with the governments of Nicaragua and Guatemala.  Most 
striking, given their repressive labour market regulatory orientation, El Salvador 
and Guatemala made changes in their enforcement system encourage victims to 
file charges by removing impediments from their procedures. 
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D.  Informal Institutions 
 
As with obligatory overtime, informal institutions play an important role in 
influencing trafficking practices by either reinforcing or displacing formal rules, 
interpretation and enforcement.  Both social norms and social conventions are 
examined. 
E.  Social Norms 
 
In contrast to the social norms supporting obligatory overtime there are no 
expressions of social norms espousing support for trafficking.  In fact there is little 
direct discussion of social norms related to trafficking at all, beyond the fear and 
embarrassment of the victims due to social stigma and the role of social norms in 
child rearing and gender relations causing all forms of child abuse to be under 
reported and victims to be discriminated against once repatriated.  The evidence of 
norms was only relevant to predatory countries Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador. 
F. Social Conventions 
 
Like obligatory overtime, social conventions are extremely important in 
sustaining trafficking in the countries.  Discussion of trafficking related social 
conventions related only to trafficking for sexual exploitation however.  In 
obligatory overtime, social conventions provide direct and indirect coercion 
predominantly in predatory repressive systems.  These included directly coercive 
threats of dismissal and physical coercion in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala 
and Honduras.  Indirect coercion in the form of pay and piece rate systems were 
also almost entirely limited to predatory repressive systems. 
In contrast to obligatory overtime, many of the social conventions 
supporting trafficking are not based on coercion but rather on enticement and are 
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widely shared across categories of countries. There is discussion and remarkable 
consistency in the use of false promises of employment in a job as the means to 
entice a potential trafficking victim.   The jobs used to entice victims ranged from 
work in beauty salons, factories and domestic servants.  The full list of jobs and 
industries is listed in Appendix 1.2.  The only evidence of discussion of physical 
coercion was in reference to El Salvador where kidnappings and other forms of 
force are used.  
The methods of communicating the enticement tend to follow in line with 
a country’s predatory regulatory orientation.  The enticement communication is 
personal including acquaintances, friends and family members in Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala.  In addition to personal 
relationships and direct communication, impersonal business-like forms exist 
through flyers, newspaper advertisements and employment agencies in El 
Salvador and Guatemala.   
Despite common reliance on enticement and false promise of employment, 
trafficking practices vary sharply.  Social conventions for trafficking relate to the 
differing nature of the organizations involved.  In predatory repressive systems 
such as El Salvador and Guatemala, traffickers tend to be business owners of 
topless bars, brothels and employment agencies.  In Guatemala these businesses 
are also involved in trafficking and criminal enterprises such as drug and migrant 
smuggling. 
Given the relationship of military, oligarchic and criminal elites in El 
Salvador and Guatemala it’s not surprising that trafficking looks more business-
like and organized on a greater scale.  Remarkably, El Salvador’s trafficking 
practices involve most victims entering the country on their own in response to a 
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fraudulent job offer.  If the person is caught, she is simply considered an illegal 
immigrant.  If she arrives without incident, she is forced into prostitution.   
In contrast, trafficking in the Dominican Republic involves many small 
smuggling rings and it is not clear what their connection is to the tourism industry.  
It is more surprising that the Dominican Republic’s system is not connected to 
drug trafficking but there are connections to government elites.  Victims pay to 
obtain travel documents through government agencies and forgers and the 
documents may be false or legitimate and are often retained by the traffickers after 
arrival in the destination country.  Documents used for trafficking purposes 
include visas for public programs such as fire fighter training programs. 
Corruption conventions play a central role in supporting trafficking and 
are not limited to predatory systems.  Corruption in immigration and law 
enforcement are problems in Costa Rica and Nicaragua as well as the Dominican 
Republic and Guatemala.  In Nicaragua, false immigration documents are so 
inexpensive that it led to a change in smuggling practices and discontinuance of 
stealth smuggling by boats in favour of regular transport.  Similarly, immigration 
and national police in the Dominican Republic falsify visas and facilitate 
trafficking through airports or alternatively like, Guatemalan police accept bribes 
in money or sex in exchange for their non-interference with trafficking activities.  
The most startling corruption allegation concerned Nicaragua whose director of 
immigration was directly involved in corrupt practices including embezzling 
money from government repatriation funds. 
In addition to facilitation, there is an allegation of involvement in 
trafficking and migrant smuggling by the Dominican military.  Notably the only 
discussion of forced labour for non-sexual exploitation was the Dominican 
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Republic involved military and migration officials working on the border between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic who were alleged by NGOs to sometimes 
facilitate illegal transit of undocumented Haitian workers.   
Lastly, unlike obligatory overtime, in trafficking, the evidence indicates 
that there is recognition that social conventions affect trafficking outcomes and 
must be challenged.  There are criticisms when formal institutions such as 
government enforcement efforts do not consistently or effectively challenge 
corruption practices.  This criticism transcends country categories and is levelled 
against Costa Rica, Nicaragua, as well as the Dominican Republic and Honduras.   
Criticisms of the obstacles to effective enforcement in trafficking, directly 
confront predatory regulatory orientations and the social conventions that arise 
from them. If government agencies serve the interests of traffickers, shielding 
them from prosecution and conviction, no matter how well connected the 
trafficker is, the government is criticized.  This is noted when prosecutors are 
reluctant to pursue charges against government officials in the Dominican 
Republic and Honduras for example.  The Dominican Republic is criticized even 
if prosecutions occur but are perceived as being too slow.   
G.  Institutions from other Realms of Social Life 
 
As with obligatory overtime, institutions beyond those directly related to 
trafficking influence trafficking practices and efforts to eradicate them.   
Institutions contributing to the level of poverty were recognized as important in 
every country category and country. Trafficking and obligatory overtime are each 
influenced by institutions related to poverty such as unemployment, low wages, 
lack of food and clothing, agricultural production and pay systems and low levels 
of education. 
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 Prostitution and commercial sex related institutions were also cited as 
relevant in every country category and country.  The fact that prostitution is legal 
in every category including Costa Rica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala and Honduras and is at times openly or widely practiced is consistently 
raised by US State Department documents. 
Immigration institutions influence trafficking in two ways, first they 
influence enforcement strategies and secondly, they influence how trafficking 
victims are treated.  In this case there is potential contradiction in Costa Rica’s 
paternalistic regulatory orientation in the sense that Costa Rica’s immigration 
institutions provide the least protection for victims allowing their immediate 
deportation.  In contrast repressive Guatemala acts in ways that seem 
contradictory.  They provide many more immigration related supports to victims 
including release of children to care by non-governmental organizations.  In 
addition, despite its legality, the Guatemalan police raids bars and immigration 
officials deport all the prostitutes it rounded up in the raids. 
Finally, immigration institution reforms to curb illegal immigration have 
been credited with discontinuation of the trafficking of sugar cane workers in the 
Dominican Republic.  At the same time, ineffective formal immigration and 
extradition-related institutions are blamed for facilitating trafficking in Nicaragua.  
 H. Summary of Trafficking as an Employment Practice 
 
The vast majority of attention and evidence on trafficking institutions and 
compliance concerns prostitution-related trafficking.  Despite this and consistent 
with ILO estimates, there is evidence of widespread trafficking for non-sexual 
exploitation and many but not all reports of this kind of trafficking focus on 
predatory repressive systems.  Non-sexual exploitation trafficking includes 
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children trafficked to work as labourers or beggars in the Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala, trafficking related to debt bondage of women in Honduras.  As 
indicated on Table 5.5 trafficking occurs for work in domestic work, agricultural 
work and in fishing and these forms transcend divisions between developmental 
predatory and paternalistic or repressive regulatory orientations.  The extent of 
this aspect of trafficking is systematically ignored in the evidence even though it 
affects many children and adults.  For example it is estimated that most Honduran 
children trafficked, estimated to be 20,000 or more work in households as 
housekeepers and child labourers (USSD H para 18). 
Both trafficking and obligatory overtime are persistent and widespread 
practices across all of the countries in the study and examination of the 
institutional architecture indicates that there are significant differences between 
the institutional arrangements supporting each practice.  In trafficking, the totality 
of formal institutional ingredients mutually challenge trafficking as a practice.  
Trafficking institutional arrangements generally challenge trafficking practices 
with more effective rules, judicial support or alternatively, criticism in the absence 
of judicial support.  Better rules and judicial pressure for support are accompanied 
by evidence of greater effort and more dimensions of enforcement with pressure 
and criticisms evident in cases of enforcement failures.  Informal institutions 
interact with trafficking in countervailing ways.  There are no social norms 
supportive of trafficking as a practice.  In support of trafficking practices there are 
widespread social conventions of enticement and corruption to facilitate.  Poverty, 
prostitution and immigration institutions influence trafficking practices.   
In contrast, obligatory overtime practices are supported by formal 
institutions that mutually reinforce its durability as a practice.  Formal institutions 
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include inadequate rules and interpretations and these are supported by non-
enforcement.  Evidence of criticism for these problems is evident primarily among 
non-governmental organizations rather than the U.S. State department.  Both 
social norms and social conventions are supportive of obligatory overtime 
practices. Coercive social conventions were almost exclusively evident in 
predatory repressive systems.  Like trafficking, institutions related to poverty 
influence obligatory overtime practices. 
Obligatory overtime and trafficking are persistent and come with different 
institutional arrangements supporting them or in the case of trafficking 
challenging them.  Both practices are considered part of forced labour within the 
ILO Core Labour Standards Declaration of 1998 and the subject of ILO 
Convention Nos. 29 and 105 as well as ILO Supervision.  The questions to be 
addressed in the next section are (1) what are the compliance obligations from the 
ILO on forced labour and (2) based on those obligations are countries within our 
categories compliant or alternatively are there compliance interventions based on 
Koh that should be considered. 
IV. Forced Labour Prohibitions in Law 
Efforts to abolish forced labour in the region began in the early 1500s from 
Catholic friars who were part of the order of Dominicans (Carozza 2003 p. 290).  
International efforts to abolish slavery began 300 years later with the 1815 
Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade.  Between 1815 
and 1957, 300 separate international agreements were negotiated and 
implemented to suppress slavery (Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International 2002 
p. 3).   
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Over the years, the slavery prohibitions expanded to practices beyond 
traditional ownership forms of chattel slavery (Shahinian 2008 paras 5-10).  
Forced labour became the subject of international standard setting separate from 
slavery following World War One.  At the time, forced labour remained a 
predominantly colonial phenomenon used by colonial authorities for economic 
development, infrastructure and in industries such as mining and agriculture (ILO 
2007 para 7).  
A.  Forced Labour in Core Labour Standards  
The Abolition of Forced labour is one of the four Core Labour Standards 
established by the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (ILO 1998a).  All ILO member states are obligated by the 1998 Declaration 
to uphold the principles underlying the Conventions prohibiting forced labour.  
The prohibition against forced labour and slavery is also considered a universally 
accepted fundamental right (ILO 2007).   
B.  Forced Labour in ILO Conventions 
There are two ILO Conventions addressing forced labour, Convention No. 
29 (1930) and Convention 105 No. (1957).  The Dominican Republic and all of 
the Central American countries have ratified both forced labour conventions 
(ILOLEX).  The Conventions 
 …aim at guaranteeing to all human beings freedom from forced 
labour, irrespective of the nature of the work or the sector of 
activity in which it may be performed.  The two instruments 
effectively supplement each other, and their concurrent application 
should contribute to the complete eradication of forced or 
compulsory labour in all its forms (ILO 2007 p. xi). 
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C.  Definition of Forced Labour 
Convention Nos. 29 and 105 define forced labour as, “all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the person has not offered themselves voluntarily” (ILO 2003b p. 34).  The two 
elements of forced labour, lack of consent and menace of penalty are further 
described in Table 5.13 below.  
Table 5.13 
 
Lack of Consent (involuntary nature 
of) work (the “route” into forced 
labour) 
 
 
Menace of a penalty (the means of 
keeping someone in forced labour) 
 
 
•Birth/descent into “slave” or bonded 
status 
•Physical abduction or kidnapping 
•Sale of person into ownership of 
another 
•Physical confinement in the work 
location – in prison or in private 
detention 
•Psychological compulsion, i.e. an 
order to work, backed up by a credible 
threat of a penalty for noncompliance 
•Induced indebtedness (by falsification 
of accounts, inflated prices, reduced 
value of goods or services produced, 
excessive interest charges etc). 
•Deception or false promises about 
types and terms of work 
•Withholding and non-payment of 
wages 
•Retention of identity documents or 
other valuable personal possessions 
 
 
•Actual presence or credible threat of 
•Physical violence against worker or 
family or close associates 
•Sexual violence 
•(Threat of) supernatural retaliation 
•Imprisonment or other physical 
confinement 
•Financial penalties 
•Denunciation to authorities (police, 
immigration, etc.) and deportation 
•Dismissal from current employment 
•Exclusion from future employment 
•Exclusion from community and social 
life 
•Removal of rights or privileges 
•Deprivation of food, shelter or other 
necessities 
•Shift to even worse working 
conditions 
•Loss of social status 
 
(ILO 2005a Box 1.1 p. 6) 
 
D.  Prohibited Forms of Forced Labour 
Prohibited forms of forced labour include slavery and abduction, 
compulsory participation in public works projects, coercive recruitment in rural 
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agriculture, domestic work in forced labour situations, bonded labour, trafficking 
in persons and some forms of prison labour (ILO 2007).  Forced labour is also 
prohibited for purposes of economic development or as a means of political 
education, discrimination, labour discipline or punishment for having participated 
in strikes (ILO 2007).  Convention No. 29 established a complete and immediate 
abolition of forced labour for private purposes (Maul 2007 p. 482).  The ban on 
the use of forced labour for private purposes applies to all forms of forced labour 
even those such as prison labour that are otherwise allowed. The aim of banning 
forced labour for private purposes was to protect “workers from the consequences 
of the joining of forces of private economic interests and institutions of state 
control and discipline” (Maul 2007 p. 482).  
E.  Acceptable Forms of Forced Labour 
 
Despite the broad language of these prohibitions, it is important to note 
that Convention Nos. 29 and 105 explicitly allow and regulate the use of forced 
labour, in some of its forms.  Many of these exceptions and exclusion arose as part 
of the historical and political context in which Convention No. 29 was adopted 
(Maul 2007).  Forced labour prohibitions do not include compulsory military 
service, normal civic obligations, work by prisoners who are convicted of some 
crimes, cases of national emergencies, and minor communal services (ILO 2007 
paras 42-66).  These forms of forced labour, not prohibited outright, are subject to 
numerous conditions and limits laid out within the conventions and CEACR 
authoritative interpretations.  For example, prison labour is sometimes allowed 
and is one of the original exceptions created by Convention No. 29 but must be 
under the effective direction of public authorities or else prisoners must be able to 
freely withhold their consent to work (ILO 2007 para 98, 114).  
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At the time of the adoption of Convention No. 29, forced labour was 
predominantly a tool used by colonial powers for infrastructure, industry and 
development purposes (ILO 2007 para 7; Maul 2007 p. 482).  Convention No 29 
allowed these forced labour systems to continue over a transition period by the 
end of which the practice was to be prohibited.  In effect, Convention No. 29 
effectively preserved the ability of colonial powers to continue their forced labour 
systems and supervised its demise until the practices were eliminated completely 
(Maul 2007 p. 482).  
The transition period for colonial powers is now considered terminated by 
the ILO but other exclusions and exemptions from the general prohibition against 
forced labour continue  (ILO 2007).  In an ILO 2007 General Survey on forced 
labour, the CEACR explained the Convention No. 29 right to be free from forced 
labour in just seven paragraphs but needed twenty-four paragraphs to explain the 
exceptions and conditions in which the exceptions apply (ILO 2007 paras 35-41; 
42-66).   
Aside from these exceptions, it is also true that unless we are 
independently wealthy, live in countries with well-developed and generous 
welfare states, we are all forced to labour.  This ‘economic coercion’ is implicitly 
excluded from the ILO Forced Labour Conventions and ILO analysis of forced 
labour and the subject of much debate in its own right (Lerche 2007 p. 430). 
F.  Compliance Obligations of States 
 
States that ratify Convention Nos. 29 and 105 must abstain from using 
forced labour and suppress the use of forced labour by others by outlawing it and 
by providing penalties that are “adequate” and “strictly enforced” (ILO 2003b p. 
34).  In general the CEACR say that they will assess compliance with the 
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conventions based in large part on whether formal institutions establish penal 
sanctions for forced labour practices, whether the provisions are easily applied in 
practice by the courts and whether the penalties adequately dissuade forced labour 
practices and are strictly applied (ILO 2007 paras 135-139).   
The CEACR further notes that the State must ensure that victims of forced 
labour practices have access to justice (ILO 2007 para 139).  Notably, the CEACR 
recognise that the effective application of formal rules depends upon sound 
functioning of authorities responsible for enforcement such as police, labour 
inspectors and judges (ILO CEACR 2007 para 139).  Finally effective 
enforcement provides a de facto form of prevention because effective punishment 
of the guilty, acts to encourage complaints and dissuade further violations by 
perpetrators (ILO 2007 para 140).  Notably, compliance is based not on the 
outcome that forced labour is eradicated.  Rather, compliance requires effective 
formal institutions, including rules that outlaw and penalties that are adequate and 
strictly enforced (ILO 2007). 
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Table 5.14 
 
Compliance Obligations Arising  
from ILO Convention Nos. 29 and 105 
 
 
Abstain from using forced labour as well as to effectively suppress 
its use by others (ILO 2007 para135 p. 34). 
 
 
(1) States must repeal legislation that might allow the State to use 
labour in conditions equivalent to forced labour; 
 
(2) States must not allow any form of forced labour to be imposed 
by third parties 
 
(3) States must establish legal safeguards to prevent de facto 
coercion to perform work  
 
4) To the extent that forced labour is allowed within the 
Conventions, States must comply with the conditions under which 
this legal forced labour occurs. 
 
(ILO 2007 para135 p. 34). 
The ILO does not apply these general compliance obligations in the case 
of trafficking and obligatory overtime.  In the former case, the ILO applies more 
stringent obligations and in the latter, the ILO effectively excludes obligatory 
overtime from consideration under the general compliance obligations.  Before 
examining employment practices related to trafficking and obligatory to evaluate 
their compliance with ILO obligations, the two compliance obligation regimes are 
compared. 
1.  Obligatory Overtime 
a.  Background 
 The imposition of extra hours outside of normal daily working hours, or 
“obligatory overtime” is a relatively new area of consideration in the context of 
forced labour and the subject of numerous complaints by Central American unions 
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(ILO 2007 para 132, footnotes 314-316).  Work hours have historically been 
considered a matter of working conditions under seventeen different ILO 
Conventions, including the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1), 
and the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (No. 30) (ILO 
2007 para 133 with footnote 311).   
 In 1997, Turkey and Canada asked the CEACR whether obligatory overtime 
violates Convention 29 (ILO 1998b para 107).  The CEACR clarified that 
obligatory overtime does not violate Convention No. 29 as long as it remains 
within nationally legislated limits or collectively bargained agreements (ILO 1998 
para 107).  When obligatory overtime remains within these limits, it amounts to 
“bad working conditions” rather than forced labour (ILO 2007 para 134).  
b.  Obligatory Overtime Compliance Obligations  
 According to the CEACR, when obligatory overtime extends beyond 
legislatively or collectively bargained limits, further inquiry is needed to 
determine whether or not it violates Convention 29 (ILO 2007 para 132).  The 
CEACR identified two conditions in which obligatory overtime violates the 
Convention.  First, forced labour violations occur when workers work in excess of 
nationally established limits because they fear dismissal from their job.  Second, 
some pay systems, are based on productivity rather than time spent working and 
violate Convention 29 when they oblige workers to work in excess of nationally 
established limits as the only means to effectively earn the minimum wage.  In 
these circumstances, the problem is not merely a matter of poor working 
conditions and instead amounts to forced labour in violation of Convention 29 
(ILO 2007 paras 132-134).  In a footnote accompanying the paragraphs on 
obligatory overtime, the Committee of Experts stated that conditions and limits on 
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overtime need to be “reasonable” and take into account “the spirit” of ILO 
Convention Nos. 1 and 30 in terms of their general goals (ILO 2007 p. 72 FN 
312).   
 In sum, obligatory overtime in predatory repressive states is imposed 
through coercive means including physical confinement, psychological 
compulsion backed up by credible threats for noncompliance, deception, 
withholding of pay as well as under the menace of penalties varying from threats 
and physical violence, dismissal from current employment, exclusions from future 
employment etc.  All of these elements satisfy the ILO’s general definition of 
forced labour and based on the general definition, compliance obligations can be 
discerned and faulty institutional components identified in the chapter can be 
identified and matched to compliance obligations using compliance tools.     
 However, the ILO does not apply this general forced labour compliance 
obligations metric to forced labour in the context of obligatory overtime.  It 
applies a standard based on work imposed beyond national work time limits under 
menace of penalty for dismissal from employment or as a means to earn the 
minimum wage. 
2. Trafficking Compliance Obligations 
The ILO applies more stringent compliance obligations in trafficking than 
its general compliance obligations and much greater than in relation to obligatory 
overtime.  Compliance criteria for trafficking, like the CEACR’s general 
compliance criteria, emphasise the importance of effective formal institutions.  
There are however some important differences.  Unlike the general compliance 
criteria, the CEACR’s trafficking compliance criteria elaborate in considerable 
detail what states must do to ensure effective formal institutions to combat 
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trafficking.   Also, the CEACR enmeshes its Convention 29 trafficking 
compliance criteria with other international human rights treaties and in the 
process creates higher compliance standards for trafficking than for other forced 
labour practices. 
The enmeshment with other human rights instruments starts with defining 
trafficking by relying on the Palermo Protocol, also known as the International 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  Trafficking involves the recruitment, transport, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person by such means as threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud or deception for the purpose of 
exploitation.  Exploitation includes the exploitation of the prostitution of others or 
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (Protocol Article 3(a)).  The 
ILO notes that there is global momentum towards establishing trafficking as a 
criminal offence (ILO 2005a para 23). 
The Palermo Protocol also influences how the CEACR frames compliance 
criteria with respect to trafficking.  CEACR compliance criteria for trafficking are 
extensive and encompass both what is expected and what is not.  For example, it 
is not required that national law criminalize prostitution in order to be in 
compliance with Convention 29 (ILO 2007 para 78).  Trafficking is to be a 
criminal offence under both Convention 29 and the Palermo Protocol according to 
the CEACR but States may enact criminal penalties either in criminal statutes or 
by establishing specific trafficking laws (ILO 2007 para 80). 
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In comparison to obligatory overtime, the CEACR brings elements of the 
Palermo Protocol to expand and deepen compliance criteria for trafficking.  The 
CEACR expansively defines the means of coercion encompassed in trafficking to 
include the threat or use of force, abduction, fraud, deception, the abuse of power 
or a position of vulnerability and the presence of these elements exclude the 
validity of voluntary consent by the victim (ILO 2007 para 79).  Where children 
are victims of trafficking, the crime can be established with or without the use of 
coercive or deceitful measures (ILO 2007 para 79). 
Compliance criteria are expanded to include prevention of trafficking and 
establishment of national plans to combat trafficking via the Palermo Protocol 
(ILO 2007 para 82).  According to the CEACR, these preventative measures are 
essential for the efficient eradication of trafficking and therefore contribute to the 
suppression of forced labour as required by Convention 29.  In addition to having 
national action plans, the CEACR notes that their application in practice is also of 
interest to the committee in assessing compliance (ILO 2007 para 82). 
In a similar vein, the CEACR includes in its compliance criteria the 
effectiveness of criminal penalties for trafficking (ILO 2007 para 84).  The 
Committee notes that compliance with Convention 29 requires that States analyze 
and solve the difficulties in the enforcement of national laws that jeopardize actual 
enforcement and implementation of penalties for trafficking (ILO 2007 para 84).   
Compliance criteria and expectations extend to labour inspectors who must 
monitor workplaces and take measures to ensure that the conditions of work 
prescribed by law are respected (ILO 2007 para 84).  Police must be able to 
identify victims and perpetrators and “take corrective measures” (ILO 2007 para 
84).   
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Compliance criteria for effective institutions extend to the performance of 
the judiciary, key in providing efficient prosecution and strict application of penal 
sanctions (ILO 2007 para 84).    The Committee asked states about measures they 
had taken to strengthen the active investigation of organized crime with regard to 
trafficking (ILO 2007 para 84).   The Committee was particularly concerned that 
states apply adequate material and human resources to law enforcement agencies, 
training of law enforcement and labour inspection staff, immigration and police 
vice squads. 
Another area of compliance with respect to trafficking, and absent in 
obligatory overtime, is the protection of victims and witnesses.  This is required 
by Convention 29 as well as the Palermo Protocol and requires that states adopt 
legislation or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking to 
remain within national territory (ILO 2007 para 83).  The ILO particularly 
requested information of ratifying states as to the measure they have taken to 
encourage victims to turn to authorities (ILO 2007 para 83).  Preventative 
measures include research, information, mass media campaigns and social and 
economic initiatives (ILO 2007 FN 182). 
Three other novel aspects of compliance criteria are relevant to trafficking 
compared to other forms of forced labour.  First, the CEACR sought information 
from States about their involvement in international cooperation efforts to combat 
trafficking.  Second, the Committee sought information about cooperation 
between employers’ and workers’ organisations as well as non-governmental 
organisations engaged in protection of human rights within States directed at 
combating trafficking noting the vital role played by social partners (ILO 2007 
para 84).  Finally, CEACR compliance criteria are results oriented with the 
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committee requesting information on prosecutions, judicial proceedings initiated 
against alleged traffickers as well as information on convictions obtained, along 
with penalties imposed (ILO 2007 para 84). 
In sum, the CEACR assesses compliance with the conventions based in 
large part on whether formal institutions establish penal sanctions for forced 
labour practices, whether the provisions are easily applied in practice by the courts 
and whether the penalties adequately dissuade forced labour practices and are 
strictly applied (ILO 2007 paras 135-139).  The CEACR further notes that the 
State must ensure that victims of forced labour practices have access to justice 
(ILO 2007 para 139).  Notably, the CEACR recognise that the effective 
application of formal rules depends upon the sound functioning of authorities 
responsible for enforcement such as police, labour inspectors and judges (ILO 
CEACR 2007 para 139).  Finally compliance also has a preventative aspect. 
 In place of the simple two-step compliance test for obligatory overtime, 
trafficking compliance criteria are much more detailed in outlining conditions in 
which a state’s formal institutions will be considered compliant:   
 
Effectiveness of Rules 
 
• Make trafficking a criminal offence 
• Consider victim consent invalid where there is coercion, threats or use of 
force, abduction, fraud, abuse of power or position of vulnerability. 
• Consider evidence of coercion, fraud, or deception unnecessary to 
establish that children are victims of trafficking. 
 
Effectiveness of Enforcement and Interpretation of rules: 
 
• Implement effective criminal penalties  
• Analyze and solve difficulties in enforcing national laws that jeopardize 
actual enforcement. 
• Evaluate implementation of penalties by analyzing the role of labour 
inspectors, police and the judiciary. 
• Provide adequate training and material and human resources for 
enforcement agencies 
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• Indicate enforcement results including prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings initiated as well as convictions obtained along with penalties 
imposed. 
• Protect victims including allowing victims to remain in the national 
territory and States must take measures and report the measures taken to 
encourage victims to turn to the authorities. 
 
Enhance the Legitimacy of Anti-Trafficking Measures: 
 
• Take preventative measures including research, information, mass media 
campaigns and social and economic initiatives 
• Participate in international cooperation efforts to combat trafficking 
• Seek the cooperation and participation of employers’ and workers’ groups 
as well as non-governmental organisations engaged in the protection of 
human rights. 
 
G.  Applying the Compliance Obligations to Overtime Compliance 
With lowered standards by the ILO, only countries that impose obligatory 
overtime in excess of national limits and threaten or dismiss workers from 
employment for their refusal or where it is imposed as a means to earn the 
minimum wage are not meeting the compliance obligations set out by the ILO.   
Despite ineffective formal institutions and routine disregard for national 
work time and overtime limits, Nicaragua appears to be compliant with 
Convention No. 29 based on the lack of evidence of the social convention of 
dismissing and threatening to dismiss workers for refusing to work obligatory 
overtime.  Costa Rica is also compliant base on this compliance obligation.  
Strictly speaking there would be no interventions required based on their 
compliance with the ILO obligations. 
The examination of obligatory overtime practices at the beginning of the 
chapter indicates that every predatory repressive system, with the possible 
exception of El Salvador is not meeting its compliance obligations as set out by 
the ILO Committee of Experts.  El Salvador, perversely, is technically compliant 
because it has no national work time limit.   Not surprisingly work time limits in 
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Guatemala and Honduras establish many exceptions and it is not always easy to 
determine if there is a limit and to whom the limit applies (Frey 2010). 
Nevertheless all of the predatory repressive countries either dismiss 
workers or have obligatory overtime as a means to earn the minimum wage.  
Examining the employment practices underpinning obligatory overtime practices, 
Legislative interventions could be considered to  
• add sanctions for violations of overtime rules  
• remove contradictions in rules 
• apply rules to employers and workers 
• add rules prohibiting dismissals for refusal to work overtime 
• clarify exemptions from national work time limits, to  
• change procedural defaults so that employer non-participation does not 
benefit employer 
• improve rules and sanctions against dismissal for refusing to work 
obligatory  
 
Given the strength of social conventions contributing to obligatory overtime 
practices, legislative interventions could be targeted directly at relevant social 
conventions such as 
• physical and verbal abuse 
• locking doors 
• pay systems 
 
Judicial interventions are necessary to  
• implement the substantive overtime and worktime rules 
• support procedural rules congruent with substantive rules 
• apply sanctions  
• provide enforceable accountability standards to state agencies 
 
Social interventions are necessary to  
• enhance the norms underlying the legitimacy of overtime limits  
• challenge and replace tolerance for labour rights violations with norms 
consistent with respect for labour rights. 
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Koh’s argument is that in the circumstances presented by countries in the 
predatory repressive category, multiple and mutually reinforcing compliance 
interventions are necessary.  Compliance interventions must also enhance 
negative and positive incentives across institutions.  In light of this, it is 
questionable whether compliance interventions narrowly aimed at work time and 
overtime institutions alone can bring about compliance even with the meagre 
Convention No. 29 compliance obligations for overtime. 
Compliance interventions must also confront and challenge institutional 
hierarchies that undermine compliance.  Neoliberal structural adjustment policy-
oriented institutions even in developmental paternalistic systems interfere with 
labour rights compliance because they make compliance irrational.  If competitive 
advantage is sacrificed by compliance with work time limits then, compliance 
becomes costly and is counter to the interests of employers.   Structural 
adjustment policy-oriented institutions encourage actors to champion norms that 
undermine the legitimacy of labour rights.  Rather than enmesh institutions across 
spheres of social life with labour rights institutions, neoliberal structural 
adjustment policies enmesh labour institutions in their logic.  Neoliberal structural 
adjustment policy oriented institutions are also layered with predatory and 
repressive regulatory institutions in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras.   
Evidence from DR-CAFTA countries indicates that coercion to work 
obligatory overtime arises from multiple institutional influences.  These include 
coercion as a result of unemployment, underemployment and poverty.   Coercion 
also results from nonenforcement of obligatory overtime rules as a means to 
attract foreign direct investment.  All of these direct and indirect forms of 
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coercion are excluded from CEACR compliance obligations.  Notably, there are 
ILO Conventions related to unemployment, freedom of association and minimum 
wage setting, for example, but they are not made part of the general compliance 
criteria for obligatory overtime 
V.  Conclusion 
The ILO imposes different obligations on states for two different forms of 
forced labour (obligatory overtime and trafficking) even though all forms of 
forced labour including these are lumped into one by the ILO in its discourse on 
forced labour as one of the four Core Labour Standards.  The ILO’s application of 
relatively more stringent standards in the case of trafficking, were generally met 
with greater efforts on the part of DR-CAFTA countries to meet them.  The 
difference in ILO obligations and difference in State efforts to meet the 
obligations may relate to whether the ILO is seeking to regulate relations between 
employers and employees in the case of obligatory overtime or criminals in the 
case of trafficking.   Overall my conclusion from the case was that, at least with 
respect to forced labour, after States ratify the conventions, the ILO continues to 
create and re-create its regulatory obligations as employment practices evolve. 
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Chapter 6 Freedom of Association Case Study 
I.  Introduction  
A.  Background Freedom of Association Case Study 
The case study attempts an analysis of the rights to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining in Central America and the Dominican Republic and is 
done with a different approach than the case study on forced labour.  From the 
outset, it is important to recognize that freedom of association is a composite right 
made up of many inter-related rights unlike the relatively simple examination of 
obligatory overtime and trafficking in the prior chapter.  It is also different from 
other labour rights because the exercise of the right freedom of association 
dislodges legal workplace arrangements where there are no unions or collective 
bargaining.  In Central America and the Dominican Republic, workplaces without 
unions and bargaining are established as the default condition and only modified 
by the exercise of association and bargaining rights.  In this non-union default 
setting, employers exercise the power to decide pay and other work rules within 
the bounds of market conditions and state regulations.  Freedom of association 
and rights to collective bargaining provide a set of rules to enable workers to 
move from the default non-union, non-bargaining workplace to a workplace with 
unions and collective bargaining. In this latter condition, state regulations and 
market conditions still retain influence but workers collectively through their 
organization also engage with employers in determining workplace pay and other 
rules.   
The transition from default employer control to shared control through 
unions and collective bargaining entails the exercise of multiple inter-related and 
inter-dependent rights with many linked components (Appendix 2.1).  The chain 
and its links can be thought of in terms of the procession of activities that workers 
in Central America, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere must accomplish to 
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exercise the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.  These 
include: (1) organizing workers to support the founding of a union, (2) gaining 
formal recognition of the union from the employer and the government, (3) 
establishing union leadership, (4) developing and implementing the union’s 
program (5) negotiating terms and conditions of employment, (6) organizing 
protests and strikes if necessary (7) enforcing collective agreements once they 
exist, and (8) engaging in politics and social dialogue to influence policy.  
Separately and taken together the components help or prevent unions from coming 
into existence in the first place, enhance or diminish the impact of unions once 
they exist and help or hinder unions from going out of existence once established.  
This is a much more complex labour right to examine than obligatory overtime 
and trafficking and requires a different approach to applying the diagnostic tool. 
Almost twenty years ago, Roy Adams (1992) examined regulation of 
unions and collective bargaining and noted that government policy varies 
according to its regulatory objective, ranging from “suppression to toleration and 
encouragement” (Adams 1992 p. 273).  Adams goes on to analyze possible 
determinants and explanations of variation.  This variation in regulatory objectives 
is curious in light of the common legal foundation for freedom of association and 
collective bargaining. 
The rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining are among 
the human rights found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as regional treaties and ILO 
Conventions.  There are eight ILO Conventions on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining (ILOLEX).  Two of these Conventions, Nos. 87 and 98, 
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were incorporated into the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work.  Their inclusion in the 1998 Declaration signals that they are 
considered fundamental human rights, and all ILO member states are obligated to 
uphold the principles underlying the rights even if they have not formally ratified 
the two conventions.  Convention Nos. 87 and 98 have been ratified by all of the 
Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. These two ILO 
Conventions and their interpretation by the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) and the Committee 
on Freedom of Association (CFA) serve as the benchmark in this chapter for 
institutional analysis.   
 In practice, workers in the Dominican Republic and Central America face 
severe resistance and obstacles when they attempt to exercise association and 
collective bargaining rights.  Given the relationship between power and 
institutional settlements, this is not surprising (Gross 2010 p.9; Knight 1992).  
Worker organizing and bargaining alters the balance of power and distributional 
outcomes between employers and workers.  Institutions governing freedom of 
association therefore influence the distribution of power and resources in the 
workplace and are themselves established through conflict and political 
compromise (Knight 1992; Berg and Kucera 2008).  Worker collective 
organization also alters the balance of power within political systems (Gross 2010 
p. 9).  In many national contexts employers and governments favor institutional 
settlements that make it more difficult for workers to gain and exercise power.  
For example, in Guatemala an ILO Technical Mission concluded:  
the basis of the Guatemalan problem in the field of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining lies in the existence of a 
labour law system which, in both substantive and procedural terms, 
prevents and raises obstacles to the appropriate development of 
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trade union activity and accordingly to collective bargaining (ILO 
CEACR 2008 Guatemala Individual Observation p. 3) 
 
B.  Chapter Plan 
 This chapter analyzes the institutional arrangements related to freedom of 
association, drawing attention to the particular ways institutions, intended and 
unintended, prevent workers from exercising association and collective bargaining 
rights.  In particular, with so many interrelated rights, the question arises whether 
some of them are more important than others and further whether there are 
meaningful differences among Central American countries and the Dominican 
Republic in the effective exercise of association and bargaining rights.  In other 
words, are there meaningful differences in terms of regulatory objectives in 
Adams’ framework of repression, tolerance and encouragement?  Further, how are 
regulatory objectives expressed in country-specific institutional arrangements?  
These questions were inspired in part by the puzzle of converging Cingranelli-
Richards scores discussed in Chapter 2.  
After this introduction, part two of the chapter outlines how ILO 
Convention Nos. 87 and 98 came into existence and explains general compliance 
benchmarks of the conventions, part three briefly discusses the historical 
background on freedom of association and trade unions in Central America and 
Dominican Republic to provide context for the comparative institutional 
assessment.  Part four presents a comparative institutional analysis of DR-CAFTA 
countries on anti-union discrimination and part five discusses compliance issues 
and Adams’ categorizations. 
C.  Selection Freedom of Association as a Case 
As outlined in chapter 2, Research Process, Freedom of Association and 
Right to Collective bargaining was selected because of its central place in my own 
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curiosity based on my experiences working with immigrant janitors in a union 
context.  Also, examining institutions of freedom of association has the potential 
for lending greater understanding to the underlying dynamics I examined with 
CIRI worker rights scores converging among countries that had historically been 
very diverse.  Lastly, because there are so many elements involved in freedom of 
association, the case study provided an opportunity to work at different scales 
within the case.  At one scale there is a closer examination of one element, anti-
union discrimination but there is also an opportunity to examine freedom of 
association at a systems level. 
D.  Research Process and Evidence 
The research process for the case study on forced labour involved the 
inter-related steps outlined in chapter 2.  The documentary evidence and sources 
used in the case study is listed below on Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 
 
Freedom of Association Evidence 
 
 
Countries 
 
 
US State 
Department  
Human Rights 
Reports 
 
NGOs 
 
ILO Committee 
of Experts 
 
Costa Rica 
 
2009 
 
International Trade 
Union 
Confederation 2009 
 
Individual 
Observation 
Convention No. 
87, 2008,  
Convention No. 
98, 2009 
 
 
Nicaragua 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
International Trade 
Union 
Confederation 2009 
 
Individual 
Observation 
Convention No. 
87, 2009,  
Convention No. 
98, 2009 
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Dominican 
Republic 
 
2009 
 
International Trade 
Union 
Confederation 2009 
 
Individual 
Observation 
Convention No. 
87, 2008,  
Convention No. 
98, 2008 
 
 
El Salvador 
 
2009 
 
International Trade 
Union 
Confederation 2009 
 
Individual Direct 
Request, 
Convention No. 
87 2009, 
Convention No. 
98 2009 
 
 
Guatemala 
 
2009 
 
International Trade 
Union 
Confederation 2009 
 
Individual 
Observation 
Convention No. 
87 2009, 
Convention No. 
98 2009 
 
 
Honduras 
 
2009 
International Trade 
Union 
Confederation 2009 
Individual 
Observation: 
Convention No. 
87 2008, 
Convention No. 
98 2008 
 
   
II. ILO Law on Freedom of Association 
A.  History of Freedom of Association at the ILO 
From its earliest moments the ILO has both relied upon and been the site 
of intense struggle over freedom of association, so much so that its first 
convention dealing with the issue, Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 
1921 (No. 11) only provided that if the right came to exist in an ILO Convention, 
it would be extended to agricultural workers (Dunning 1998 p. 157; Swepston 
1998 p. 170).   Multiple attempts to place freedom of association and even 
questionnaires on the subject, on the annual conference agenda failed until after 
the Second World War (Dunning 1998 pp. 157-158; Morse 1950 p. 413). At the 
first International Labour Conference following the end of the war in 1944, 
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member states approved the Declaration of Philadelphia, which affirmed the 
ILO’s commitment to freedom of association and the right of collective 
bargaining (Dunning 1998 pp. 158-159).  This was in part possible because of 
organized labour’s respect from governments such as the UK for “maintaining 
industrial morale” during the war (Dunning 1998 p. 158). 
The creation of an ILO Convention on freedom of association may not 
have been possible without the Cold War.  In November 1945 the ILO became 
one of the UN’s specialized agencies (Dunning 1998 p. 159).  In 1947 the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) received rival proposals to 
address trade union rights and freedom of association.  Non-socialist countries 
supported an American Federation of Labor (AFL) proposal to refer the matter of 
trade union rights to the ILO as a UN specialized agency for it to determine 
appropriate action (Dunning 1998 pp 159-169; ILO 1948 pp. 576-578).  Arguing 
that the ILO could not be trusted because it allowed the participation of 
employers, a block of socialist countries supported a World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU) proposal to establish a UN based system including five clauses 
protecting trade union rights and a UN based Trade Union Committee to 
investigate and recommend to ECOSOC appropriate measures for violations 
(Dunning 1998 p. 159; Morse 1950 p. 413).  
ECOSOC voted 15-3 to refer the matter to the ILO, averting what would 
have been a devastating loss for the ILO, but also went beyond the simple hands-
off referral in line with the AFL proposal (Dunning 1998 p. 160).  The ECOSOC 
resolution recognized the principles of freedom of association and requested from 
the ILO “an early report on action taken” at its next session (Dunning 1998 p. 
160).  In effect, the referral pressured the ILO to resolve the longstanding 
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disagreements among constituents and establish a freedom of association 
convention (Dunning 1998 pp. 160-161).   The ILO’s first step was a resolution 
presented to the 30th International Labour Conference in 1947 that had been 
crafted by a high-level committee.  In the drafting process, the Employer’s 
Committee proposed unsuccessfully that the resolution’s provision of a “right to 
join” associations should be amended to include “the right not to join” (Dunning 
1998 p. 161).  Despite defeat of their proposed amendment, the employers joined 
with other constituents voting unanimously to support the resolution and move 
ahead towards a freedom of association convention at its next (31st) annual 
conference (Dunning 1998 p. 161).   
These developments were reported back to the ECOSOC, which held 
another series of discussions and in effect helped to keep pressure on the ILO in 
three ways.  First, the Commission gave its own recognition of the principles in 
the ILO resolution and requested the ILO to continue in its efforts to adopt 
conventions dealing with freedom of association (Dunning 1998 p. 161).  Second, 
ECOSOC maintained its own competence over issues of freedom of association 
saying it awaited a report from the UN Commission on Human Rights on those 
aspects of freedom of association that would be appropriately included as part of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Dunning 1998 p. 161).   
Finally, ECOSOC referred the ILO resolution and report to the UN General 
Assembly which provoked additional discussion and led to the adoption of a UN 
resolution recognizing the principles of freedom of association and recommending 
the ILO “pursue urgently, in collaboration with the United Nations, the study of 
the control of machinery to protect trade union rights and freedom of association” 
(UN 1947b pp. 959-1018 cited in Dunning 1998 p. 161).  
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The International Labour Office prepared a draft of Convention 87, which 
was then discussed by another high-level ILO Committee prior to the 31st 
International Labour Conference.  The committee members were “undoubtedly 
influenced by the powerful support of the General Assembly” (Dunning 1998 p. 
162).  The Employer’s Committee did not reintroduce their ‘right not to associate’ 
amendment (Dunning 1998 p. 162).  The Committee and subsequently the Labour 
Conference adopted Convention 87 with no substantial changes and placed a 
further Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
(Convention 98) on the agenda for its next session (Dunning 1998 pp. 162-163).   
Convention 98 was adopted at the 32nd International Labour Conference 
(Macklem 2005 p. 65).  
The collaboration between ECOSOC and ILO continued after Conventions 
87 and 98 were adopted and led to the creation of two special procedures for the 
protection of freedom of association (ILO 2006 p. 2).  They are the Fact-Finding 
and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association and the Freedom of 
Association Committee (CFA) (ILO 2006 p. 2).   The Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission is composed of independent experts who are authorized 
to investigate and seek adjustments of difficulties by agreement with governments 
but has only been used six times since it was established in 1950 (ILO 2006 p. 2).  
The Committee on Freedom of Association is a tripartite body established in 
1951, which meets three times a year to examine complaints submitted to it under 
the special procedure (ILO 2006 p. 2).  
 After adoption of ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the United Nations General 
Assembly, ECOSOC and its Commission on Human Rights continued to 
elaborate freedom of association rights.  These efforts coincided with the Cold 
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War, which increasingly divided nations and actors such as trade union 
confederations (Morsink for e.g.).  Conflicts over the inclusion of freedom of 
association played out differently in each arena resulting in differences in its 
framing (Swepston 1998 pp. 171-172).  Different framings of freedom of 
association continued to emerge even after the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted 10 December 1948, when provisions in the Declaration were 
negotiated into international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) (Swepston 1998 p. 172).  Yet there was also recognition in the 
treaties of their connection with and potential impact on ILO Convention 87 and 
both treaties guarantee that they will not undercut protections within ILO 
Convention 87 (Swepston 1998 p. 172).   
B.  ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98 
Convention Nos. 87 and 98 constitute the institutional settlement at the 
international level over the rules governing freedom of association, and therefore, 
serve well as compliance benchmarks for a cross-country comparative analysis.  
The Conventions were forged through interaction and contention between the ILO 
and the UN, as well as among the three ILO constituents: employer, union and 
government representatives (Dunning 1998 pp 159-169).  Convention 87, adopted 
in 1948, (Appendix 2.2) sets out the rights of workers and employers to establish 
and join organizations of their own choosing, to draw up constitutions, to elect 
their own leaders, to organize their administration, to formulate programs and to 
establish federations and confederations (Convention 87 articles 2, 3, 5, 6 
ILOLEX).   The Convention commits governments to refrain from interfering or 
restricting the lawful exercise of association rights in general and specifically 
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prohibits using administrative authority to dissolve worker or employer 
organizations or make employer and worker organizations subject to conditions 
that restrict their rights (Article 6, 7 ILOLEX).    
In addition to refraining from interference, governments must undertake to 
give effect to the association rights outlined in the Convention and “take all 
necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may 
exercise freely the right to organise” (Article 11). The Convention obliges worker 
and employer organizations to “respect the law of the land” and governments to 
ensure that the law of the land does not impair the guarantees in the Convention 
(article 8).   Convention 87 allows governments to exclude in whole, or in part, 
the police and armed forces from rights in the Convention (Article 9).   In sum, 
Convention 87’s regulatory objective is to establish tolerance for the exercise of 
association rights for all workers except police and the armed forces.  
Convention 98, adopted in 1949, (Appendix 2.2) was intended to 
supplement and complete Convention 87 guarantees (Morse 1950 p. 414; ILO 
1994 para 199; ILO 1948 p. 586).  Convention 98 establishes the right of workers 
to adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination, particularly 
conditioning employment on non-membership in a union or dismissing or 
otherwise engaging in prejudicial treatment of workers because of union 
membership or union activity outside of working time (or within working time by 
consent of the employer) (article 2).  Convention 98 also establishes the rights of 
worker and employer organizations to adequate protection against acts of 
interference by each other (Article 2(1)).  The Convention defines interference to 
include acts designed to promote or support the establishment of worker 
organizations with the object of placing them under employer domination through 
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financial or other means (Article 2(2)).   
Convention 98 does not specify the means required to secure the 
substantive rights it aims to protect.  Instead, the Convention provides that 
ensuring respect for the rights to organize “shall be established, where necessary,” 
with “machinery appropriate to national conditions” (Article 3).  In addition, 
despite the Convention’s title, the “Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining,” 
the text of the Convention does not explicitly establish collective bargaining as a 
right.  Instead, the Convention provides that “when necessary” states will 
undertake “measures appropriate to national conditions” to “encourage and 
promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation” (Article 4).  At the time of its adoption, the Director-General of the 
ILO explained that Convention 98 provides that “as far as necessary and 
appropriate, governments will take steps to encourage negotiations between 
employers’ and workers’ organizations (Morse 1950 p. 414). 
As in the case of Convention 87, Convention 98 allows states to decide 
whether to exclude the armed forces and police from its protections (Convention 
87 Article 9; Convention 98 Article 5 ILOLEX).  Convention 98 did not, 
however, “deal with the position of public servants engaged in the administration 
of the State” or “prejudice their rights or status” (Convention 98 Article 6 
ILOLEX).   ILO Convention No. 151, adopted in 1978, applies the rights found in 
Convention 98 to public servants (ILOLEX).  On its face, the regulatory objective 
of Convention 98 is orientated towards both tolerance and encouragement.  
Establishing tolerance of association rights can be seen in the Convention’s aim to 
explicitly protect workers (except for police, armed forces and public servants) 
against acts of anti-union discrimination and similarly, to protect worker and 
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employer organizations (except for police, armed forces and public servants) from 
interference.   The regulatory objective of encouragement can be seen in the 
Convention’s treatment of collective bargaining for workers and employers who 
are not police, armed forces or public servants.    
C. Authoritative Interpretations of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 
The meaning of conventions is not restricted to their explicit provisions 
but is also subject to interpretation.  There are two ILO committees authorized to 
interpret Convention Nos. 87 and 98 thereby defining the contours of State 
obligations under the Conventions.  The ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association (CFA) is a tripartite committee, with employer, union and 
government representation and it receives complaints alleging violations of the 
Conventions. These special procedure complaints may be filed by governments or 
organizations of workers and employers without regard to a country’s ratification 
of the Conventions or even if it is not a member of the ILO as long as it is a 
member of the UN (ILO 2006 p. 2).   The CFA handled 2500 complaints in its 
first fifty years (ILO 2006 p. 3). 
 The decisions of the CFA are published and collected in digests and 
provide a “body of principles” on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining based on the ILO Constitution and ILO Conventions, as well as non-
binding Recommendations and Resolutions (ILO 2006 p. 3).  The CFA maintains 
that the value of this body of principles is that it comes from a highly regarded 
tripartite body and is based on complex, real-life allegations of violations 
throughout the world.  It has “acquired recognized authority” at national and 
international levels (ILO 2006 p. 3).   
The other body responsible for authoritative interpretations of the 
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Conventions is the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR).  The CEACR interprets the conventions 
through supervision of state parties as well as through General Surveys. The 
CEACR has done extensive work on freedom of association.  At the time the ILO 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights was adopted in 1998, the ILO Governing 
Body had made more frequent requests of the CEACR to undertake general 
surveys on freedom of association and collective bargaining than on any other 
group of conventions (Dunning 1998 p. 164).   General surveys on Convention 
Nos. 87 and 98 were done in 1956, 1957, 1959, 1973 and 1983 before the sixth 
and final general survey was completed in 1994 (ILO 1994 para 2).  
CFA and CEACR interpretations of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 have 
significantly expanded on the meaning and applications of the Conventions and 
therefore the institutional settlement governing freedom of association.  Where a 
subject is not explicitly covered in the text of the conventions, the CFA and 
CEACR draw on various sources to make authoritative decisions about it.  For 
example, although the right to collective bargaining is not explicitly provided in 
ILO Convention 98, the CEACR and CFA have decided that the ILO 
Constitution, Declaration of Philadelphia, and Convention 87 infer the right to 
collective bargaining for workers in general (Macklem 2005 p. 71; ILO 2008b 
para 167).  Similarly, the right to strike is not specifically included in ILO 
Convention Nos. 87 or 98 but has been inferred by the CEACR in the context of 
the right of unions to formulate their programs in full freedom, and the CEACR 
has developed jurisprudence defining a narrow scope of exclusions from the right 
to strike for workers who provide essential services within the Committee’s strict 
definition  (Servais 1984 pp. 777-778; ILO 2006 paras 520-676).  These 
 217 
interpretations have broadened the scope of association related activities for which 
“tolerance” is the regulatory objective and narrowed the exclusions in which 
repression of association rights is allowed. 
CFA and CEACR interpretations of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 also 
clarify obligations when there are contradictions between the Conventions as in 
the case of the inclusion of public servants in Convention 87 and their exclusion 
from Convention No. 98.  Over the years, the CEACR interpretation has 
significantly narrowed the public servant exclusion from Convention No. 98 (ILO 
1994 para 200 for example).  First, the CEACR interprets Conventions 87 and 98 
together rather than as unrelated singular conventions (ILO 2006 paras 1061-
1064).  According to the CEACR, interpreting the two Conventions together, 
certain categories of public servants, including those in confidential positions may 
be excluded from Convention 98 protections against anti-union discrimination and 
the right to collective bargaining but this does not diminish or contradict their 
rights to association protected under Convention 87 (ILO 1994 para 199; ILO 
2006 para 1062).   Here again, the CEACR interpretations have the effect of 
narrowing exclusions from association rights and bargaining rights. 
Interpretations of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 also bear upon the rights of 
trade unions and their members beyond the workplace and employment 
relationship, in other realms of social life, such as politics.  The CFA has upheld 
the right of trade union organizations to “pursue lawful activities,” including 
political activities and relations and found that governments may not impose 
“general prohibitions” on political activities (ILO 2006 paras 495, 500, 503).   Yet 
the CFA has also found that such political activity is not a general right but rather 
a right to be exercised specifically for the defense of union and occupational 
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interests and must advance economic and social objectives (ILO 2006 paras 495, 
497, 498).  Union political activity should not go beyond these “true functions by 
promoting essentially political interests” (ILO 2006 para 502).  
The CFA further explains, “It is only in so far as trade union organizations 
do not allow their occupational demands to assume a clearly political aspect that 
they can legitimately claim that there should be no interference in their activities” 
(ILO 2006 para 505).  The rationale for these limits is to maintain trade union 
independence from political parties and governments so that unions function 
freely and are “sheltered from political vicissitudes” (ILO 2006 para 497).  
Concern over relations between trade unions and political parties was evident 
during the Cold War and directed at socialist governments and unions (ILO 2006 
para 506 for example).  The regulatory objective here seems to have been to 
establish a qualified tolerance to union/worker involvement in political activity as 
long as it remains within acceptable non-revolutionary bounds. 
The rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining were 
established first by compromise between employer, union and government 
representatives within the ILO leading to the adoption of the conventions and 
subsequently by their interpretations by the CEACR and CFA.  These evolving 
standards are disseminated through published digests of compiled and updated 
decisions of the CFA and by general surveys undertaken by the CEACR.  The 
standards are also applied by the CEACR in supervising state parties compliance 
with the conventions and by the CFA in cases alleging violations of association 
rights.  The conventions and their interpretations provide a regulatory model with 
overlapping objectives of tolerance and encouragement of association and 
collective bargaining rights.  With the exception of narrowly defined segments of 
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the workforce, police and armed forces, and in the case of Convention 98, public 
servants, repression of association and collective bargaining rights is not allowed. 
III. Regional Context 
A.  Historical Basis of Union Development in the Region 
Unions in the Dominican Republic and Central America share with other 
countries in the region a similar historical pattern of union-state-market relations.  
In general, most Latin American governments preferred to directly legislate 
substantive employment protections such as hours of work, overtime, vacation 
and non-wage benefits because of their hostility towards unions and their desire 
for workers to rely on the state rather than unions for protection (Cook 2006 p. 
105).  The reason underlying this preference for direct regulation was political.  
Radical ideologies found among trade union activists challenged the state’s 
authority and so labour laws were developed to protect workers but at the same 
time to establish a powerful presence of the state in labour relations (Cook 2006 p. 
105).  The state’s concern for its power and control extended to regulating union 
activities such as union formation, strikes and collective negotiations (Bronstein 
1995; Bronstein 1997 cited in Cook 2006 p. 105).  Collective rights in general 
were restricted and frequently violated (Cook 2006 p. 105).   
Critical junctures or historic decisional moments distinguished divergent 
trajectories of union-state-market relations among the countries in this study as 
discussed in Chapter 3.  Using Standing’s (1991) ideal typologies of state roles in 
labour market regulation, the countries in this study are grouped, based on their 
regulatory orientations: 
Costa Rica is categorized as paternalistic and is expected to emphasize labour 
market regulations and processes in which regulations come about through state 
decisions based on values of elites or as attempts to co-opt segments of the 
working class rather than negotiation and sharing of power.  
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Nicaragua is categorized as protective and is expected to emphasize regulation 
of labour markets through negotiations with worker organizations with resulting 
regulations reflecting acceptance of collective worker voice and balance of power.  
To Standing’s (1991) definition, I have also incorporated Nicaragua into this 
category because of its absence of repressive regulations 
 
 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras are categorized as 
repressive and labour market regulations are expected to largely repress and limit 
collective action on the part of workers.   
 
A country’s belonging to one of the three different groupings or categories is 
expected to be directly relevant to their respective treatment of freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining.  In addition to the labour market 
regulatory dimension, a country’s overall orientation towards regulation is 
expected to influence its treatment of freedom of association and right to 
collective bargaining (Evans 1995).  In this dimension there are two ideal type 
divisions among the countries  (Evans 1995) that could influence freedom of 
association.  These are predatory and developmental state orientation. 
Costa Rica is considered a developmental state because of its relatively well-
functioning and centrally coordinated bureaucratic structure.  In contrast to 
predatory states, Costa Rica’s agencies are autonomous even though they are 
connected to different organizations and groups.  
The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
are considered predatory states because their state bureaucracies have more of a 
tendency to be a market and profit oriented endeavor. Access to state functions 
and services is directed at those who can pay in money or power.  All five of the 
countries have strong histories of neopatrimonial forms of predation with dictators 
establishing state apparatus to serve and enrich themselves.  
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Based on these typologies, Costa Rica is expected to prefer direct regulation 
over collective bargaining but also because of its developmental nature, to have 
the capacity to establish rules and enforce them whatever its policy is toward 
collective bargaining.  In Adams’ schema, it’s not clear whether Costa Rica will 
also tend towards tolerance or repression but it would not be expected to be 
encouraging of worker organization and collective bargaining.   
In the case of Nicaragua, there are two tendencies at work based on applying 
Evans’ and Standing’s typologies.  Nicaragua should be much less repressive 
towards worker organization than all of the other countries.  In fact, in Adams 
schema, Nicaragua would be expected to be encouraging of trade union 
organization and bargaining.  What is not clear however is how much institutional 
capacity Nicaragua has to actually implement union encouraging policies given its 
predatory regulatory orientation.  Another reason to expect Nicaragua to behave 
differently in its treatment of trade unions is the critical role unions played in 
mobilizing support for the Sandinistas before during and after the 1979 
Revolution that removed its neopatrimonial dictator Samoza. 
The Nicaraguan labor movement closely aligned itself in relation to and in 
support of the successful Sandinista movement (Roberts 2007 p. 118).  The same 
or similar relationship of a national union movement to a winning revolutionary 
party or even just a ruling party has not occurred among any of the other 
countries.   No other countries in the study have relied on mobilizing unions and 
their members.  This union-party relationship also represents at least a partial 
break from traditional predatory practices into the realm of ideas and policy 
programs rather than pure corruption.  It’s important to qualify that this shift does 
 222 
not indicate that corruption and predation disappeared but rather that a new logic 
counter to predation became possible and even viable. 
There is support for identifying the union role in politics as a key institutional 
hierarchy by Roberts (2007).  Roberts argues that in cases such as Nicaragua, 
reliance on labour-mobilizing requires a regulatory objective of encouragement, 
producing stronger labour movements because they were embedded in larger 
labour-party blocs (Roberts 2007 p. 120).  Roberts does not identify the specific 
institutional mechanisms, of encouragement but rather, that union movements in 
labour-mobilizing systems tended to have higher union densities and greater 
degrees of organizational concentration in larger national confederations (Roberts 
2007 p. 118).  Peak density during the import substitution era for example in 
Nicaragua measured 37.3% compared to 15.4% in Costa Rica, 17% in the 
Dominican Republic and 8.5% in Honduras (Roberts 2007 p. 119).  
The third category of the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras are expected to be labour repressing rather than mobilizing of trade 
union organization and collective bargaining.  It is not clear if or how their 
predatory orientations will affect their styles of union repression.  Also, Honduran 
unions have enjoyed some at least partial incorporation into the political/elite 
system as evidenced in Chapter 3 and so it’s possible that although all these 
countries are generally repressive there could be differences in degree of 
repression as well as styles.  
IV. Comparative Institutional Analysis 
A.  Introduction 
Based on these institutional hierarchies and Adams’ framework three 
different groupings of DR-CAFTA countries emerge with respect to union-state-
market relations based on regulatory orientation in the labour market, state 
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capacity or regulation and institutions governing union roles in politics.  These 
are Nicaragua, expected to be encouraging, Costa Rica, expected to be tolerant 
and Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras expected to be 
repressive.   
  Institutional tools and frameworks can be applied at different scales 
ranging from finely focusing on one right to broad based analysis of the 
configuration as a whole (Ostrom 2005 p. 11).  According to Ostrom, analysis can 
be done and explanations sought at multiple levels (Ostrom 2005 p. 12).   A major 
challenge in institutional analysis is deciding which level of analysis is most 
appropriate to explain a particular obstacle.  Table 6.2 lists different dimensions of 
institutional analysis related to freedom of association. 
Table 6.2 
 
Freedom of Association 
 
 
A. Institutions that prevent workers 
from effectively organizing into 
unions in the first place: 
 
 
B.  Institutions that control unions 
or limit their impact once they exist 
 
 
C.  Institutions that threaten union 
existence 
 
1.  Violence 
2.  Limitations of civil liberties 
3.  Anti-union discrimination 
4.  Exclusion of workers from 
association rights 
5.  Minimum member requirements 
6.  Union registration and recognition 
procedures 
7.  Alternatives to unions 
8.  Threats and actual closures, re-
incorporations 
1. Violence 
2.  Limitations of civil liberties 
3.  Anti-union discrimination 
4.  Restrictions on election of union 
officials 
5.  Limits on the collective bargaining 
subjects and outcomes 
6.  Exclusion of workers from 
collective bargaining 
7.  Limitations on strikes 
1.  Violence 
2.  Limitations of civil liberties 
3.  Anti-union discrimination 
4.  De-registration procedures 
5.  Minimum membership 
requirements 
6.  Delays and refusals by employers 
to bargain 
7.  Unaddressed violations of 
collective bargaining agreements 
8.  Threats and actual closures, re-
incorporations 
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B. Distinctive Institutional Outcomes 
Among Central American countries and the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua is 
startlingly different than its neighbors and tolerant and can even be characterized 
in Adams’ regulatory objective as encouraging of association and bargaining 
rights relative to its neighbours.  Although the second poorest country in Latin 
America, Nicaragua is the only DR-CAFTA country characterized in 2009 as 
having experienced steady growth in collective bargaining and the registration of 
unions (ITUC N 2009 p. 1).  Nicaraguan unions play an important political role in 
policymaking and political elections, and most public sector conflict with unions 
is based on political rivalries and policy conflicts among parties rather than anti-
union sentiment (USSD N 2009 p. 14; p. 15).  Violence in Nicaragua is reported 
in conjunction with worker mobilizations in strikes precipitating confrontations 
between the government and striking workers.   Yet, violence, as in the case of a 
transportation strike in May of 2008, did not prevent eventual union victory in the 
dispute (USSD N 2009 p. 15). Bertelsmann reported in 2010 that half of 
Nicaragua’s workforce is organized including significant parts of the agriculture 
sector (Bertelsmann 2010 p.8).   
C.  Anti-Union Discrimination Compliance Obligations 
1.  Introduction 
Anti-union discrimination is “one of the most serious violations of 
freedom of association” with the potential to “jeopardize the very existence of 
trade unions” (ILO Digest 2006 p. 155 quoting 331st Report, Case No. 2169 para 
639).  In recent years there has been a surge in complaints of anti-union 
discrimination at ILO supervisory bodies (ILO 2008 para 41).  Compliance 
benchmarks regarding anti-union discrimination, like all aspects of freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining, are established through CEACR 
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regular supervision and General Surveys of Convention 98 as well as through 
decisions rendered by the Freedom of Association Committee and the Fact-
Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association (ILO 1994 para 
13). Together these bodies and their decisions constitute a “veritable international 
law on freedom of association” (ILO 1994 para 13).  Specific compliance criteria 
exist with reference to anti-union discrimination. 
Anti-union discrimination is composed of two necessary elements.  The 
first is an underlying anti-union motivation and the second is an “actual restriction 
on the exercise of freedom of association” (Bartolomei de la Cruz 1976 pp. 9).  
The forms of anti-union discrimination are both individual and collective 
(Bartolomei de la Cruz 1976 pp. 5-6).  One form of discrimination involves the 
employer either ending or preventing an employment relationship from occurring 
through: (1) non-employment by refusal to hire or reinstate, or by closure or 
transfer of the employer’s facility, for example, (2) dismissal and (3) blacklisting 
of trade union members, supporters, leaders and activists (Bartolomei de la Cruz 
1976 pp. 5-6).  A second form of discrimination leaves intact the employment 
relationship but makes the union members, supporters, leaders or activists subject 
to less favourable conditions of employment through transfer, suspension, 
disciplinary penalties, allocation of work tasks, denial of promotion etc 
(Bartolomei de la Cruz 1976 pp. 6).  
2.  Compliance Criteria Related to Anti-Union Discrimination 
The compliance benchmarks on anti-union discrimination appear very 
straightforward and unambiguous—reminiscent of the style of trafficking 
compliance benchmarks.  No person should be subjected to discrimination or 
prejudice with regard to employment because of legitimate trade union activities 
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or membership whether past or present (ILO 2006 paras 770-772).  Protections 
against anti-discriminatory acts apply equally to members and former and current 
trade union leaders (ILO 2006 para 775).  The protections apply, even if the 
employer does not recognize the trade union as representing a majority of the 
employees (ILO 2006 para 776).  Further, Convention 98 protections against anti-
union discrimination are continuous from the time of recruitment and the period 
of employment and include the time of the “work termination” (ILO 2006 paras 
771, 786, 787, 788; ILO 1994 para 210). 
a. Hiring and Blacklisting 
The Committee views “blacklisting” of trade union officials or members to 
be a serious threat to the free exercise of trade union rights and governments 
should take stringent measures to combat such practices (ILO 2006 para 803; ILO 
1994 para 211).  Because there are many practical difficulties in proving anti-
union discrimination particularly in the context of blacklisting, employees with 
past trade union membership or activities should be informed about the 
information held on them and given a chance to challenge it (ILO 2006 para 782).  
Legislation should allow the possibility to appeal against discrimination in hiring, 
i.e. even before the workers can be qualified as an “employee” (ILO 2006 para 
784).   
b. Dismissal 
The dismissal of workers on grounds of trade union membership or 
activity violates the principles of freedom of association (ILO 2006 para 789). 
Violations of freedom of association also include dismissals of union leaders in 
conjunction with subcontracting, even where employees such as public servants 
are hired subject to free appointment and removal, such removal should not be 
motivated by trade union functions or activities, compulsory retirement when 
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imposed as a result of legitimate trade union activities (ILO 2006 paras 789-793).  
Protections against dismissal for anti-union discrimination include using the 
pretext of economic necessity, staff reduction and corporate restructuring (ILO 
2006 paras 795-797).   Administrative procedures, even when bipartite do not 
afford sufficient protection against anti-union discrimination when they allow 
grounds for dismissal based on ‘lack of harmony in the working relationship’ 
(ILO 2006 para 798). 
c. Conditions at Work 
Discriminatory acts cover more than hiring and dismissal but also include 
any discriminatory measures during employment, in particular transfers, 
downgrading and other acts that are prejudicial to the worker (ILO 2006 para 
781).  Acts that are considered discriminatory under Convention 98 protections 
include not only hiring and dismissal but also any discriminatory measures during 
employment, in particular transfers, downgrading and other acts that are 
prejudicial to the worker (ILO 2006 para 718). Acts that are counter to the 
protection against anti-union discrimination include the non-renewal of a contract 
for anti-union reasons, acts of harassment and intimidation, granting bonuses to 
non-union workers and excluding workers who are union members during periods 
of collective conflict, demotions, frequent transfers, relocation, deprivations or 
restrictions of all kinds such as remuneration, social benefits, vocational training 
and more subtle attacks which may be the outcome of omissions (ILO 2006 paras 
785-788; ILO 1994 para 212). 
d. Fuller Protection of Trade Union Leaders and Representatives: 
The general principles of protection from the acts of anti-union 
discrimination above cover “all persons” by reason of membership or legitimate 
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union activities (ILO 2006 paras 770-772).  However, compliance guidelines also 
provide for additional measures to be taken to ensure fuller protection for leaders 
and delegates and members of trade union against discriminatory acts (ILO 2006 
para 773).  This is for two reasons.  First protection against anti-union 
discrimination is particularly desirable in the case of union officials because in 
order to perform their functions in full independence, they should have a 
guarantee that they will not be prejudiced on account of the mandate, which they 
hold from their trade unions (ILO 2006 para 799).  Second, the CEACR has found 
that additional protection of union leaders and officials helps to ensure that effect 
is given to the fundamental principle that organizations have the right to elect their 
representatives in full freedom (ILO 2006 para 799).  This overlaps with 
protections provided by Convention 135 and Recommendation 143 (ILO 1994 
para 208). 
e. Time period for Fuller Protection of Trade Union Leaders 
The CEACR has pointed out that one way of ensuring protection of trade 
union officials is to provide that they will not be dismissed, either during or for a 
certain period following their term in office except for serious misconduct (ILO 
2006 para 804).   This additional protection of trade union officials does not 
however, imply that leaders are conferred with immunity against dismissal 
irrespective of circumstances  (ILO 2006 para 801). There are numerous cases 
delineating legitimate dismissals of union officials such as for absence from work 
without employer permission and using paid time, personnel and facilities without 
employer permission for carrying out trade union activities (ILO 2006 paras 805, 
809).  In cases where dismissal of trade union leaders is allowed without 
indicating the motivation for the dismissal, the committee has indicated that 
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appeal procedures need to be made available to the union officials (ILO 2006 para 
807).  In cases where there were a large number of trade union leaders dismissed, 
the Committee considered that it would be “particularly desirable for the 
government to carry out an inquiry in order to establish the true reasons for the 
measures taken” (ILO 2006 para 812).  
3.  Compliance Criteria Related to Anti-Union Discrimination Not Included 
a.  Exclusions 
The substantive protections against anti-union discrimination contain a 
significant exception because they apply only to private sector employees.  Public 
sector employees are protected under equivalent provisions of Convention 151, 
not incorporated into the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work (ILO 1994 para 203).  Higher-level public servants are excluded from 
protection under both Conventions if they are “directly employed in the 
administration of the State,” as distinct from other employees employed by the 
government, by public enterprises or by autonomous public institutions (ILO 1994 
para 200).  
b. No Requirement for Specific Substantive or Procedural Rules 
Convention 98 does not specify the substantive or procedural regulations 
that states should enact in order to guarantee protection from anti-union 
discrimination.  Instead the protection can take various forms adapted to national 
contexts as long as it prevents or effectively redresses anti-union discrimination 
(ILO 1994 para 214).  In fact substantive regulations protecting against anti-union 
discrimination appear to be optional altogether. Governments undertaking to 
guarantee freedom of association with appropriate measures should “when 
necessary” accompany them with measures, which include the protection of 
workers against anti-union discrimination in employment (ILO 2006 para 814).    
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4. The Challenge of Communicating Compliance Criteria When the Convention 
Explicitly Requires Nothing Specific  
 
Perhaps as a result of the Convention’s limitation of not specifying what if 
any formal institutions need to be in place, the CEACR communicates compliance 
obligations in three different ways in an effort to elaborate on how states should 
legislate and implement protections against anti-union discrimination.  First, the 
CEACR and Committee on Freedom of Association discuss some aspects of 
implementation in ways that give the appearance of compliance obligations even 
though they are not actually found in the Convention.  Second, they use an 
alternative tactic of defining circumstances and situations that do not satisfy 
compliance obligations.  Lastly, they define ‘best practices’ that meet or exceed 
compliance obligations that they would like to encourage.   
a. Compliance Criteria on Implementation 
Implementation-related compliance obligations pronounced by the 
CEACR include that legislation should have: 
1.  Explicit Remedies and Penalties:  for acts of anti-union discrimination in 
order to ensure the effective application of the Convention (ILO 2006 para 813). 
Legislation must make provisions for appeals and establish sufficiently dissuasive 
sanctions against acts of anti-union discrimination to ensure the practical 
application of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention (ILO 2006 para 822).  It is 
important to forbid and penalize in practice all acts of anti-union discrimination in 
respect of employment and the persons responsible for such acts should be 
punished (ILO 2006 paras 771-772). The Committee has recalled the need to 
ensure by specific provisions accompanied by civil remedies and penal sanctions 
the protection of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination at the hands of 
the employer (ILO 2006 para 824).   
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2. Compensation: Compensation must compensate victims of anti-union 
discrimination fully, both in financial and in occupational terms for the prejudice 
suffered (ILO 1994 para 219).   
3.  Reinstatement:  The remedy of reinstatement should be available to those 
who are victims of anti union discrimination and governments should amend 
legislation so that workers dismissed for exercise of trade union rights can be 
reinstated (ILO 2006 paras 837-840; 842).   
4. Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement:  When reinstatement is impossible: 
compensation for anti-union dismissal should be higher than that prescribed for 
other kinds of dismissal (ILO 1994 para 221.  The amount should be reviewed 
periodically and not established in absolute figures but rather drafted in a way to 
retain their dissuasive effect (ILO 1994 para 221).  In the 2006 Digest, “if 
considerable time has elapsed and it is not practicable to reinstate the worker, the 
government should take steps to ensure that the worker receives full compensation 
without delay (ILO 2006 para 841, 843).  The best solution in general is the 
reinstatement of the worker to his post with payment of unpaid wages and 
maintenance of acquired rights (ILO 1994 para 219). 
5.  Burden of Proof:  The Committee has recognized that one of the main 
difficulties of anti-union discrimination cases is that the burden of proof is placed 
on workers and may constitute an insurmountable obstacle (ILO 1994 para 217).  
Legislation or practice should provide ways to remedy the difficulty by for 
example shifting the burden of proof from the worker to the employer or 
establishing a presumption in favour of the worker as has been enacted by several 
countries (ILO 1994 para 217). 
 232 
6.  Enforcement: There are also expectations about the procedures to enforce 
anti-union discrimination.  Where cases of alleged anti-union discrimination are 
involved, the competent authorities should initiate an inquiry immediately and 
take suitable measures to remedy any effects of the anti-union discrimination 
brought to their attention (ILO 2006 para 835).  Additionally, governments should 
take the necessary measures to enable labour inspectors to enter freely without 
previous notice any workplace including cases relating to anti-union 
discrimination (ILO 2006 para 834).   
7.  National Procedures: The government must ensure that complaints of anti-
union discrimination are examined in a framework of national procedures, which 
should be prompt, impartial and considered as such by the parties concerned (ILO 
2006 paras 817,820, 826, 827, 828, 829, 835; ILO 1994 para 216).  
b. Implementation Conditions that do not Meet Compliance Expectations 
1.  Lengthy Procedures: The longer it takes for procedures to be completed, the 
more difficult it becomes for the competent body to issue a fair and proper relief 
since the situation complained of has often been changed irreversibly, people may 
have been transferred, etc to a point where it becomes impossible to order 
adequate redress or come back to the status quo (ILO 2006 para 821).   
2. Absence of Effective Prohibition through Inadequate Procedures and 
Sanctions: The basic regulations that exist in the national legislation prohibiting 
acts of anti-union discrimination are inadequate when they are not accompanied 
by procedures to ensure that effective prohibition against such acts is guaranteed 
(ILO 2006 para 818).  The committee considers that legislation that allows the 
employer to terminate the employment of a worker on condition that he pay the 
compensation provided for by law in all cases of unjustified dismissal, when the 
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real motive is his trade union membership or activity, is inadequate under the 
terms of Article 1 of the Convention and the most appropriate measure is 
reinstatement (ILO 1994 para 220).   
c. Implementation that Meets or Exceeds Compliance Criteria (Best 
Practices) 
Finally, comments by the CEACR and CFA also indicate a number of practices 
that are allowed and even encouraged but not required in implementing 
protections against anti-union discrimination.  
1.  Preventative Procedures:  Legislation that establishes preventative machinery 
requiring that a decision by independent public authorities be taken before union 
officials can be dismissed (ILO 1994 para 215; ILO 2006 para 831).   
2.  Establishing a system in which it is compulsory for each employer to prove 
that the motive for dismissing employees is not related to union activities (ILO 
2006 para 831).  3.  Severe fines in the case of dismissals, administrative orders to 
reinstate dismissed workers and the possibility of closing down the enterprise does 
not infringe on Convention 98 (ILO 2006 para 825). 
D.  Anti-Union Discrimination Distinctive Differences: 
Based on overall institutional outcomes, Nicaragua appears to have a very 
different encouraging orientation towards unions and collective bargaining.  
Nevertheless, Nicaragua shares some common institutional obstacles to freedom 
of association with other DR-CAFTA countries that are repressive or barely 
tolerant of unions.  Anti-union discrimination in the private sector is one common 
obstacle.  Across DR-CAFTA countries, anti-union discrimination usually takes 
the form of threats, harassment, verbal and physical abuse, dismissals from jobs 
and blacklisting to prevent union leaders and supporters from being hired by 
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another employer.  Anti-union discrimination perpetrated by employers is the 
most pervasive means to prevent unions from forming, to control unions once they 
exist and to pressure unions to go out of existence across all of the DR-CAFTA 
countries.  
Formal laws create institutional obstacles by design across DR-CAFTA 
countries.  Nicaraguan law protects only nine union executive board members 
from anti-union discrimination, while leaving other workers unprotected (ITUC 
N).  Additionally, the law in Nicaragua provides a lengthy two-step process for 
reinstatement proceedings in cases of anti-union dismissal (USSD N).  The law 
makes it illegal for employers to fire workers for their union activity but 
nevertheless allows it to occur if employers agree to pay twice the normal 
severance pay required by law (ITUC N). These formal rules help bolster informal 
social conventions perpetrated by private sector employers such as harassment, 
financial incentives to leave the union, anti-union dismissals, blacklisting, 
canceling employment contracts of workers who organize and flexibilization of 
employment contracts especially in tourism and telecommunications (USSD N; 
ITUC N).  These formal institutions are very similar to those of other DR-CAFTA 
countries regardless of whether they are in the developmental paternalistic 
category (Costa Rica) or predatory-repressive (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras). 
Two factors differentiate Nicaragua and help to counter the effects of anti-
union discrimination relative to other DR-CAFTA countries.  First, there is 
evidence that workers do not rely solely on the state to protect them from anti-
union discrimination and sometimes strike after illegal firings (USSD N).  Second, 
there are numerous instances in which the government orders reinstatement of 
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workers despite the law and intervenes on behalf of unions and workers after 
firings (USSD N).  Anti-union animus is plentiful in the private sector and formal 
institutions are inadequate but as noted by the ITUC, the Nicaraguan government 
has made relatively more efforts to intervene in support of unions (ITUC N 2009).   
In Honduras there is also evidence that unions do not always rely on 
formal rules and procedures governing anti-union discrimination.  The example in 
the evidence occurs very differently in Honduras than in Nicaragua.  In Honduras 
there were reported occasional strikes after employers dismissed union leaders 
and activists and further that the protests and strikes sometime lead to 
reinstatement of workers without any legal or administrative procedures (USSD H 
p. 9, ITUC H p. 2).  In Honduras, unlike Nicaragua, the government does not 
intercede to support dismissed or striking workers (ITUC H p. 2).  There was 
evidence that in at least one successful protest and strike, the Honduran union won 
by making the government’s complicity with the company a focal point and 
occupied the ministry of labour offices in protest (ITUC H p. 2).   
Common formal institutional shortcomings among countries do not 
necessarily dictate the same outcome overall.  Arguably, categorical differences 
do indeed matter in terms of respect for freedom of association and rights to 
collective bargaining in Central America and the Dominican Republic even when 
a narrow set of formal institutions appear to be very similar.  It is possible that 
Robert’s concept of labour-mobilizing indicates that the political role of unions in 
Nicaragua creates values and norms convergent with respect for association rights 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2006 p. 14).  These norms may contribute to Nicaragua’s 
movement away from its past orientation of repressiveness towards 
encouragement and protection.  In this case, new norms substitute for inadequate 
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formal institutions by infusing them with meaning and leading to an opposite 
outcome than the formal institution alone would dictate (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006 p. 14).  One explanation is that, in Koh’s terms, ‘political internalization’ of 
the value of freedom of association and unions, has occurred in Nicaragua and 
influences outcomes more than formal institutions.  This political internalization 
exists in the context of Nicaragua’s labour-mobilizing relationship between unions 
and political parties. 
In contrast, there is an example from Honduras in which a union uses a 
very similar strategy to get out from under dysfunctional and repressive formal 
institutions.  In addition, the Honduran union must confront the state’s repressive 
intentions.  In Honduras the union must overcome the formal institutions and the 
government.  The social conventions and norms infuse the formal rules further 
eroding their protective value. 
E.  Distinctive Institutional Configurations 
Taking together the components of freedom of association an overall 
institutional “configuration” emerges showing significant differences between 
Nicaragua and developmental paternalistic Costa Rica and predatory repressive 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador Guatemala and Honduras).  At this 
configurational level, freedom of association in Nicaragua can be characterized as 
a situation in which workers are vulnerable to anti-union discrimination and the 
state focuses its efforts to control unions by limiting union rights to strike.   What 
is noticeable in Nicaragua and consistent with Standing’s labour market 
regulatory regime ideal type, is the absence of formal institutional components 
present in other countries to prevent workers from organizing in the first place and 
to control unions once they exist.  This is not to say that there are not institutional 
problems, especially informal ones in Nicaragua.  Once unions exist, informal 
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social conventions by employers continue to play a role in controlling and 
encouraging unions to go out of existence.  These include continued anti-union 
discrimination, financial incentives to leave the union (ITUC N), routine stalling 
tactics before engaging in collective bargaining, routine violations of collective 
bargaining agreements once they exist and threats and actual closures of union 
facilities (USSD N).    
Nevertheless, in contrast to the developmental paternalistic and predatory 
repressive counterparts, there is evidence of fewer legislated obstacles to 
organizing in Nicaragua compared to all the other countries.  Nicaragua is the 
only country in which there was evidence of effective dismantling of legislated 
obstacles to organizing by for example side-stepping complicit labour ministry 
personnel and decentralizing union registration procedures (ITUC N).  There is 
also an absence of compliance criticisms from the ILO CEACR towards 
Nicaragua in stark contrast to its neighbors.  In contrast to Nicaragua’s relatively 
quick dismantling of obstacles to union registration for example, there is a 
pervasive and repetitive pattern of interactions between the ILO and the other 
countries.  The compliance interactions invariably involve, the ILO identifying a 
compliance short-coming preventing workers from being able to organize into 
unions in the first place and expressing its hope that the country’s tripartite body 
will engage in social dialogue and recommend legislation, with technical 
assistance from the ILO if necessary, and that the country’s legislature will adopt 
the recommended legislation with all due speed thus addressing the shortcoming.    
Occasionally as in the case of Costa Rica, the government expresses its 
“readiness and will to resolve” the problem and its commitment to tripartite 
dialogue and ILO technical assistance (ILO 2008 CEACR CR 87 p. 2).  For its 
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part, the ILO CEACR note later in the same Individual Observation to Costa Rica, 
an allegation from Costa Rican labour organization, SITEPP that Costa Rica’s 
unionization rate is only 2.5% and that “the (government’s) commitments made to 
the ILO over many years relating to draft legislation submitted to the Legislative 
Assembly have only been vain promises (ILO 2008 CEACR CR 87 p. 3).   
Responding to the government’s stated commitment, the union’s allegations and 
lack of change in Costa Rican legislation concludes: 
The Committee emphasizes once again that the matters 
pending raise important issues relating to the application of the 
Convention.  Taking into account the various ILO missions that 
have visited the country over the years and the gravity of the 
problems, it hopes to be in a position to note substantial progress in 
the near future in both law and practice.  The Committee requests 
the Government to keep it informed in this respect (ILO 2008 
CEACR CR pp. 3-4). 
 
Nicaragua’s is a very different picture than the ones that emerge in the 
case of developmental paternalistic Costa Rica, and predatory repressive 
countries.  They all share with Nicaragua a central problem of worker 
vulnerability to anti-union discrimination and control of strikes albeit with 
different institutional flavours.  What is layered with the anti-union discrimination 
and control of strikes varies by country. In Costa Rica, the main obstacle 
preventing workers from effectively organizing into unions, in addition to anti-
union discrimination, is the widespread support and reliance on employer 
dominated Solidarity Associations (Solidarismo) as an alternative to independent 
trade unions (ILO CR; USSD CR; ITUC CR). Solidarismo was founded and 
based in the Costa Rican Catholic Church and was a merging of ideas of Catholic 
social justice with market-oriented ideology (ASEPROLA CR).    
In the case of Costa Rica in addition to anti-union discrimination, there is 
positive discrimination in favour of Solidarismo. The law requires 12 members in 
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order to form an independent trade union but only 3 to form a solidarity 
association (ITUC CR).  Employers recognize non-union worker committees and 
create direct agreements with them. Other DR-CAFTA countries share the social 
convention of employer efforts to establish employer dominated and employer 
friendly worker organizations, but Costa Rica is unique in the extent to which is 
has taken this course and its efforts to ascribe normative legitimacy to it. 
The other component of Costa Rica’s configurational picture revolves 
around a more pervasive effort to control what public sector unions do in terms of 
collective bargaining. (ILO CR; USSD CR; ITUC CR).  Rather than exclude 
public sector workers from collective bargaining altogether as many predatory 
repressive systems do, Costa Rica exercises control over the outcome of collective 
bargaining through judicial rulings striking negotiated clauses in public sector 
agreements because they are unreasonable or disproportionately benefit public 
employees (ILO CR; USSD CR; ITUC CR). 
Predatory repressive systems such as the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, place more and deeper obstacles to prevent 
association rights and collective bargaining and more and deeper controls on 
union strikes than Nicaragua.  They also use but place less emphasis on 
normatively legitimate alternatives to unions.  All of the predatory repressive 
countries are more violent than Nicaragua or Costa Rica.   
Like obligatory overtime, informal social conventions such as violence 
and threats of violence play a much more central role in predatory states. In the 
Dominican Republic evidence includes cases of physical punishment by 
withholding water, imposing HIV testing and covert intimidation of union 
activists (USSD DR) and violently breaking up unions by physically removing 
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union activists from workplaces (ITUC DR).  Honduras presents the picture of 
increasing reliance on violence to suppress unions with four deaths, and numerous 
threats and detention by employers of trade unionists (ILO H; USSD H; ITUC H).  
In contrast to Nicaragua where laws are reportedly reformed to make association 
rights easier to exercise, Honduras is enacting laws to increase penalties for 
protesters blocking roads and streets (ITUC H).  Opinion is not universal about 
Honduras however with the USSD blaming violence on “nefarious elements in the 
labour movement or mafia” not employers or the government (USSD H). 
All of the predatory repressive countries emphasize preventing workers 
from organizing by excluding workers through various means from association 
and collective bargaining rights.  Honduras excludes many public service 
employees, firms with less than 30 workers, security guards and some agricultural 
workers from association rights (ILO H; USSD H; ITUC H).  Many Honduran 
public employees who are allowed to organize are not allowed to engage in 
collective bargaining and if allowed to engage in collective bargaining, the subject 
matters are restricted (ITUC H).  Similarly, the Dominican Republic excludes 
categories of civil service and autonomous municipal agencies or alternatively 
establishes higher thresholds of membership before association rights are 
recognized (ILO DR).    
Consistent with its performance on overtime and trafficking, the 
Dominican Republic is closest to Nicaragua with respect to the absence of formal 
institutional barriers.  The Dominican Republic relies on social conventions and 
so its formal rules are very closely aligned with ILO standards establishing default 
rules facilitating the registration unions.  In the Dominican Republic, if a union 
registration petition is not rejected within a specific timeframe, union registration 
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is deemed to be automatic (USSD DR; ITUC DR).  In contrast to Nicaragua 
however, there are more exclusions of public sector civil service and municipal 
employees (ILO DR).   
The worst configuration for purposes of rights to freedom of association, 
tracks with Guatemala and El Salvador.  As with obligatory overtime, each 
country uses multiple mutually reinforcing formal and informal institutional 
components to maintain repression.  The labour movements in Guatemala and El 
Salvador evidence strong vestiges of neopatrimonial pasts. Guatemala’s labour 
movement represents a small stubborn holdout resisting an institutional system 
designed to eradicate it through violence, absence of legal protections, inadequate 
sanctions and ever-evolving company strategies at union avoidance, including 
fraudulent bankruptcy and reincorporation. The totality of these strategies results 
in impunity for violations of trade union rights (USSD G 2009 p. 17).  
Additionally, this is not just private sector behaviour.  
El Salvador and Guatemala have more institutional arrangements to 
prevent unions from forming in the first place and more energetically prevent 
public sector unions from forming.  For example, other predatory repressive 
countries tend to emphasize either excluding public sector workers from rights to 
association such as in Honduras or alternatively registration procedures to create 
obstacles for those in the private sector with rights to associate from actually 
forming unions as in the Dominican Republic.  In contrast El Salvador and 
Guatemala do both very strongly.  El Salvador exempts many categories of public 
employees from association rights in contradiction to Convention No. 87 and 98.  
Guatemala participates in avoidance of unions by, for example, establishing 
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commercial contracts with state employees and then arguing that as a result they 
are not employees with rights to organize or bargain (ITUC G 2009 p. 1). 
A finer grained analysis within categories would also highlight differences 
between even the worst extremes of El Salvador and Guatemala in how each 
country establishes effective obstacles to trade union activity.  For example, 
compared to Guatemala, El Salvador relies more on formal rules rather than 
informal violence to suppress worker efforts to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining.  This is consistent with El Salvador’s approach to obligatory overtime 
as well.  In contrast, violence is the prevalent and effective social convention to 
repress unions across all three configurational functions in Guatemala (ILO G; 
USSD G 2009; ITUC G 2009).  Yet violence is not isolated to Guatemala and or 
countries in the predatory repressive category.  Violence is more prevalent as an 
informal social convention used against Honduran and Dominican unions than it 
is in Costa Rica.  In Nicaragua, violence, when it is briefly discussed, occurs in 
the context of a strike battle only (USSD N 2009). 
V.  Politics and Compliance 
The regulatory orientation that seems to matter most for purposes of 
freedom of association is Nicaragua’s labour market regulatory regime as 
protective in conjunction with its near total absence of repressiveness in regulating 
union formation.  Nicaragua appears to overcome some of its predatory regulatory 
orientation by substituting for inadequate formal institutions in anti-union 
discrimination with the political will to act in contradiction to the formal 
institutions making for a very different outcome in Nicaragua relative to other 
countries.  Also Nicaragua retains fewer formal institutions to prevent workers 
from organizing and to control unions once they exist.  Finally, Nicaragua acts 
relatively quickly on its own to remove obstacles to worker organizing without 
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resorting to lengthy tripartite dialogue that does not lead to legislative reform for 
many years as occurs in Costa Rica.  
The predatory repressive category’s relevance is supported by evidence of 
more extreme and thorough institutions to make it difficult for workers to exercise 
association rights.   There were nevertheless some distinctions within the group.  
There are many fewer formal institutional obstacles in place in the Dominican 
Republic compared to all of the other predatory repressive countries.  It is at the 
level of social conventions that their similarity with other predatory repressive 
countries becomes clear. 
The ILO CEACR engages in compliance dialogue with DR-CAFTA 
countries in supervising Convention Nos. 87 and 98.  This compliance dialogue 
cycle as described in the case of Costa Rica is illustrative of the absence of 
recognition of a role for politics and power in ILO compliance.  The ILO 
encourages countries to engage in tripartite dialogue assuming that dialogue will 
lead to consensus and consensus will lead to legislation that will also be adopted 
by consensus as a logical way to make a labor relations system work in 
compliance with the Conventions.  As pointed out by the Costa Rican trade union 
comment to the ILO, tripartite dialogue is itself a potential tool to prevent or at 
least delay compliance related reforms. 
The ILO CEACR compliance criteria on politics were inspired by the cold 
war and there is no evidence of ILO criticisms of DR-CAFTA countries based on 
politics despite the fact that for example, El Salvador prohibits trade unions from 
taking part in political activities (ITUC 2009 ES p. 1).  Similar prohibitions may 
well exist in other DR-CAFTA countries but the ITUC, USSD or ILO do not 
consistently track or comment on them. 
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Chapter 7  Conclusions and Final Thoughts 
I.  Recapitulation of Research Project 
A.  Projects Goals and Purpose 
 
The purpose of the project was to develop a diagnostic tool: (1) to 
understand and frame labour rights as institutional employment practices; (2) to 
enable systematic comparison of these employment practices to relevant 
compliance obligations in ILO Conventions, and (3) to help identify and suggest 
areas for possible interventions to improve congruence between domestic 
employment practices and ILO obligations as well as possible shortcomings and 
contradictions within the ILO Conventions themselves.   
The tool aims to change the debate on labour standards by fully integrating 
into the discussion formal rules and their grammar, informal social norms and 
informal social conventions that undermine or bolster the formal rules.  It also 
calls for examining rules from other realms of social life that while not directly 
related to a particular labour right nevertheless have an impact.  In effect, the goal 
of using the diagnostic tool is to prevent narrowly viewing and engaging in 
conflict over reforming the formal institutional grammar without examining the 
informal institutions as so often occurs.  In the process, the potential is created to 
demand holistic  “institutional arrangements” that comply with and improve upon 
internationally recognized norms. 
B.  Research Process 
The idea for this research grew from my experience working in Boston 
with immigrant janitors from Central America and Dominican Republic.  This 
experience led me to recognise that labour rights violations are not aberrations 
from an employment system but rather an integral component of the system.  The 
research process was to first understand the historical/political context of the 
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societies and employment systems from which the immigrant janitors had come 
through in-depth country studies.  The second step was to search for theoretical 
concepts to make sense of labour rights violations as an integral part of an 
employment system rather than as an aberration.  The third part of the process was 
to integrate the concepts to create the diagnostic tool to guide examination of real 
cases of labour rights violations.  The process of arriving at the diagnostic tool 
was also based on examining existing labour standards monitoring methodologies 
and informed by historical knowledge of the countries and the region gained 
through the research process.  The fourth and final step was to apply the tool to 
forced obligatory overtime, trafficking and freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.  In each case I examined publicly available evidence and analyzed the 
evidence along institutional lines based on the tool: evidence about formal rules, 
their interpretation and enforcement as well as evidence of informal social norms 
and informal social conventions and influences from other realms of social life.  I 
also noted how the country’s implementation of the right was characterized and 
how the institutional elements compared to the compliance obligations and 
dimensions of internalisation and possible interventions to improve 
implementation of the right.  
C.  Theoretical Basis for the Diagnostic Tool 
The diagnostic tool (Tables 4.2 and 4.3) is based on integrating institutions 
theory from political economy and compliance theory from international law.  The 
institutions theory used in the tool applies comparative employment systems 
concepts to problems of labour rights (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2002; 
Helmke and Levitsky 2006).   Using this approach, labour rights violations, like 
corporate governance and educational systems, can be viewed as interrelated 
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practices embedded in a web of formal and informal rules governing employment 
within a society.   
  The compliance side of the tool incorporates Harold Koh’s compliance 
theory (Koh 1997; Koh 1998).   Koh argues that international legal norms such as 
ILO Conventions become domesticated through multiple processes that 
internalize the international legal norms into formal domestic law, interpretations 
and enforcement as well as through supportive social norms and social 
conventions. 
D.  Selection of Countries 
The Dominican Republic and five Central American countries (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) were selected to be 
included in the study.  They were selected first because of my own experience 
working with union members from the region working as janitors in Boston.  In 
addition, the countries share a common history and culture.  The countries also 
share many similar social and employment institutions.  For example, they have a 
common bureaucratic architecture for enforcing labour rights, including a labour 
ministries and labour courts (USTR 2005).  In addition, all the countries have 
ratified all four of the ILO conventions that were included in the ILO 1998 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as Core Labour 
Standards (CLS).  Yet there are also important differences among the countries, 
including levels of income, human development and more importantly labour 
rights outcomes.   
Another key reason for selecting the countries was also their inclusion in a 
relatively new trade agreement, DR-CAFTA.  DR-CAFTA replaced an earlier 
trade-related labour rights enforcement regime in the U.S. Generalized System of 
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Preferences (GSP).  In the GSP system a country could lose access to U.S. 
markets for non-compliance with certain labour rights loosely similar to CLS.  
Activists have argued that DR-CAFTA is detrimental to improving enforcement 
and gaining compliance with labour rights.  At the crossroads of the ILO Core 
Labour Standard  (CLS) initiative and a new trade regime there continues to be 
great controversy about whether respect for labour rights is improving or 
worsening in the region (WOLA 2009 p. 7).   
For the purpose of facilitating cross-national comparisons, I used a 
framework to categorize countries depending on their capacity for institutional 
action (Evan 1995) and labour market regulatory regime (Standing 1991). Based 
on these guides, I re-examined and updated my country studies as well as similar 
work done by Itzigsohn (2000) attempting a similar kind of comparison between 
Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic.  Three groupings of the countries 
emerged to facilitate comparison in the cases.  The evidence on labour rights in all 
the countries was all drawn from publicly available information from the ILO, 
non-governmental organizations and the U.S. State Department Human Rights 
Reports.  The results from using the tool on this information is not meant to be 
“the whole story” but rather to initiate debate based on analysis of the evidence.  
E.  Selection of Labour Rights 
Labour rights vary in complexity and scope.  Some labour rights are 
relatively straightforward in terms of their institutional grammar while others, 
such as the right to freedom of association have multiple components.  For this 
reason, two case studies were undertaken to use the tool.  The first case study was 
relatively simple examination of two forms of forced labour, obligatory overtime 
and trafficking.  The second case study applied the diagnostic tool at a different 
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scale and scope on the many inter-related component rights making up freedom of 
association. 
Both case studies were based upon evidence of compliance and non-
compliance with ILO Conventions.  I selected Conventions underlying two of the 
four Core Labour Standards (CLS): (1) the abolition of forced labour and (2) 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.  The CLS were 
selected for the research because they are universally applicable. They are 
comparable across the countries and there is adequate evidence for purposes of the 
inquiry.  Relevant ILO Conventions underlying the CLS were used rather than the 
CLS themselves to overcome some of the shortcomings of the CLS such as their 
de-linking of the “standards” from binding international “legal rights.” 
Conventions, as adopted by the ILO, represent institutional settlements at 
the international level governing specific labour rights (Table 4.2).  These 
Conventions also provide an authoritative and comparative metric to use as 
compliance benchmarks enabling cross-national comparison and analysis.  In this 
way, international labour rights are the central focal point for comparisons and 
analysis.  Nevertheless, at the same time, the diagnostic tool is intended to be 
respectful of institutional diversity.  In other words, it is expected that there may 
be many recipes to compliance with international labour rights just as there are 
may be many recipes to non-compliance.  
II.  Summary of Findings 
A.  Forced Labour Case Study 
The use of the diagnostic tool in the case study on forced labour was 
useful in three different distinct areas.  First, at the micro level, the diagnostic tool 
was useful in identifying varieties of formal institutional ingredients associated 
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with obligatory overtime and trafficking and how these ingredients were 
distributed across the countries.  For example, there are fewer problems with 
formal institutional rules in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (Table 5.6) as 
compared to the other countries with regard to obligatory overtime.  This suggests 
that interventions to better align domestic law with the international norms are 
more relevant in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.  At the same 
time, further interventions are required in all of the countries to deal with the 
varieties of rules that create exceptions to prohibitions on obligatory overtime 
(Table 5.6).  Additionally, the tool helped to identify stark differences among the 
countries with respect to styles of non-enforcement of the formal rules.  Costa 
Rica embraces non-enforcement of obligatory overtime rules as an open policy in 
contrast to the silent non-enforcement styles of the other countries.  Thus, 
enhanced ILO attention and supervision of non-enforcement could be a possible 
intervention in Nicaragua, The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras (Table 5.8).  
Another area at the micro level in which the tool was useful was in 
uncovering patterns and interactions between formal and informal institutions, and 
these in turn were matched to possible interventions to improve compliance.  
Costa Rica’s open non-enforcement of formal limits on obligatory overtime was 
supported by the government’s efforts to legitimize obligatory overtime as a 
means to further development (Table 5.9).  El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 
also evidenced efforts to affirm informal social norms supportive of obligatory 
overtime practices by employers.  As a result, in all these cases, the tool indicated 
a possible intervention would be enhanced ILO attention and supervision 
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challenging government’s for actively supporting norms undermining prohibitions 
against obligatory overtime.  
The tool also helped to identify distinctive informal institutional patterns 
such as social conventions of physical coercion, threats and the withholding of 
pay among employers in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras. In fact, in the case of the Dominican Republic interventions to improve 
compliance centre entirely on the strong role that social conventions play in 
eroding formal institutions (Tables 5.10 and 5.11).  On the other hand there was 
no such evidence in Costa Rica and Nicaragua (Tables 5.10 and 5.11).  
The second area in which the tool was useful was as a guide to uncover 
important inconsistencies in ILO and ILO Conventions.  Forced labour is one of 
the ILO 1998 Core Labour Standards (CLS), and all countries are required to 
uphold the principles underlying the standards based solely on their membership 
in the ILO regardless of their ratification of the ILO conventions.  Forced labour 
takes different forms including forced obligatory overtime, prison labour and 
trafficking for sexual and non-sexual economic exploitation.  The case study on 
forced labour in the form obligatory overtime revealed some deep contradictions 
in the notion of core labour standards. 
Employers impose obligatory overtime on workers in the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and the evidence indicates 
extensive use of both direct and indirect forms of coercion that violate ILO 
general standards on forced labour.  However, as a result of the ILO Committee of 
Experts interpretation, the ILO obligatory overtime standards are tied to national 
work time limits.  The perverse result is that no matter how coercive or violent, 
obligatory overtime can only amount to forced labour if there also a violation of a 
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non-core labour standard in the form of a national limit on work time under ILO 
Convention Nos. 1 or 30.  Countries with no work-time limits at all cannot be said 
to have imposed obligatory overtime in violation of forced labour standards. 
Nevertheless, the forms of direct and indirect coercion exerted on workers do not 
comply with ILO general compliance obligations on Forced Labour as established 
by the Committee of Experts  (Tables 5.13 and 5.14).  
Another contradiction and inconsistency was identified using the tool in 
the case study on obligatory overtime and trafficking by identifying the fact that 
the ILO applies far stricter compliance standards and achieves higher compliance 
efforts from DR-CAFTA countries on trafficking.  Unlike obligatory overtime and 
freedom of association, countries are more willing to admit they have problems 
with trafficking and do not argue against the merits of its eradication or work to 
facilitate its continuation. Perhaps in the case of predatory repressive countries 
like El Salvador and Guatemala, their better performance on eradication of 
trafficking as compared to obligatory overtime and freedom of association, arises 
from their comfort and familiarity with the police-like enforcement regime 
required to fight trafficking.   
Finally, using the tool to guide analysis of forced labour institutions and 
compliance provided some possible indications of the ILO’s programmatic shifts 
over time.  The case study demonstrated that the ILO is more effective in its 
regulation of matters outside of traditional employment relationships such as 
trafficking compared to traditional employment problems such as obligatory 
overtime.  Notably, with trafficking the violators tend to be viewed as “criminals” 
rather than as “employer organizations.”  Arguably, the ILO’s greater 
effectiveness in this realm relative to obligatory overtime and freedom of 
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association is a function of the strengths and limits of the ILO’s tripartite structure 
of employer, worker and states.  It is possible that the ILO is able to be more 
effective when the social partners share a consensus about a problem to be 
addressed through the ILO supervisory machinery.  The ILO’s relative success on 
trafficking fits well with the ILO’s recent turn towards its decent work agenda and 
its emphasis on non-traditional forms of employment, poverty and development. 
B.  Freedom of Association Case Study 
Freedom of association with its multiple inter-related facets presented an 
opportunity for using the tool at a different scale than the forced labour case, 
which closely focused on two aspects (obligatory overtime and trafficking) of one 
right.  Like forced labour, one part of the freedom of association case study 
focused on one right – the right to be free from anti-union discrimination. The 
institutional and compliance analysis from the tool showed that all the countries 
have similarly dismal formal and informal institutions with respect to Convention 
No. 98 protections against anti-union discrimination.  Nevertheless, Nicaragua 
performed better than any of the other countries on protecting workers against 
anti-union discrimination because the government acts and intervenes on behalf of 
workers demanding their reinstatement despite the lack of formal institutional 
basis for doing so.  
This case study also explored labour institutions and compliance a 
different scale.  In this application, the component rights and compliance 
obligations making up freedom of association were combined into an overall 
institutional characterization based on Roy Adams’s regulatory characterisations.  
In other words, institutional arrangements and compliance obligations 
encompassing the totality of the component rights were combined and matched to 
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an overall effect of suppression, toleration or encouragement of trade union and 
association rights in Convention Nos. 87 and 98.  
Adams’s model of regulatory objectives of repression, tolerance and 
encouragement was a useful metric to categorize overall regulatory configurations 
on freedom of association (1992).  Establishing tolerance of trade union 
organizing and collective bargaining is often thought of as an exercise in 
forbearance—deliberately not intervening so as to leave workers free without 
penalty or retaliation to organize.  Remarkably, however, in using the tool, the 
evidence indicates that, if a country has an objective of establishing tolerance for 
association and collective bargaining in the private sector, it must actively 
intervene rather than exercise forbearance.  This is exactly what Nicaragua does 
when it demands that private employers reinstate workers who were fired for 
union activity despite the total absence of a legal requirement for reinstatement. 
Surprisingly, trade union rights are better established in Nicaragua than in 
much better developed Costa Rica.  In Costa Rica’s case, paternalistic labour 
market regulations act to mitigate its fundamental opposition to unions and 
regulation resulting from negotiation.  As with forced labour, Costa Rica is 
confident in espousing social norms to bolster its regulatory decisions and 
orientation.  The government actively supports non-conflictual solidarity 
associations as substitutes for unions.  Solidarity associations are closer to its 
consensus model of class relations.  In addition to highlighting differences 
between regulatory ideal types, this case study also highlighted that even within 
the same type, each country has its own particular institutional styles and flavours.   
For example, El Salvador and Guatemala are both extremely repressive and 
actively hostile toward union and association rights but El Salvador relies more 
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heavily on establishing formal institutional obstacles while Guatemala relies more 
heavily on informal social conventions of violence towards trade union activists. 
This case also highlighted the role of the ILO in expanding rights under 
the Conventions to make up for perceived shortcomings and ambivalence at the 
time of institutional settlement when the Conventions were adopted.  The 
ambivalence toward association rights in the Conventions is not surprising in light 
of the ILO tripartite structure.  The ILO is governed by government, employer and 
union representatives that make up each member country’s tripartite group.  A key 
difference between forced labour and freedom of association Conventions as 
institutional settlements among the social partners is that the forced labour 
Conventions commit states to end their own practice of it.  In contrast, 
governments took great pains to exempt themselves from the obligations and their 
employees from the rights arising from Convention No. 98 on the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining.  
The tool also helped to distinguish Nicaragua’s performance relative to the 
other countries on the particularly important right of unions to engage in political 
activities and relations.  Unlike all the other countries, Nicaragua’s trade unions 
are an integral part of the political landscape and valued for their ability to 
effectively mobilize votes and action.  They have been politically aligned with the 
Sandinista since the 1979 Revolution.  As a result, Nicaraguan unions experience 
many fewer institutional obstacles to association rights compared to the other 
countries.  Arguably, the useful role that unions play in politics also contributes to 
informal social norms and informal social conventions supportive of association 
and union rights relative to the other countries.    
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Despite the importance of union rights to engage in politics as an essential 
institutional ingredient, the case study demonstrated that the role of politics is 
largely absent from ILO supervision of Convention Nos. 87 and 98.  In fact, the 
ILO takes an apolitical approach to regulating freedom of association.  It 
encourages bureaucratic processes and procedures that seem to imply that politics 
do not matter.  When it identifies obstacles to freedom of association in the rules 
and processes governing it, the ILO again takes an apolitical view of social 
dialogue by asking the partners to “fix” the problem.   
Also, the ILO Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of 
Association take a narrow view of the right of trade unions and union members to 
engage in politics for general political reasons.  Arguably, their view is narrower 
than the civil and political rights of trade union organizations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Among all the evidence in 
the case study on freedom of association, the ILO did not once raise a concern 
about the rights of unions to engage in politics despite the fact that according to 
unions and non-governmental organisations, some of the countries in the study 
prohibit unions from engaging in any political activity whatsoever. This 
prohibition is a violation of obligations under the Conventions but the ILO 
Committee of Experts simply fails to address it.   
In sum, the evidence from the case of freedom of association indicated that 
politics matter in terms of Nicaragua’s dismantling of its former repressive 
regime.  While Costa Rica and other DR-CAFTA countries often affirm their 
commitment to do as the ILO asks and find consensus through social dialogue, 
Nicaragua acted and dismantled its repressive institutional obstacles to association 
rights.  The key difference in this regard is that unions in Nicaragua have an 
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integral role in party politics.  Unions are useful in maintaining power as they 
mobilize workers and useful in preventing the return of the former repressive 
system.  Even the liberal’s return to power in the 1990s did not result in a total 
reversal back to its former repressive system.  
C.  Evaluation and Direction of Further Research 
One promising outcome of the research is that it has been well received by 
scholars in the field.  The theoretical framework was peer reviewed and published 
in Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations (Frey 2010). The diagnostic tool 
based on the framework was also published in an ILO book Regulating for Decent 
Work (Frey 2011).  The review process for both publications resulted in 
improvement to the research project.  The project goal, analytical tool and 
methods also benefited from the feedback of David Cingranelli, Roy Adams and 
Janice Bellace, the U.S. member of the ILO Committee of Experts.  
The project presented a number of interesting insights.  At the micro level 
– such as trafficking, obligatory overtime or anti-union discrimination – the tool 
usefully identified many institutional ingredients and thereby exposed patterns 
within and between the countries.  Once identified, the shortcomings have the 
potential to have political effects within the country and in the supervision process 
of the Committee of Experts.  For example, with regard to obligatory overtime, 
coercive social conventions overrode formal laws in the Dominican Republic.  
Nevertheless, since the texts of the Dominican laws comply with ILO standards, 
the informal social conventions undermining the laws are largely are overlooked.     
Yet with respect to freedom of association, the examination of only one 
right, anti-union discrimination, would have been misleading in isolation without 
consideration of other aspects of freedom of association.  Nicaragua shares with 
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all of the other countries ineffective formal institutions on anti-union 
discrimination, however, has a remarkably different outcome overall.  This is 
revealed by examination of the right of unions to participate in politics, which is 
unique to Nicaragua.  Accordingly, the study usefully showed the value of using 
the institutional analysis at multiple levels.  It would be helpful, however, to 
systematize the data analysis and facilitate the process of scaling up and down to 
different levels of analysis.  
The results of the case studies are not intended to be generalizable beyond 
the countries in the comparison.  History and contextual foundations matter, and 
the countries are particular in relation to their geography, economies, history and 
the significant role of the United States. While the case studies themselves are not 
generalizable, the diagnostic tool can be applied more widely to provide insight 
into other labour rights, countries and contexts.  One idea for further application 
would be to examine one right, such as work time limits, in one country over a 
longer period of time.   Also, given the important role of politics in realizing rights 
to freedom of association, I would like to use the tool to examine the history of the 
Committee of Experts supervising freedom of association Conventions through 
the Cold War period. 
Another positive aspect of the research project was its close examination 
and framing of ILO Conventions as institutional settlements.  In debates about 
international labour standards, the contents of ILO Conventions are often taken 
for granted as ahistorical fact.  Viewing ILO Conventions in terms of institutional 
components highlights the historical and political conflicts within the ILO and 
their influence on the eventual content of the standards.  ILO Conventions 
understood as institutional compromises helps to reveal the distributional and 
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power effects.  Additionally, comparing the ILO Convention benchmarks to social 
reality highlights contradictions and shortcomings in the standards themselves.  
As the freedom of association case study demonstrates, the Cold War period had a 
tremendous effect on the formulation of labour standards that continues to 
influence the application of the standards today, decades after the end of the Cold 
War.  It is also clear from the research that the area of union role in politics 
governed by ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98 has been largely overlooked since 
the end of the Cold War. 
The project also shows that labour standards need not be an area of debate 
isolated from the actual work and study of employment relations and social 
science.  Labour standards have the potential to contribute to the field of 
international comparative employment relations.  International labour standards 
can be conceptualized and framed in very specific and meaningful ways, and can 
usefully serve as a common metric for purposes of comparison across industries, 
countries and time periods.  Using labour standards as authoritative norms for 
purposes of creating common benchmarks also helps to legitimize the labour 
standards.  When social scientists compare labour practices across countries on 
the basis of social and economic conditions while ignoring labour standards in 
law, in effect they contribute to undermining the relevance and legitimacy of these 
standards whether they do so intentionally or not.  In contrast lawyers and legal 
academics have often ignored the social and economic context while focusing 
formulation, interpretation of labour standards in law.  The research project 
demonstrates that the puzzle of labour standards compliance actually creates a rich 
agenda for interdisciplinary work across law and social sciences.   
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The project also has helped to explain why labour standards are difficult to 
establish and to improve.  Countries may choose to formally adopt the labour 
standards found in ILO Conventions because of coercion from other countries or 
for other instrumental purposes. Under these conditions, Koh’s internalization 
process is expected to be incomplete or alternatively not to occur at all.  Koh’s 
compliance theory helps to explain how labour standards fail to influence labour 
outcomes.  If labour standards are viewed as detrimental to development, then 
resisting their legitimacy, enactment and enforcement is logical. As Engerman 
pointed out policy changes implementing labour standards flow from changes in 
attitude, rhetoric and political power (Engerman 2003 p. 11). 
Lastly, a personal measure of the project’s usefulness is that it has 
fundamentally changed how I think about my work in the labour movement.  I 
now organize and represent mostly public sector workers including teachers, 
paraprofessional educators, cafeteria workers, secretaries, librarians and also some 
professors in higher education.  The tool helps me to examine aspects of my work 
at a micro institutional level.  For example, it encourages me to attend to and try 
to influence the informal institutional elements as well as the formal institutional 
grammar I negotiate into local collective bargaining agreements. 
The tool also helps me to remember the concentric institutional 
arrangements within which my work is done.  The diagnostic tool has helped me 
to interpret and account for the varieties of ways that state and national anti-union 
legislative initiatives play out in my school districts and libraries.  I recognize 
aspects of phenomena that I found in the cases in my current labour work.  For 
example, the institutional settlements around new anti-union laws in my own state 
of Massachusetts have a poor, contradictory institutional grammar that rivals any 
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of the contradictory laws I found in El Salvador or Honduras.  Also, in 
communities where I represent workers, I find myself actively searching for local 
contexts in which the union can become an integral and useful part of the 
community.  In one of the towns for which I am responsible, the union played a 
critical role in a local initiative to increase taxes for example.  Our success in the 
campaign altered attitudes and relationships between our union’s leadership and 
the school’s management. 
The gap between widely accepted legal obligations and their persistent 
violation presents a compelling challenge.  Many methodologies such as 
Cingranelli-Richards and the ILO’s decent work indicators are effective in 
exposing the existence of the gap.  The diagnostic tool developed in this project is 
intended as a step forward in understanding the multiple and complex factors that 
contribute to the gap in an effort to guide multiple mutually reinforcing 
interventions necessary to realize labour rights. 
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Appendix 1 
Chapter 5 Forced Labour 
 
Appendix 1.1 
Obligatory Overtime by Job or Industry 
 
CR from evidence 
Domestic Work 
Ag exports 
Maquilas 
Companies in General 
Bus drivers 
Taxi Drivers 
 
Nicaragua 
Employers in general 
Companies 
People 
FTZ (textiles) 
 
Dominican Republic 
Maquilas (textiles) 
Common practice (textiles?) 
Sugar (ag) 
 
El Salvador 
Textiles 
Financial Sector 
Banking 
Private Security Guards 
Public Transport Drivers (govt) 
Commercial (retail?) 
 
Guatemala 
Men 
Women 
Justices of the Peace (public sector) 
Employers in general 
Textiles 
Public Water Workers 
National Civil Police 
Category 029 public sector sub contracted employees 
Production targets and piece rates in factories 
Bananas 
Ranches 
In agriculture as condition of bargaining with trade union 
Administrators (supervisors?) in Agriculture 
 
Honduras 
Textiles 
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Employers in General 
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Appendix 1.2 
 
Jobs used to entice people into trafficking 
 
 
Costa Rica 
Unspecified 
 
Dominican Republic 
Unspecified 
 
El Salvador 
Beauty Salons 
Gyms 
Factories 
Domestic servants, maids  
Models 
 
Guatemala 
Beauty Salons 
Cafeterias 
Domestic servants, maids 
 
Honduras 
Waitresses 
 
Nicaragua 
Domestic servants, maids 
Nannies 
Waitresses 
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Appendix 1.3 
Related social Conventions to free employers from work time limits and 
obligations to pay for overtime hours worked 
 
(1) Corruption: When workers lodge complaints, corruption among labour 
inspectors, labour courts and employers interfere with enforcement (El Salvador).  
Government officials also simply ignore violations (El Salvador).  
 
(2) Bogus Bonus: Employers set extremely high production quotas requiring 
overtime and do not pay bonuses unless the quota is met (Honduras). 
 
(3) Wage theft:  Employers improperly pay or fail to pay workers at all for their 
overtime hours until workers file formal complaints (Costa Rica).   
 
(4) Wage theft with threat of Dismissal for Complaint: In other cases, when 
workers complain of unpaid or improperly paid wages, employers threaten to fire 
or withhold accumulated pay and benefits (Guatemala).  Even when formal 
complaints are filed, employers may refuse to provide information on pay and 
work-time to courts (Guatemala).   
 
(5) Time off: Employers offer time off rather than overtime pay for obligatory 
overtime hours (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras).   
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Appendix 1.4 National Work Time Limits 
 Work time limits in DR-CAFTA countries are established in national laws 
through a combination of mechanisms such as defining normal work time, the 
work time before overtime pay must be paid, limits on overtime hours/days or 
alternatively based on rules governing minimum daily and/or weekly rest that 
workers are entitled to (Lee, McCann and Messenger 2007 p. 18).  There are 
myriad rules and exceptions governing the establishment of national work time 
limits (Chart below).  As indicated in institutional arrangements underpinning 
obligatory overtime, El Salvador has no work time limit and if all of the allowable 
exceptions are applied, arguably, Guatemala and Honduras also lack national 
work time limits for at least some categories of workers. 
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National Work Time Limits in DR-CAFTA Countries 
 
 
 
 
CR 
 
DR 
 
ES 
 
G 
 
H 
 
N 
Normal 
Work Day 
& Week 
8/48 8/44 8/44 8/48 8/44 8/48 
Exceptions 
to Normal 
Work Day 
& Week 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Weekly 
Rest 
1 day for 
every 6 
days 
worked 
36 hours 
per week 
1 day 1 day 
every 5 or 
6 days 
worked 
1 day for 
every 6 
days 
worked 
1 day for 
every 6 
days 
worked 
Exceptions 
to Weekly 
Rest 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Limit on 
Overtime 
12 hours 
in a day 
including 
regular 
and 
overtime 
80 hours 
in a 
trimester 
None 12 hours 
in a day 
including 
regular 
and 
overtime 
12 hours in 
a day 
including 
regular and 
overtime 
for six days 
per week 
3 hours in a 
day and 9 
hours in a 
week 
Exceptions 
to Overtime 
limit 
Yes No NA No Yes No 
Overall 
Work Time 
Limit 
48 hours 
weekly, 
44 hours 
weekly + 
80 hours 
overtime 
in a 
trimester 
None 48-84 
hours per 
week 
depending 
on 
exceptions 
72 hours 
per week12 
hours per 
day, 6 days 
weekly 
57 hours 
weekly 
Bottom 
Line Limit 
48 hours 44 hours 
per week 
+ 80 
hours in 
trimester 
None 48-84 
hours 
depending 
on 
exceptions 
72 hours or 
no limit  
with 
exceptions 
57 hours  
(ILO Working Time Database) 
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Appendix 1.5 
 
Ratification by DR-CAFTA Countries of Selected ILO Work Time 
Conventions 
 
 
Convention 
 
Costa 
Rica 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
El 
Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Nicaragua 
No. 1 Hours of 
Work 
Industry 
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. 30 Hours 
of Work 
Commerce  
No No No Yes No Yes 
No. 14 Weekly 
Rest 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
ILOLEX 
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Appendix 2 
Chapter 6 Freedom of Association Appendix 
 
Appendix 2.1 
 
Categories of Rights Related to Freedom of Association and Right to 
Collective Bargaining (ILO 2006) 
 
Category 1: Trade Union Rights and Civil Liberties 
 
General principles 
Right to life security and the physical and moral integrity of the person 
Arrest and detention of trade unionist 
Preventative Detention 
Detention during a state of emergency 
System of education through labour 
Internment in psychiatric hospitals 
Freedom of movement 
Rights of assembly and demonstration 
Freedom of opinion and expression 
Freedom of speech at the International Labour Conference 
Protection against disclosure of information on trade union membership activities 
Protection of trade union premises and property 
Guarantee of due process of law 
Special bodies and summary procedures 
Bringing Charges and sentencing of trade unionists to imprisonment 
State of emergency and the exercise of trade union rights 
Questions of a political nature affecting trade union rights 
 
Category 2: Right of workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, 
to establish and to join organization 
 
General principles 
Distinctions based on race, political opinion or nationality 
Distinctions based on occupational categories (A-T) 
Other distinctions  
 
Category 3: Right of workers and employers to establish organizations 
without previous authorization 
 
Requirement of previous authorization 
Legal formalities for the establishment of organizations  
Requirements for the establishment of organizations (minimum number of 
members etc.) 
Registration of organizations 
 
Category 4: Right of workers and employers to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing 
 
General principles 
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Trade union unity and pluralism 
Freedom of choice of trade union structure 
Sanctions imposed for attempting to establish organizations 
Favouritism or discrimination in respect of particular organizations 
Admissible privileges for most representative unions 
Right to join organizations freely 
Union security clauses  
 
Category 5: Right of organizations to draw up their own constitutions and 
rules 
 
Legislation on the subject and interference by the authorities 
Model constitutions 
Racial discrimination 
Relations between first-level trade unions and higher-level organizations 
 
Category 6: Right of organizations to elect their representatives in full 
freedom 
 
General principles 
Electoral procedures 
Eligibility conditions (A-H) 
Obligation to participate in ballots 
Intervention by the authorities in trade union elections 
Challenges to trade union elections 
Removal of executive committees and the placing of trade unions under control 
 
Category 7: Right of organizations to organize their administration 
 
General principles 
Internal administration of organizations 
Control over the internal activities of organizations 
Financial administration of organizations (A-C) 
 
Category 8:  Right of organizations to freely organize their activities and to 
formulate their programs 
 
General principles 
Political activities and relations 
Other activities of trade unions organizations (protest activities, sit-ins, public 
demonstrations etc) 
 
Category 9:  Right to strike 
 
Importance of the right to strike and its legitimate exercise 
Objective of the strike (strikes on economic and social issues, political strikes, 
solidarity strikes, etc.) 
Types of strike action 
Prerequisites 
Recourse to compulsory arbitration 
 291 
Cases in which strikes may be restricted or even prohibited with compensatory 
guarantees (A-D) 
Situations in which a minimum service may be imposed to guarantee the safety of 
persons and equipment (minimum safety service) 
Situation and conditions under which a minimum operational service could be 
required 
Examples of when the Committee has considered that the conditions were met for 
requiring a minimum operational service 
Non-compliance with a minimum service 
Responsibility for declaring a strike illegal 
Back-to-work orders, the hiring of workers during a strike, requisitioning orders 
Interference by the authorities during the course of the strike 
Pickets 
Wage deductions 
Sanctions (A-D) 
Discrimination in favour of non-strikers 
Closure of enterprises in the event of a strike 
 
Category 10:  Dissolution and suspensions of organizations 
 
General principles 
Voluntary dissolution 
Dissolution on account of insufficient membership 
Dissolution and suspension by administrative authority 
Cancellation of registration or trade union status 
Dissolution by legislative measures 
Reasons for dissolution 
Intervention by the judicial authorities 
Use made of the assets of organizations that are dissolved (A-B) 
 
Category 11:  Right of employers’ and workers’ organizations to establish 
federations and confederations and to affiliate with international 
organizations of employers and workers 
 
Establishment of federations and confederations 
Affiliation with federations and confederations 
Rights of federations and confederations 
Affiliation with international organizations of workers and employers (A-C) 
Participation in ILO meetings 
 
Category 12:  Protection against anti-union discrimination 
 
General principles 
Workers protected 
Forms of discrimination (A-D) 
Trade union leaders and representatives (A-C) 
Need for rapid and effective protection 
Reinstatement of trade unionists in their jobs 
Discrimination against employers 
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Category 13: Protection against acts of interference 
 
General principles 
Solidarist or other associations (A-B) 
 
Category 14: Collective Bargaining 
 
The right to bargain collectively – General principles 
Workers covered by collective bargaining 
Subjects covered by collective bargaining 
The principle of free and voluntary negotiation 
Mechanisms to facilitate collective bargaining 
The principle of bargaining in good faith 
Collective bargaining with representatives of non-unionized workers 
Recognition of the most representative organizations 
Determination of the trade union(s) entitled to negotiate 
Rights of minority unions 
Determination of employers’ organization entitled to negotiate 
Representation of organizations in the collective bargaining process 
Level of bargaining 
Restrictions on the principle of free and voluntary bargaining (A-B (a-i)) 
Time limits for bargaining 
Duration of collective agreements 
Extension of collective agreements 
Relationship between individual employment contracts and collective agreements 
Incentives to workers to give up the right to collective bargaining 
Relationship between ILO Conventions 
 
Category 15: Consultation with organizations of workers and employers 
 
General principles 
Consultation during the preparation and application of legislation 
Consultation and employment flexibility 
Consultation processes of restructuring, rationalization and staff reduction 
Consultation concerning the bargaining process 
Consultations on the redistribution of the assets of trade unions which have been 
dissolved 
 
Category 16: Participation of organizations of workers and employers in 
various bodies and procedures 
 
Category 17: Facilities for workers’ representatives 
 
General principles 
Collection of dues 
Access to management 
Access to the workplace 
Free time accorded to workers’ representatives 
Facilities on plantations 
 
Category 18: Conflicts within the trade union movement 
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Appendix 2.2 Comparison of the rights and protections along with 
procedures and exclusions provided in Conventions 87 and 98 
 
Convention 87 Convention 98 
Substantive Protections and Rights 
 
• The right without distinction 
whatsoever to establish and, subject 
only to the rules of the organisation 
concerned, to join organisations of their 
own choosing without previous 
authorization (Article 2; Also applies to 
federations and confederations in 
Article 6) 
 
• The right to draw up their 
constitutions and rules, to elect their 
representatives in full freedom, to 
organise their administration and 
activities and to formulate their 
programmes. 
(Article 3 (1)). 
 
• have the right to establish and join 
federations and confederations and any 
such organisation, federation or 
confederation shall have the right to 
affiliate with international organisations 
of workers and employers (Article 5) 
 
• public authorities shall refrain from 
any interference which would restrict 
this right or impede the lawful exercise 
thereof. (Article 3(2); Also applies to 
federations and confederations (Article 
6). 
 
• Organisations shall not be liable to be 
dissolved or suspended by 
administrative authority. (Article 4; 
Also applies to federations and 
confederations Article 6) 
 
• The acquisition of legal personality by 
workers' and employers' organisations, 
federations and confederations shall not 
be made subject to conditions of such a 
character as to restrict the application of 
the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 
Substantive Protections and Rights 
 
• Workers shall enjoy adequate 
protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination in respect of their 
employment (Article 1). 
 
• Such protection shall apply more 
particularly in respect of acts calculated 
to--(a) make the employment of a 
worker subject to the condition that he 
shall not join a union or shall relinquish 
trade union membership; 
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise 
prejudice a worker by reason of union 
membership or because of participation 
in union activities outside working 
hours or, with the consent of the 
employer, within working hours 
(Article 1(2 a, b). 
 
• Workers' and employers' 
organisations shall enjoy adequate 
protection against any acts of 
interference by each other or each 
other's agents or members in their 
establishment, functioning or 
administration (Article 2(1). 
 
• In particular, acts which are designed 
to promote the establishment of 
workers' organisations under the 
domination of employers or employers' 
organisations, or to support workers' 
organisations by financial or other 
means, with the object of placing such 
organisations under the control of 
employers or employers' organisations, 
shall be deemed to constitute acts of 
interference within the meaning of this 
Article (Article 2(2). 
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hereof (Article 7) 
 
 
In exercising the rights provided for in 
this Convention workers and employers 
and their respective organisations, like 
other persons or organised 
collectivities, shall respect the law of 
the land (Article 8(1).  
 
The law of the land shall not be such as 
to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to 
impair, the guarantees provided for in 
this Convention (Article 8(2). 
 
Procedures for implementing 
substantive Rights and protections 
 
• Each Member of the International 
Labour Organisation for which this 
Convention is in force undertakes to 
give effect to the following provisions. 
 
• Each Member of the International 
Labour Organisation for which this 
Convention is in force undertakes to 
take all necessary and appropriate 
measures to ensure that workers and 
employers may exercise freely the right 
to organise (Article 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exclusions from protections/rights 
 
• The extent to which the guarantees 
provided for in this Convention shall 
apply to the armed forces and the police 
shall be determined by national laws or 
regulations (Article 9(1). 
 
• In accordance with the principle set 
forth in paragraph 8 of Article 19 of the 
Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation the ratification of this 
Convention by any Member shall not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures for implementing 
substantive Rights and protections 
 
• Machinery appropriate to national 
conditions shall be established, where 
necessary, for the purpose of ensuring 
respect for the right to organise as 
defined in the preceding Articles 
(Article 3). 
 
• Measures appropriate to national 
conditions shall be taken, where 
necessary, to encourage and promote 
the full development and utilisation of 
machinery for voluntary negotiation 
between employers or employers' 
organisations and workers' 
organisations, with a view to the 
regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective 
agreements (Article 4). 
 
Exclusions from protections/rights 
 
• The extent to which the guarantees 
provided for in this Convention shall 
apply to the armed forces and the police 
shall be determined by national laws or 
regulations (Article 5(1)). 
 
• In accordance with the principle set 
forth in paragraph 8 of Article 19 of the 
Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation the ratification of this 
Convention by any Member shall not 
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be deemed to affect any existing law, 
award, custom or agreement in virtue of 
which members of the armed forces or 
the police enjoy any right guaranteed 
by this Convention (Article 9(2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definitions: 
 
In this Convention the term 
organisation means any organisation of 
workers or of employers for furthering 
and defending the interests of workers 
or of employers (Article 10). 
 
be deemed to affect any existing law, 
award, custom or agreement in virtue of 
which members of the armed forces or 
the police enjoy any right guaranteed 
by this Convention (Article 5(2)). 
 
• This Convention does not deal with 
the position of public servants engaged 
in the administration of the State, nor 
shall it be construed as prejudicing their 
rights or status in any way (Article 6) 
 
 
 
 
